Serial pattern learning by event observation.

Serial pattern learning was investigated in a variation of the task introduced by Nissen and Bullemer (1987). We presented an asterisk at 1 of 4 spatial locations on each trial, and Ss either responded with a keypress or observed the event. The first 4 blocks contained 10 repetitions of a 10- or 16-element pattern, and the 5th block contained a random sequence. The difference in response time on the 5th random block and the previous patterned block served as an indirect measure of pattern learning. A direct measure was obtained in a final test block in which Ss predicted the next asterisk position. Equivalent learning occurred for responding and observing with indirect measures, but observation was superior with direct measures. These findings indicate that knowledge of serial order can develop through simple perceptual experience, and this is more available to deliberate recall than is knowledge acquired while responding.     

Cognitive Neuropsychology and Developmental Disorders: Uncomfortable Bedfellows

Cognitive neuropsychology provides a theoretical framework and methods that can be of value in the study of developmental disorders, but the "dissociation" logic at the centre of this approach is not well suited to the developmental context. This is illustrated with examples from specific language impairment. Within the developing language system there is ample evidence for interaction between levels of representation, with modularity emerging in the course of development. This means that one typically is seeking to explain a complex pattern of associated impairments, rather than highly selective deficits. For instance, a selective impairment in auditory processing can have repercussions through the language system and may lead to distinctive syntactic deficits that are seen in written as well as spoken language. Changes in the nature of representations and in the relationships between components of a developing system mean that cross-sectional data at a single point in development may be misleading indicators of the primary deficit. Furthermore, traditional cognitive neuropsychology places a disproportionate emphasis on representational (competence) deficits, with processing (performance) deficits being relatively neglected. Methods for distinguishing these two kinds of impairment are discussed, as well as other approaches for elucidating the underlying nature of developmental disorders.     

Randomized controlled trial of an intervention to prevent adherence failure among HIV-infected patients initiating antiretroviral therapy.

OBJECTIVE: Compare the efficacy of a multicomponent social support intervention to standard-of-care counseling on medication adherence among HIV-infected patients initiating antiretroviral therapy. DESIGN: Randomized controlled trial. Generalized estimating equations tested for differences in the percentage of participants achieving 90% adherence. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Pill-taking, electronically monitored over 6 consecutive months; plasma viral load (VL), assessed at 3 and 6 months following initiation of therapy. RESULTS: Of 226 participants who were randomized and began the trial, 87 (38%) were lost to the study by 6 months. The proportion of adherent participants declined steadily over time, with no time by group interaction. Sustained adherence was associated with increased odds of achieving an undetectable VL (OR=1.78; 95% CI=1.01, 3.13). In intention-to-treat analyses, a larger proportion of the intervention group than the control group was adherent (40.15% vs. 27.59%, p=.02) and achieved an undetectable VL p=.04). However, the majority of participants who remained on study experienced some reduction in VL (>or=1-log drop or undetectable), regardless of experimental condition. CONCLUSION: The multicomponent social support intervention significantly improved medication adherence over standard-of-care counseling; evidence for improved virologic outcomes was inconsistent. Early discontinuation of care and treatment may be a greater threat to the health of HIV patients than imperfect medication-taking.     

Perceptual learning in maze discriminations

In Experiment 1, rats were trained on a discrimination between rubber- and sandpaper-covered arms of a maze after one group had been pre-exposed to these intra-maze cues. Pre-exposure facilitated subsequent discrimination learning, unless the discrimination was made easier by adding further discriminative stimuli, when it now significantly retarded learning. In Experiment 2, rats were trained on an extra-maze spatial discrimination, again after one group, but not another, had been pre-exposed to the extra-maze landmarks. Here too, pre-exposure facilitated subsequent discrimination learning, unless the discrimination was made substantially easier by arranging that the two arms between which rats had to choose were always separated by 135°. The results of both experiments can be explained by supposing that perceptual learning depends on the presence of features common to S+ and S-.     

Normative Practical Reasoning: Christian Pillar

In the first part I discuss the thesis, advanced by John Broome, that intentions are normatively required by all-things-considered judgments about what one ought to do. I endorse this thesis, but remain sceptical about Broome's programme of grounding the correctness of reasoning in formal relations between contents of mental states. After discussing objections to the thesis, I concentrate in the second part on the relation between rational action and rational intention. I distinguish between content-related and attitude-related reasons for propositional attitudes like believing, wanting, and intending something. The former appeal to features of the content of the propositional attitude they are reasons for, the latter would be reasons for a propositional attitude because of features of the propositional attitude as a whole, for example the feature of its being beneficial to believe or to want that p . I try to show that the common philosophical reaction to attitude-related reasons, namely to claim that they are merely content-related reasons in disguise, is mistaken. In its most extreme form such a reaction would fail to respect the first-person character of reasoning which manifests itself in, among other things, the fact that a Moore-sentence and its analogue for intentions cannot be a conclusion of reasoning. In the third part I argue that there are attitude-related reasons for intentions, and, in showing how they influence practical deliberation, I find that their existence can be rendered compatible with the thesis that it is rational to intend to do what one thinks one ought to do.