Contextual conditioning and reinstatement of extinguished instrumental responding

In three experiments we studied the relationship between contextual conditioning and the reinstatement of extinguished lever pressing that occurs when noncontingent food is introduced following extinction. In all three experiments the non-contingent food was presented off-baseline (with the response levers not present). On subsequent tests, with the response levers present, animals that had been exposed to food showed more reinstatement of lever pressing than control animals. This finding rules out alternative mechanisms for the reinstated responding that rely on the interaction of non-contingent food and responding, such as superstitious reinforcement or the discriminative after-effects of food. In addition, in each experiment we demonstrated that manipulations known to affect contextual conditioning (signalling the food in Experiment 1, context extinction in Experiment 2, and switching contexts in Experiment 3) reduced the reinstatement. These results are consistent with the claim that contextual conditioning is important in controlling instrumental conditioning and closely parallel findings concerning the reinstatement of Pavlovian responsing following extinction.     

Risk taking from the participant's perspective: the case of driving and accident risk.

Although perceived health risk plays a prominent role in theories of health behavior, its empirical role in risk taking is less clear. In Study 1 (N = 129), 2 measures of drivers' risk-taking behavior were found to be unrelated to self-estimates of accident concern but to be related to self-ratings of driving skill and the perceived thrill of driving. In Study 2 (N = 405), out of a wide range of potential influences, accident concern had the weakest relationship with risk taking. The authors concluded that although health risk is a key feature in many theories of health behavior and a central focus for researchers and policy makers, it may not be such a prominent factor for those actually taking the risk.     

Terror Management and Personality: Variations in the Psychological Defense Against the Awareness of Mortality

Drawing on terror management theory (TMT), we discuss the psychological motivations that shape personality at two levels: the characteristically human personality common to us all and the individual differences that distinguish some people from others. TMT posits that the motivation to protect the self against deep-rooted fears about mortality drives people to maintain meaningful, reliable conceptions of reality and positive evaluations of themselves, two broad tendencies that form the foundation of every person’s personality. We review studies showing that mortality reminders increase efforts to bolster cultural sources of meaning and self-esteem in similar ways across individuals and cultures. TMT also posits that individual differences in personality partly reflect the different sources of meaning and self-esteem that people invest in to assuage mortality fears. We review evidence that individual differences predict the degree and direction of people’s defensive responses to mortality reminders. Directions for future research are discussed.     

Managing Elder Suicide: A Profile of American and Canadian Crisis Prevention Centers

Suicides among older adults in the United States and Canada in the last decade have accounted for an increasing share of all suicides. In both countries the use of firearms among older adults has steadily increased. Despite these trends, little is known about the extent to which crisis centers are prepared to prevent elder suicide. A survey of AAS-listed crisis prevention centers examined the training, knowledge, and current practices relevant to elder suicide among personnel in 321 crisis prevention centers in both countries. Results revealed insufficient training, a lack of familiarity with recent suicide trends, and limited outreach to older adults.     

Normative Practical Reasoning: Christian Pillar

In the first part I discuss the thesis, advanced by John Broome, that intentions are normatively required by all-things-considered judgments about what one ought to do. I endorse this thesis, but remain sceptical about Broome's programme of grounding the correctness of reasoning in formal relations between contents of mental states. After discussing objections to the thesis, I concentrate in the second part on the relation between rational action and rational intention. I distinguish between content-related and attitude-related reasons for propositional attitudes like believing, wanting, and intending something. The former appeal to features of the content of the propositional attitude they are reasons for, the latter would be reasons for a propositional attitude because of features of the propositional attitude as a whole, for example the feature of its being beneficial to believe or to want that p . I try to show that the common philosophical reaction to attitude-related reasons, namely to claim that they are merely content-related reasons in disguise, is mistaken. In its most extreme form such a reaction would fail to respect the first-person character of reasoning which manifests itself in, among other things, the fact that a Moore-sentence and its analogue for intentions cannot be a conclusion of reasoning. In the third part I argue that there are attitude-related reasons for intentions, and, in showing how they influence practical deliberation, I find that their existence can be rendered compatible with the thesis that it is rational to intend to do what one thinks one ought to do.