Appearance‐Related Communication Mediates the Link Between Self‐Objectification and Health and Well‐Being Outcomes

Grounded in objectification theory, the 2 studies presented here predicted that self‐objectification is positively related to appearance‐related communication (i.e., fat talk and old talk), and, in turn, appearance‐related communication is associated with health and well‐being outcomes. Results from Study 1, which investigated only fat talk, revealed that fat talk significantly mediated the relationship between self‐objectification and body dissatisfaction, drive for thinness, bulimia, and self‐esteem. Study 2 sought to replicate the findings from Study 1, as well as extend appearance‐related communication to old talk. Fat talk was found to mediate the relationships between self‐objectification and body dissatisfaction, drive for thinness, bulimia, depression, and diet. Old talk significantly mediated the relationships between body dissatisfaction, drive for thinness, and bulimia.     

Personal computer software for teaching differential psychodiagnostics

The third edition of theDiagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), outlines for the student what symptoms to consider when attempting to arrive at an accurate differential diagnosis of eight broad psychiatric categories. This paper describes a program developed to instruct a medical or graduate student in the science of such decision making.     

R⌝-algebras and R⌝-model structures as power constructs

In relevance logic it has become commonplace to associate with each logic both an algebraic counterpart and a relational counterpart. The former comes from the Lindenbaum construction; the latter, called a model structure, is designed for semantical purposes. Knowing that they are related through the logic, we may enquire after the algebraic relationship between the algebra and the model structure. This paper offers a complete solution for the relevance logic R. Namely, R-algebras and R-model structures can be obtained from each other, and represented in terms of each other, by application of power constructions.This paper was presented at the 1986 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Logic in Auckland, 9–12 July, 1986.     

Anything is possible

This paper criticises necessitarianism, the thesis that there is at least one necessary truth; and defends possibilism, the thesis that all propositions are contingent, or that anything is possible. The second section maintains that no good conventionalist account of necessity is available, while the third section criticises model theoretic necessitarianism. The fourth section sketches some recent technical work on nonclassical logic, with the aim of weakening necessitarian intuitions and strengthening possibilist intuitions. The fifth section considers several a prioristic attempts at demonstrating that there is at least one necessary proposition and finds them inadequate. The final section emphasises the epistemic aspect of possibilism.     

HIV counselling in the national blood transfusion service

The problems caused for the NBTS by the advent of HIV are reviewed, with particular reference to the impact on blood donor numbers, the strategies adopted to minimise the risk of HIV infection through blood transfusion, and the counselling dilemmas faced by the Service in the setting of the blood donor clinic. The notification procedure for blood donors found anti-HIV positive is described, with the importance of confirmation of such results before approach to the donor emphasised. Counselling issues arising from indeterminate and false positive lest results are explored and those arising from enquiries generated by cases of possible post-transfusion HIV infection are examined.     

Attitudes to new technology in relation to social beliefs and group memberships: A preliminary investigation

Though the term “new technology” is widely used and discussed, there has been very little systematic study of attitudes to technology and their relation to other beliefs and group memberships. This article describes an initial investigation into the nature of attitudes towards new technology (n=534 undergraduates) and demonstrates that, as yet, these attitudes are only weakly structured and are not fully integrated with other social beliefs. General evaluations of the benefits of technological advance appear to be almost unrelated to beliefs about the inevitability of these advances or the desire to acquire training to deal with them. Contrary to popular expectations, evaluations of video games are unrelated to other beliefs about technology while other social beliefs are, as yet, only weakly integrated with these attitudes. This study also identifies gender differences in the assessment of potential benefits and highlights other differences attributable to academic group memberships. These finding are discussed with reference to the literature on sex-role stereotyping and group socialization processes.     

Parity,moral options,and the weights of reasons

The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We'll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two ways. We must complicate the picture somehow. I consider two candidate complications. The first, Parity Monism, is inspired by Ruth Chang's suggestion that parity is a fourth comparative beyond the traditional three (>, <, =). This view complicates the single weight relation by allowing that the weights of reasons can be on a par. Unfortunately, Parity Monism resolves only one of the two paradoxes that afflict simple versions of Weight Monism. To resolve both paradoxes, we need our second candidate complication, Weight Pluralism. This view holds that reasons have at least two weight values (e.g., justifying weight and requiring weight) and these two values aren't always equivalent. Parity is no substitute for Pluralism.