Inhibition of the LH Surge by Restraint Stress in Cyclic Rats: Studies on the Role of GABAA and GABAB Receptors

There is evidence that stress can alter the activity in the brain of gamma-aminobutyricacid (GABA), a neurotransmitter that has been implicated in the regulation of LH secretion. In the present study the role of GABA in the restraint stress-induced inhibition of the LH surge was investigated in the intact cyclic rat. Intracerebroventricular (icv) administration of the GABAA receptor agonist muscimol (0.1, 0.5 or 1 μg) 5 min before the presumed onset of the pro-oestrous LH surge (at 0900 h) caused a dose dependent suppression of the surge. A single dose of the GABAB receptor agonist baclofen (1 μg; icv) injected at 0855 h postponed the onset of the LH surge, and repeated injections at 0855 and 1130 h suppressed the surge. These data indicate that GABA-ergic activity in the brain can inhibit the LH surge in the cyclic rat via GABAA and GABAB receptors. Pro-oestrous rats were subjected to 5 hrs of restraint starting at 0855 h. Pretreatment with the GABAA receptor antagonist bicuculine (1 μg; icv) at 0840, 0940 and 1040 h or pretreatment with the GABAB receptor antagonist phaclofen (10 μg; icv) at 0840 h were ineffective in preventing the restraint-induced inhibition of the LH surge. The results suggest that GABAA and GABAB receptors are not involved in the inhibitory effect of restraint stress on the LH surge.     

Effects of Acute Stress or Centrally Injected Interleukin-1beta on Neuropeptide Expression in the Immune System

Acute stress stimulates the expression and release of corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) and arginine vasopressin (AVP) from the hypothalamus, and the pro-opiomelanocortin products beta-endorphin and ACTH from the anterior pituitary. These neuropeptides are also expressed in immune tissues, and it has been proposed that they may modulate immune responses to stress through paracrine mechanisms. We subjected rats to restraint stress or central injection of interleukin (IL)-1beta to determine whether these acute stimuli can alter the expression of neuropeptides in the spleen and thymus. Restraint stress significantly increased the contents of all these neuropeptides in thymic, but not splenic, extracts. A single icv injection of IL-1beta increased contents of CRH, AVP, ACTH and beta-endorphin in the spleens of both sham-operated and adrenalectomised (ADX) rats. IL-1beta increased thymic contents of CRH and ACTH in sham-operated rats but these increases were not observed in ADX rats. These results suggest that the effects of IL-1beta on neuropeptide expression in the spleen are independent of glucocorticoids, whereas IL-1beta stimulation of neuropeptide expression in the thymus is dependent on circulating glucocorticoids. There were significant correlations between increases in CRH, ACTH and beta-endorphin in the spleen, and between CRH and ACTH in the thymus, consistent with the suggestion that IL-1beta-induced increases in ACTH and beta-endorphin may be mediated through CRH. These results provide evidence that stressors can directly influence neuropeptide expression in immune tissues. Thus stress may influence immune functions through paracrine mechanisms involving locally synthesised neuropeptides as well as through activation of the hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal axis.     

大学二年级学生人际宽恕与报复心理及其与抑郁的关系研究

采用沉思量表、报复动机量表、宽恕倾向量表、宽恕态度量表和流调中心用抑郁量表对236名大二学生进行问卷调查,综合探讨大学生人际宽恕和报复心理及其与抑郁的关系。研究发现:(1)男大学生的报复倾向显著高于女大学生。(2)宽恕倾向与报复倾向及对侵犯的沉思程度显著负相关。沉思程度和抑郁显著正相关。(3)沉思程度和宽恕倾向对抑郁分别具有显著的正向和负向的预测作用。(4)大学生的宽恕倾向和宽恕态度的相互作用以及宽恕倾向和报复倾向之间的交互作用对抑郁均没有显著预测作用。     

Linking the demands–control–support model to innovation: The moderating role of personal initiative on the generation and implementation of ideas

The demands–control–support model indicates that workers can use job control and social support for problem solving. We examined whether personal initiative moderated relationships between, on the one hand, job control used for problem solving and social support used for problem solving and, on the other hand, ideas generation and implementation. We operationalized job control used for problem solving as ‘changing aspects of work activities to solve problems’. We operationalized social support used for problem solving as ‘discussing problems to solve problems’. Using an experience sampling methodology, participants provided data for up to four times a day for up to five working days (N= 89). The extent to which people ‘changed aspects of their work activities to solve problems’ was associated with higher levels of ideas generation for people with high personal initiative. The extent to which people ‘discussed problems to solve problems’ was associated with higher levels of ideas implementation for people with high personal initiative.     

Paranoid delusions and threatening hallucinations: a prospective study of sleep paralysis experiences

Previously we reported a three-factor structure for hallucinations accompanying sleep paralysis (SP). These earlier analyses were, however, based on retrospective accounts. In a prospective study, 383 individuals reported individual episodes online providing further evidence for the three-factor structure as well as clearer conceptually meaningful relations among factors than retrospective studies. In addition, reports of individual episodes permitted a more fine-grained analysis of the internal structure of factors to assess predictions based on the hypothesis that a sensed or felt presence (FP) is a core experience affecting other SP hallucinations. Results were generally consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, associations among, and temporal stability of, sensory hallucinations were largely explained by their common association with FP. The findings are consistent with REM initiation of a threat activated vigilance system with pervasive effects on the SP experience and suggest a potential model for the thematic organization of nightmares and dreams more generally.     

The nature and varieties of felt presence experiences: A reply to Nielsen

Nielsen [Nielsen, T. (2007). Felt presence: Paranoid delusion or hallucinatory social imagery? Consciousness and Cognition, 16(4), 975–983.] raises a number of issues and presents several provocative arguments worthy of discussion regarding the experience of the felt presence (FP) during sleep paralysis (SP). We consider these issues beginning with the nature of FP and its relation to affective-motivational systems and provide an alternative to Nielsen’s reduction of FP to a purely spatial hallucination. We then consider implications of the “normal social imagery” model. We can find only one specific empirical hypothesis articulated within this framework and it turns out to be one that we explicitly addressed in our original paper. We also review our position regarding the possible relation of FP during SP to a number of related anomalous experiences and contrast FP to anomalous vestibular-motor (V-M) phenomena. We review our position that the neuromatrix concept, in the light of available evidence, is more appropriately applied to V-M experiences than FP. Finally, we pursue speculations, raised in Nielsen’s commentary, on the wider implications of FP.     

Found and missed: failing to recognize a search target despite moving it

We present results from five search experiments using a novel 'unpacking' paradigm in which participants use a mouse to sort through random heaps of distractors to locate the target. We report that during this task participants often fail to recognize the target despite moving it, and despite having looked at the item. Additionally, the missed target item appears to have been processed as evidenced by post-error slowing of individual moves within a trial. The rate of this 'unpacking error' was minimally affected by set size and dual task manipulations, but was strongly influenced by perceptual difficulty and perceptual load. We suggest that the error occurs because of a dissociation between perception for action and perception for identification, providing further evidence that these processes may operate relatively independently even in naturalistic contexts, and even in settings like search where they should be expected to act in close coordination.     

Challenge and error: critical events and attention-related errors

Attention lapses resulting from reactivity to task challenges and their consequences constitute a pervasive factor affecting everyday performance errors and accidents. A bidirectional model of attention lapses (error ↔ attention-lapse: Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009) argues that errors beget errors by generating attention lapses; resource-depleting cognitions interfering with attention to subsequent task challenges. Attention lapses lead to errors, and errors themselves are a potent consequence often leading to further attention lapses potentially initiating a spiral into more serious errors. We investigated this challenge-induced error ↔ attention-lapse model using the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), a GO–NOGO task requiring continuous attention and response to a number series and withholding of responses to a rare NOGO digit. We found response speed and increased commission errors following task challenges to be a function of temporal distance from, and prior performance on, previous NOGO trials. We conclude by comparing and contrasting the present theory and findings to those based on choice paradigms and argue that the present findings have implications for the generality of conflict monitoring and control models.     

A PARADOX OF JUSTIFIED BELIEVING

The following principles may plausibly be included in a wide range of theories of epistemic justification:

• (1) 

  There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a falsehood,
• (2) 

  There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a principle of epistemic justification,
• (3) 

  Beliefs acquired in compliance with a justifiably-believed epistemic principle are justified.

I argue that it follows from these three individually plausible claims that an agent's belief may be both justified and unjustified. I consider how theories may avoid this paradox, and conclude that deontological theories of epistemic justification face considerable, perhaps insurmountable, difficulties.