Explaining early moral hypocrisy: Numerical cognition promotes equal sharing behavior in preschool‐aged children

Recent work has documented that despite preschool‐aged children's understanding of social norms surrounding sharing, they fail to share their resources equally in many contexts. Here we explored two hypotheses for this failure: an insufficient motivation hypothesis and an insufficient cognitive resources hypothesis. With respect to the latter, we specifically explored whether children's numerical cognition—their understanding of the cardinal principle—might underpin their abilities to share equally. In Experiment 1, preschoolers’ numerical cognition fully mediated age‐related changes in children's fair sharing. We found little support for the insufficient motivation hypothesis—children stated that they had shared fairly, and failures in sharing fairly were a reflection of their number knowledge. Numerical cognition did not relate to children's knowledge of the norms of equality (Experiment 2). Results suggest that the knowledge–behavior gap in fairness may be partly explained by the differences in cognitive skills required for conceptual and behavioral equality.     

Olfactory Reference Syndrome: A Case Report and Screening Tool

Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings - Olfactory reference syndrome (ORS) is a lesser known disorder that is related to obsessive–compulsive disorder. ORS is the obsessional and...     

Preschoolers’ Compliance With Others’ Violations of Fairness Norms: The Roles of Intentionality and Affective Perspective Taking

ABSTRACT

Young children are remarkably compliant with social norms, especially those governing fairness and equality. Yet children also frequently observe and face opportunities to violate those social norms, particularly in situations in which doing so is self-beneficial. In 3 studies, we investigated the conditions under which children adhere to social norms using a novel resource distribution paradigm in which children met an experimenter who expressed either a norm-consistent (equal distribution) or norm-inconsistent (unequal distribution) intention. In Experiment 1, we found that preschoolers generally complied with an experimenter’s intention, regardless of its norm consistency. In Experiment 2, the experimenter again expressed a norm-consistent or norm-inconsistent intention but accidentally placed resources in the opposite distribution of that intended. Preschoolers mostly defaulted to the social norm of fairness. However, they were less likely to do so (and more likely to comply with the norm-violating experimenter) when the inequality was self-benefitting. The likelihood of norm defiance in the face of self-benefit appeared to relate to children’s affective perspective taking. In Experiment 3, we found that training preschoolers in affective perspective taking increased the likelihood children would defy a norm-violating experimenter’s unfair intention. Thus, although preschoolers were generally compliant, both fairness norms and affective perspective taking served as important mechanisms to help children selectively defy adults’ instructions and intentions.     

Being excluded by one means being excluded by all: Perceiving exclusion from inclusive others during one-person social exclusion

Although research has shown that social exclusion undermines well-being, past work has focused primarily on complete and unambiguous social exclusion in which all people in a situation exclude one individual. Might the presence of an inclusive other buffer individuals against the deleterious consequences of social exclusion? The present research investigates a novel situation, one-person exclusion, in which one person includes while another excludes. Participants played a virtual ball-tossing game in which they experienced two-person exclusion, one-person exclusion, or inclusion. Inclusive others did not buffer against the consequences of exclusion; experiencing one-person exclusion (vs. inclusion) led to perceived exclusion and lessened belongingness, similar to two-person exclusion. Moreover, instead of perceiving includers as a form of support, paradoxically, participants inaccurately believed that inclusive others had engaged in exclusion. These findings suggest that one-person exclusion is sufficient to elicit negative outcomes and that inclusive bystanders may be perceived as part of the exclusion.     

Characterization of the Stanford Integrated Psychosocial Assessment for Transplant (SIPAT) in Lung Transplant Candidates

The SIPAT is a standardized measure for pre-transplant psychosocial evaluation. Previous SIPAT studies utilized a relatively small lung transplant sample and only included listed patients. This study characterized the SIPAT in 147 lung transplant candidates to better elucidate its utility. The average score corresponded to a minimally acceptable rating and nearly half of the patients had relative or absolute contraindications. Interstitial Lung Disease (ILD) patients scored more favorably than non-ILD patients (U?=?7.69, p?<?.05). The Total (β?=?? .05, SE?=?.018, p?<?.01), Social Support Subscale (β?=?? .133, SE?=?.058, p?<?.05), and Psychosocial Stability and Psychopathology Subscale (β?=?? .103, SE?=?.040, p?<?.05) significantly predicted listing status. The SIPAT has a unique profile in lung transplant candidates and demonstrated utility for guiding transplant decisions. Future research should examine which lung transplant outcomes are significantly associated with SIPAT scores.

     

The Self as a Moral Agent: Preschoolers Behave Morally but Believe in the Freedom to Do Otherwise

Recent work suggests a strong connection between intuitions regarding our own free will and our moral behavior. We investigate the origins of this link by asking whether preschool-aged children construe their own moral actions as freely chosen. We gave children the option to make three moral/social choices (avoiding harm to another, following a rule, and following peer behavior) and then asked them to retrospect as to whether they were free to have done otherwise. When given the choice to act (either morally or immorally), children avoided harm and abided by rules, but they endorsed their freedom to have done otherwise. When choice was restricted by adult instruction, children did not endorse their free choice and indicated feeling constrained by moral obligation in their explanatory responses. These results suggest that children believe that their moral actions afford free will, but this belief is dependent on their experience of choice.     

Conflicting perspectives mediate the relation between parents’ and preschoolers’ self-referent mental state talk during collaboration

We examined the relations between the referent of parents and preschoolers’ mental state talk during a collaborative puzzle-solving task (N = 146 dyads; n = 81 3-year-olds, n = 65 4-year-olds). The results showed that parents’ references to their own knowledge and beliefs (self-referent cognitive talk), and references to their child’s knowledge and beliefs (child-referent cognitive talk) were both related to children’s (primarily self-referent) cognitive talk. We then tested whether any of the observed relations could be explained by the presence of conflicting perspectives within the collaborative interaction. Mediational analyses revealed that conflicting perspectives mediated the positive relation between parents’ production of self-referent cognitive talk and child cognitive talk. By contrast, the positive relation between parents’ production of child-referent cognitive talk and child cognitive talk did not depend on the presence of this type of conflict. These findings highlight an important mechanism through which parents’ references to their own mind might promote children’s developing mental state talk in collaborative contexts.     

Being nice by choice: The effect of counterfactual reasoning on children's social evaluations

The ability to engage in counterfactual thinking (reason about what else could have happened) is critical to learning, agency, and social evaluation. However, not much is known about how individual differences in counterfactual reasoning may play a role in children's social evaluations. In the current study, we investigate how prompting children to engage in counterfactual thinking about positive moral actions impacts children's social evaluations. Eighty-seven 4-8-year-olds were introduced to a character who engaged in a positive moral action (shared a sticker with a friend) and asked about what else the character could have done with the sticker (counterfactual simulation). Children were asked to generate either a high number of counterfactuals (five alternative actions) or a low number of counterfactuals (one alternative action). Children were then asked a series of social evaluation questions contrasting that character with one who did not have a choice and had no alternatives (was told to give away the sticker to his friend). Results show that children who generated selfish counterfactuals were more likely to positively evaluate the character with choice than children who did not generate selfish counterfactuals, suggesting that generating counterfactuals most distant from the chosen action (prosociality) leads children to view prosocial actions more positively. We also found age-related changes: as children got older, regardless of the type of counterfactuals generated, they were more likely to evaluate the character with choice more positively. These results highlight the importance of counterfactual reasoning in the development of moral evaluations.

Research Highlights

• Older children were more likely to endorse agents who choose to share over those who do not have a choice.
• Children who were prompted to generate more counterfactuals were more likely to allocate resources to characters with choice.
• Children who generated selfish counterfactuals more positively evaluated agents with choice.
• Comparable to theories suggesting children punish willful transgressors more than accidental transgressors, we propose children also consider free will when making positive moral evaluations.