遗忘症患者外显与内隐记忆分离的实验研究：自由回忆与再认任务

采用WMS－CR和MMSE筛选了9名遗忘症患者,采用自由回忆和再认两项任务观察了他们及正常对照组的外显记忆。结果发现：遗忘症患者两项外显记忆任务操作呈分离现象,自由回忆任务操作明显受损,再认任务的操作尽管较对照组低,但与对照组差异未达显著性水平。推论;①外显记忆受患者损伤的颞叶或间脑结构调节。②再认任务至少包含两种性质不同的潜在加工过程,一种为意识性重组加工,另一种为无意识自动加工,两者相互独立地贡献再认任务的操作。正常人意识性重组加工的贡献占优势,掩盖了无意识的作用。遗忘症患者意识性重组加工损伤,无意识自动加工部分代偿作用。③先前研究未对遗忘症患者进行认知功能的筛选,患者对再认障碍可能源于其他认知功能障碍,而非记忆障碍之故。     

遗忘症患者外显与内隐记忆实验研究:语义性启动效应任务

采用ＷＭＳ—ＣＲ和ＭＭＳＥ对临床脑损伤患者进行了认知功能与记忆功能两方面的筛选,获得９名遗忘症患者。然后采用偏好和自由联想两项语义性启动效应任务进行测验,发现遗忘症患者在外显记忆受损情况下,的确存在语义性启动效应,且与正常对照相近。推论语义性启动效应任务与遗忘患者损伤的颞叶或间脑结构无关。同时还讨论了启动效应任务,认为偏好任务采用言语性材料不是理想的方法。     

Memory belief is weak

Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds.     

My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive

An orthodox sceptical hypothesis claims that one’s belief that “I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” (or any other ordinary anti-sceptical belief) is insensitive. A form of sensitivity-based scepticism, can thus be constructed by combining this orthodox hypothesis with the sensitivity principle and the closure principle. Unlike traditional solutions to the sensitivity-based sceptical problem, this paper will propose a new solution—one which does not reject either closure or sensitivity. Instead, I argue that sceptics’ assumption that one’s ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs are insensitive will give rise to self-contradiction. The orthodox sceptical hypothesis is thus revealed to be incoherent and arbitrary. Given that there is no coherent reason to presuppose our ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs to be insensitive, the argument for sensitivity-based scepticism can thus be blocked at a lower epistemological cost.     

Is ‘Knowing that P’ Identical with ‘Knowing that “P” Is True’?

Philosophia - It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’,...     

右侧脑发育不全遗忘症患者的启动效应与右侧皮层的分离

采用ＷＭＳ－ＣＲ、ＷＩＳＣ－ＣＲ和４项内隐记忆任务（偏好、自由联想、字根补笔和字辨认）观察一例右侧大脑发育不全患者和两组正常对照的知觉性启动效应和语义性启动效应。发现该患者智力发育迟滞、记忆功能严重障碍,但两种启动效应正常。显示右侧大脑皮层发育不全不影响两种启动效应任务操作,启动效应与右侧大脑皮层分离。不支持Ｋｅａｎｅ等人认为知觉性启动效应的神经学基础在大脑皮层的结论。结合先的研究结果认为知觉性启动效应可能与基底神经节有关,语义性启动效应可能与左侧大脑皮层有关。     

基底神经节损伤对知觉性启动效应影响的进一步研究

基底神经节的认知和记忆功能是近年认知神经科学研究的热点。该研究采用两项语义性启动效应（自由联想、偏好）和一项知觉性启动效应（字辨认）任务,发现基底神经节损伤、分别伴两侧海马或右侧丘脑损伤的两例患者的语义性启动效应正常,知觉性启动效应障碍。由于先前研究已经证实海马或丘脑结构与启动效应无关,因此该两例患者表现的知觉性启动效应障碍可归因于基底神经节损伤,进一步证实了王常生等人认为基底神经节可能具有或参与知觉性启动效应调节作用,与语义性启动效应无关的观点。     

右侧脑发育不全患者启动效应与智力水平分离

采用 ＷＭＳ－ＣＲ． ＷＩＳＣ－ＣＲ和４项内隐记忆任务（偏好、自由联想、字根补笔和字辨认）观察一例右侧脑发育不全患者和两正常对照组被试的智商、记忆商和启动效应。发现该患者智力发育迟滞、记忆功能严重损伤,但启动效应正常。提示右侧脑发育不全患者启动效应与智力测验结果分离。由于启动效应是人类的一种重要的无意识习得能力,因此该研究表明智力发育迟滞者或脑损伤患者仍可能存在较好的无意识习得能力,这对特殊教育和临床脑损伤患者康复有一定的参考价值;同时该研究提示当前智力测验未能反映大脑功能的无意识方面,提出今后的智力测验应包括无意识习得能力的测量。     

右侧基底节损伤遗忘症患者的知觉性启动效应与语义性启动效应的分离与定位

采用偏好、自由联想、字根补笔和字辨认等4项任务观察一例单纯性右侧基底节损伤遗忘症患者和两组正常对照的启动效应。结果发现：（1）该患者知觉性启动效应障碍,而语义性启动效应正常。认为知觉性启动效应的神经学基础可能在基底节。（2）该患者知觉性启动效应与语义性启动效应分离。认为神经组织的损伤可导致不同形式启动效应的分离,提出内隐记忆或启动效应的不同形式可能存在不同的神经学基础。