排序方式: 共有7条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Anjan Chakravartty 《Synthese》2010,172(2):197-213
Recent work in the philosophy of science has generated an apparent conflict between theories attempting to explicate the nature
of scientific representation. On one side, there are what one might call ‘informational’ views, which emphasize objective
relations (such as similarity, isomorphism, and homomorphism) between representations (theories, models, simulations, diagrams,
etc.) and their target systems. On the other side, there are what one might call ‘functional’ views, which emphasize cognitive
activities performed in connection with these targets, such as interpretation and inference. The main sources of the impression
of conflict here are arguments by some functionalists to the effect that informational theories are flawed: it is suggested
that relations typically championed by informational theories are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific representation,
and that any theory excluding functions is inadequate. In this paper I critically examine these arguments, and contend that,
as it turns out, informational and functional theories are importantly complementary. 相似文献
2.
3.
The semantic view of theoriesis one according to which theoriesare construed as models of their linguisticformulations. The implications of thisview for scientific realism have been little discussed. Contraryto the suggestion of various champions of the semantic view,it is argued that this approach does not makesupport for a plausible scientific realism anyless problematic than it might otherwise be.Though a degree of independence of theory fromlanguage may ensure safety frompitfalls associated with logical empiricism, realism cannot be entertained unless models or (abstractedand/or idealized) aspects thereof are spelled out in terms of linguistic formulations (such as mathematical equations),which can be interpreted in terms of correspondencewith the world. The putative advantage of thesemantic approach – its linguistic independence – isthus of no help to the realist. I consider recent treatmentsof the model-theoretic view (Suppe, Giere, Smith), and find that although some of these accounts harbour the promiseof realism, this promise is deceptive. 相似文献
4.
Anjan Chakravartty 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):149-158
Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic
induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006,
Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the
underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper,
I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction
would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that
which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.
相似文献
Anjan ChakravarttyEmail: |
5.
Symbolic analysts or indentured servants? Indian high-tech migrants in America’s information economy
Paula Chakravartty 《Knowledge, Technology, and Policy》2006,19(3):27-43
Paula Chakravartty contrasts the everyday experiences of Indian entrepreneurs from Bangalore, who are very successfully developing
that region as a high-tech global metropolis, with the often unhappy, mid-level educated Indian migrants to the U.S. who now
come to the U.S. on H-1B visas because they were not “good enough” to break into the elite schools and best high-tech operations
in India. Because of foreign status, Indian migrants often face “glass ceilings” in professional advancement not commensurate
with education, experience or professional attainment, as Chakravartty points out. She maintains that due to the precariousness
of the H-1B type immigration status, it can be argued skilled migrants to the U.S. have frequently been exploited by employers,
having become the equivalent of “high-tech braceros.” Chakravartty also explores the evolving ties of international students in the U.S. and high-tech workers from India in
Silicon Valley that have led to kinds of globally circulating currents of hi-tech labor. 相似文献
6.
Anjan Chakravartty 《国际科学哲学研究》2004,18(2-3):151-171
Structural realism has recently re‐entered mainstream discussions in the philosophy of science. The central notion of structure, however, is contested by both advocates and critics. This paper briefly reviews currently prominent structuralist accounts en route to proposing a metaphysics of structure that is capable of supporting the epistemic aspirations of realists, and that is immune to the charge most commonly levelled against structuralism. This account provides an alternative to the existing epistemic and ontic forms of the position, incorporating elements of both. Structures are here identified with relations between first order, causal properties: properties that confer specific dispositions for relations. This form of structuralism constitutes an explicit proposal for what seem implicit structuralist tendencies in sophisticated but more traditional characterizations of realism. An outline of the proposal's response to the anti‐realist's pessimistic induction on the history of scientific theories is considered. 相似文献
7.
Anjan Chakravartty 《Synthese》2011,178(1):37-48
The philosophy of science has produced numerous accounts of how scientific facts are generated, from very specific facilitators
of belief, such as neo-Kantian constitutive principles, to global frameworks, such as Kuhnian paradigms. I consider a recent
addition to this canon: van Fraassen’s notion of an epistemic stance—a collection of attitudes and policies governing the
generation of factual beliefs—and his commitment to voluntarism in this context: the idea that contrary stances and sets of
beliefs are rationally permissible. I argue that while scientific inquiry inevitably favours a high degree of consensus in
our choices of stance, there is no parallel constraint in the case of philosophical inquiry, such as that concerned with how
scientific knowledge should be interpreted. This leads, in the latter case, to a fundamental and apparently irresolvable mystery
at the heart of stance voluntarism, regarding the grounds for choosing basic epistemic stances. 相似文献
1