Liturgy, Art and Politics

This article examines the category of "liturgy" in its relation to aesthetics, ethics and politics. It is argued that liturgy occupies a unique mediating position between art and politics, for, on the one hand, it ensures that the political points perpetually beyond itself, and, on the other hand, the artistic is prevented from lapsing into a "magic circle" of compensatory reality or merely "fine" art. Alternative aesthetic formulations, for example, that of Adorno, are examined and shown to be problematic and ultimately nihilistic and unrealizable. By contrast, a liturgical aesthetic is shown to have a genuine ethical practicability. Modernity is then examined. It is argued that late capitalist structures—including (contra Paul Piccone) is apparently opposed structures, such a post-Fordist organicism—can be seen as a kind of anti-liturgy liturgy, or, one might say here, "ritual" (for all the latter term's more dubious post-nineteenth century assumptions can here be assumed), which has produced an entirely self-perpetuating minimal automated subjectivity. Finally, it is concluded that the manifold problems faced by non-liturgical aesthetics and politics can be reduced to this separation of the ideal from the real. This separation is further examined. The lineaments of a specific liturgical tradition—in this case, the Christian—and especially its eucharistic focus—are analyzed, and it is suggested that here one might find suggestions as to a fusion of the ideal and the real, and hence indications of how one might begin to outwit several of the problems in aesthetic and political theory already shown to involve difficulties.     

Attentional biases in geometric form perception

This paper reports the operation of robust attentional bias to the top and right during perception of small, single geometric forms. Same/different judgements of successively presented standard and comparison forms are faster when local differences are located at top and right rather than in other regions of the forms. The bias persists when form size is reduced to approximately one degree of visual angle, and it is unaffected by saccadic eye movements and by instructions to attend to other reliably differentiating regions of the forms. Results lend support in various degrees to two of the possible explanations of the bias: (1) a static, skewed distribution of attentional resources around eye fixation; and (2) biased, covert scanning that commences invariably at the top and right of stim ulus forms. Origins of the bias in terms of possible left-hemispheric capacity for constructing representations of visual stimuli from parts, as well as in terms of reading experience and prevailing optic flow during locomotion through space are considered. Recent investigations of conditions under which the bias can be maintained or reduced are mentioned.     

Somatic response to stress, physical symptoms and health service use: The role of current stress

The study examined physical symptoms and health service utilization of subjects high or low on a measure of the tendency to experience stress somatically and high or low on a measure of current stress. High somatic responders reported greater numbers of symptoms than low somatic responders regardless of stress level. However, high somatic responders who were experiencing high levels of current stress reported significantly more symptoms than high somatic responders who were experiencing low levels of stress. These findings indicate that somatic response to stress reflects both a general tendency to focus on physical symptoms, and a specific tendency to focus more on physical symptoms when under stress. Analysis of health service records indicated that high somatic responders had more visits prompted by symptoms than low somatic responders, but did not differ in frequency of health service visits designed to maintain health. The findings further clarify the relationship between somatic response to stress, physical symptoms and health service use.     

Effects of concreteness and semantic relatedness on composite imagery ratings and cued recall

Day and Bellezza (1983) rejected a dual coding imagery explanation for the superior recall of concrete words because unrelated concrete pairs were rated lower in composite imagery but were still remembered better than related abstract pairs. We show that dual coding theory explains their results and our new findings using the same paradigm. In Experiment 1, 120 subjects rated imagery or relatedness for 108 pairs that varied in concreteness, pair relatedness, and associative strength. Incidental cued recall followed. Relatedness and strength affected imagery ratings, as did concreteness, and very low relatedness partly accounted for the low composite imagery ratings for unrelated concrete pairs. Concreteness and relatedness also affected recall, and suporior recall for unrelated concrete pairs occurred consistently under imagery but not under relatedness instructions. In Experiment 2, 40 subjects rated imagery value and recalled 24 pairs. Subsequent questioning indicated that composite images were retrieved better given stimuli from unrelated concrete than from related abstract pairs. These findings and Day and Bellezza’s original results are explained in terms of (1) imaginal and verbal associative processes, which jointly influence composite imagery ratings and recall, and (2) the critical role of stimulus concreteness during image retrieval and recall (i.e., the conceptual peg hypothesis).     

The epistemic efficacy of stupidity

I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, as contemporary theories construe it, is not a particularly valuable cognitive achievement, and that we would do well to reopen epistemology to the study of cognitive excellences of all sorts.I am grateful to Warren Goldfarb for sharing his knowledge of wines with me, and to Kenneth Winkler for sharing his knowledge of birds.     

Procedural Justice and Culture

The past fifteen years have seen the development of a considerable research literature on the social psychology of procedural justice (see Lind & Tyler, 1988, for a review). Procedural justice research reveals some serious shortcomings in the exchange theories that have traditionally dominated Western analyses of the social psychology of groups, and in so doing, the procedural justice literature has important ramifications for cross-cultural psychology. Results from a number of studies conducted in the United States and Western Europe show that individualistic, self-interest based models of human behaviour are insufficient to explain procedural justice phenomena. Instead, procedural justice effects frequently reveal strong group-oriented concerns and motivations even in cultural contexts generally thought to be characterized by individualistic orientations. The research literature also shows that if a group's procedures are judged to be fair, people are more likely to show group-oriented behaviour and to hold more favourable attitudes toward the group and its leaders. These findings have led to the development of a theory of justice judgments—the Lind and Tyler group-value theory—which is based on group norms and relations rather than on social exchange theory. We describe a general model of social behaviour that integrates group- and individually-oriented behaviour, and we discuss the implications of the model for social and cross-cultural psychology.     

The associative basis of contingent color aftereffects.

According to a conditioning analysis of the orientation-contingent color aftereffect (McCollough effect, ME), orientation stimulus (grids) become associated with color. Contrary to this interpretation are reports that simple forms cannot be used to elicit illusory color and that the ME is not degraded by decreasing the grid-color correlation. The present results indicate: (a) Form stimuli can contingently elicit color aftereffects; (b) even a non-patterned stimulus--the lightness of a frame surrounding a colored area--can contingently elicit color aftereffects; (c) this frame lightness-contingent aftereffect, like the ME, persists for at least 24 hr; and (d) the frame lightness-contingent aftereffect can be used to demonstrate that correlational manipulations affect the ME, as they affect other types of conditional responses.