Caregiving for children through conflict and displacement: a pilot study testing the feasibility of delivering and evaluating a light touch parenting intervention for caregivers in the West Bank

A child's adjustment to wartime stress is reliant not only on individual responses and qualities, but very significantly on the availability of support that they may receive from their parent or caregivers and quality of relationships. Strengthening parental support has the potential to be valuable. A pilot two-arm randomised controlled trial investigated the feasibility of delivering and evaluating the “Caring for Children Through Conflict and Displacement” intervention with caregivers in the West Bank. Feasibility to recruit and train non-specialist staff on-the-ground to screen families for eligibility, collect outcome data, deliver the intervention and to recruit and retain families in the study were examined. Research staff and intervention facilitators were successfully appointed in the field, screened participants and delivered the intervention to 120 caregivers, collecting outcome measures pre-and post-delivery. All families completed the outcome measures, with very little missing data. This indicated that the intervention can be delivered feasibly and evaluated with families in this humanitarian context. Preliminary outcome data showed promise that the intervention may have the potential to both improve family functioning and reduce children's problem behaviour. Implications of family-focused initiatives, particularly within a conflict/post-conflict context for the prevention of several negative health and social outcomes directions, are discussed.     

The University Of Colorado Meaning Norms

There exist surprisingly few normative lists of word meanings even though homographs—words having single spellings but two or more distinct meanings—are useful in studying memory and language. The meaning norms that are available all have one or more weaknesses, including: (1) the collection of free associates rather than meanings as responses to the stimulus words; (2) the collection of single rather than multiple responses to the stimulus words; (3) the inclusion of only the two most frequently occurring meaning categories, rather than all meaning categories, for the stimulus words; (4) omission of the responses typical of each meaning category; (5) inadequate randomization of the presentation order of the stimulus words; and (6) unpaced presentation of the stimulus words. We have compiled meaning norms for 90 common English words of low, medium, and high concreteness using a methodology designed to correct these weaknesses. Analysis showed that words of medium concreteness have significantly more first-response meanings than do words of either low or high concreteness, lending support to the view that concreteness is a categorical, rather than a continuous, semantic attribute.     

On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity

Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that A=B is clearly true; at the other end, A and B are such that the identity is clearly false. In between, normal criteria of identity leave the truth or falsehood of A=B undecided, and it is argued that in these circumstances A=B has no truth value.These arguments are to be understood counterfactually. My claim is that, so understood, neither establishes its conclusion. The first involves a pair of counterfactual situations that are equally possible or tied. If A=B and A=C have no truth value, a counterfactual conditional with one of them as consequent and an antecedent that is true in circumstances in which either is true should have no truth value. Intuitively, however, any such counterfactual is false. The second argument can be seen to invite an analogous response. If this is right, however, there is an important disanalogy between this and the classical paradox of the heap. If the disanalogy is only apparent, the argument shows at most that the existence of persons can be indeterminate.     

Lacunae and likeableness in the Big Five model of personality

In the abridged Big Five-factor Circumplex (AB5C) model of Hofstee, deRaad, and Goldberg (1991) each circumplex is divided into 12 facets, each of 30 degrees. Most facets contain several points representing the loadings of adjectives on the pair of factors involved. But 28 facets have between zero and two points. Significantly more such ‘lacunae’ arise in facets of the Factor I+ and Factor II− variety (heterogeneous blends) than in facets for I+ and II+ or I− and II− (homogeneous blends).Three studies examine different aspects of the overall hypothesis that most lacunae arise from inconsistent implications for likeableness associated with heterogeneous blend items. Study 1 examines the Anderson Likeableness values of adjectives falling in different types of facets. Study 2 expects raters to have difficulty assigning heterogeneous blend items correctly to their predicted factor membership. In Study 3, subjects rate the likeableness of items that explicitly pair adjectives of high and low likeableness. Results support the overall hypothesis that most lacunae are associated with incompatible implications for likeableness.     

The Countertransference Experiences of Pregnant Counselors Working With Sex Offenders

Using a phenomenological approach, the authors explored the lived experiences of female counselors who were pregnant during the course of providing clinical services to sex offenders. Themes included awareness of countertransference, emotional distress, safety concerns, and clinical objectivity.     

Autistic defenses in agoraphobic syndrome: "flat" objects and the retardation of projective identification

The function of autistic defenses in the generation of agoraphobic symptoms is explored in the case of a patient treated in psychoanalytic psychotherapy. The therapist's growing awareness of autistic modes of relating in the case facilitated various changes in the transference relationship. Although oedipal concerns are seen as important, a formulation is presented whereby autistic modes of generating experience are viewed as fundamental to an understanding of agoraphobic experience. Clinical findings in the transference-countertransference relationship led to the additional observation that the retardation of defensive forms of projective identification further contributed to the patient's agoraphobic difficulties. This formulation is tied theoretically to the idea that agoraphobic experience occurs when the dialectic between paranoid-schizoid and autistic-contiguous modes of generating experience collapses. The treatment implications of these observations are briefly explored.     

What are randomised controlled trials good for?

Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are widely taken as the gold standard for establishing causal conclusions. Ideally conducted they ensure that the treatment ‘causes’ the outcome—in the experiment. But where else? This is the venerable question of external validity. I point out that the question comes in two importantly different forms: Is the specific causal conclusion warranted by the experiment true in a target situation? What will be the result of implementing the treatment there? This paper explains how the probabilistic theory of causality implies that RCTs can establish causal conclusions and thereby provides an account of what exactly that causal conclusion is. Clarifying the exact form of the conclusion shows just what is necessary for it to hold in a new setting and also how much more is needed to see what the actual outcome would be there were the treatment implemented.     

Does Roush show that evidence should be probable?

This paper critically analyzes Sherrilyn Roush’s (Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence and science, 2005) definition of evidence and especially her powerful defence that in the ideal, a claim should be probable to be evidence for anything. We suggest that Roush treats not one sense of ‘evidence’ but three: relevance, leveraging and grounds for knowledge; and that different parts of her argument fare differently with respect to different senses. For relevance, we argue that probable evidence is sufficient but not necessary for Roush’s own two criteria of evidence to be met. With respect to grounds for knowledge, we agree that high probability evidence is indeed ideal for the central reason Roush gives: When believing a hypothesis on the basis of e it is desirable that e be probable. But we maintain that her further argument that Bayesians need probable evidence to warrant the method they recommend for belief revision rests on a mistaken interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization. Moreover, we argue that attempts to reconcile Roush’s arguments with Bayesianism fail. For leveraging, which we agree is a matter of great importance, the requirement that evidence be probable suffices for leveraging to the probability of the hypothesis if either one of Roush’s two criteria for evidence are met. Insisting on both then seems excessive. To finish, we show how evidence, as Roush defines it, can fail to track the hypothesis. This can remedied by adding a requirement that evidence be probable, suggesting another rationale for taking probable evidence as ideal—but only for a grounds-for-knowledge sense of evidence.