Determinants of Mediator Behavior: A Test of the Strategic Choice Model1

The present study simulated an organizational dispute to test 12 hypotheses about mediator behavior that were derived from the strategic choice model of mediation. This model is based on the assumption that mediators have four basic strategies to resolve disputes: (a) integrate, which involves a search for mutually acceptable outcomes; (b) press, which involves lowering one or both parties' aspirations; (c) compensate, which involves offering positive benefits in exchange for concessions; and (d) inaction, which involves letting the parties handle the dispute by themselves. The major proposition of the model is that two factors, the mediator's assessment of the likelihood of a mutually acceptable agreement and the mediator's concern for the parties' aspirations, interact to predict mediator behavior. Nine of the 12 hypotheses derived from the model were supported. Pressing by mediators occurred most when mediators had a low estimate of the likelihood of agreement in combination with a low concern for the parties' aspirations. Compensating occurred most when mediators had a low estimate of the likelihood of agreement in combination with a high concern for the parties' aspirations. Inaction occurred most when the mediators' estimate of the likelihood of agreement was high and their concern for the parties' aspirations was low. Integrating occurred most when the mediators had a high concern for the parties' aspirations.     

Negotiation from a near and distant time perspective

Across 3 experiments, the authors examined the effects of temporal distance on negotiation behavior. They found that greater temporal distance from negotiation decreased preference for piecemeal, single-issue consideration over integrative, multi-issue consideration (Experiment 1). They also found that greater temporal distance from an event being negotiated increased interest in conceding on the lowest priority issue and decreased interest in conceding on the highest priority issue (Experiment 2). Lastly, they found increased temporal distance from an event being negotiated produced a greater proportion of multi-issue offers, a greater likelihood of conceding on the lowest priority issue in exchange for a concession on the highest priority issue, and greater individual and joint outcomes (Experiment 3). Implications for conflict resolution and construal level theory are discussed.     

Alcohol as social lubricant.

This study examines how consuming alcohol differentially affects the communicative behavior and perceptions of high and low social self‐esteem (SSE) women as they engage in a brief interaction with a flirtatious male. Alcohol myopia theory proposes that alcohol affects behavior when it blocks a person's normal inhibitions about enacting a behavior. It was predicted that low SSE women would be more inhibited when talking to a flirtatious male than would high SSE women and, therefore administration of a social self‐esteem measure and random assignment to an alcoholic or nonalcoholic beverage condition, participants (N=50) talked with an attractive, flirtatious male confederate. Low SSE women were less anxious and self‐disclosed more when drinking than when sober, whereas high SSE women were not significantly affected by alcohol consumption. The discussion highlights the complex and often contradictory effects of alcohol consumption on social interaction.     

Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures as a Function of Intentionality,Consequences, Expected Future Interaction,and Power1

Two studies investigated preferences for dispute resolution procedures as a function of several situational factors. Study 1 varied intentionality of the conflict, consequences, and expected future interaction between the disputants. The data indicated that 3rd-party procedures were most preferred when the wrongdoing was intentional and when there were high consequences. Study 2 varied intentionality, consequences and the power relationship between the 2 disputants. The relevant effects of Study 1 were replicated, and it was found that arbitration and advisory arbitration were most preferred when the conflict involved parties of equal power. The study supports the general view that research in several domains can be integrated into a coherent pattern of effects relevant for dispute resolution.     

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

Intravention: Third-Party Intervention with Clout

This study examined the dispute-resolution behavior of the "intravenor," a distinct third-party role in organizational dispute resolution. Unlike a mediator, whose involvement in the dispute is at the whim of the disputants, the intravenor can control the outcome of the dispute. Unlike an arbitrator, who is compelled to dictate the outcome of the dispute, the intravenor may or may not impose an outcome. The experiment reported here examined the impact of four variables on third party behavior: The third party′s role (intravenor versus mediator), the third party′s beliefs about the disputants reaching agreement (cooperative versus uncooperative disputants), the third party′s self-interest in the outcome, and the third party′s concern about the disputants′ outcome (interest in the disputant′s mutual welfare). The results suggest that intravention spawns a distinctive pattern of third-party behavior: Intravenors imposed outcomes in 66% of the cases, but more when they viewed the disputants as uncooperative than cooperative. Only 44% of the imposed outcomes reflected the disputants′ underlying interests, but this was greater when the intravenor had high compared to low concern for the disputants′ aspirations. Intravenors were more likely than mediators to use forceful, pressure tactics, and were more confident and saw themselves as more influential. Taken together, the results provide the basis for an integrated model of third-party intervention in organizational dispute resolution.     

Buyer beware of your shadow: how price moderates the effect of incidental similarity on buyer behavior

Using both a lab experiment and actual transaction data, we investigated whether and how incidental similarities (e.g., shared letters between buyer and seller's name) might influence buyer behavior. Particularly, while prior work suggests that consumers generally prefer incidental similarity, we use the context of Internet auctions to show that this preference reverses when prices are high. Under these conditions, buyers avoid incidentally similar sellers. We speculate that this effect is tied to individuals' motive to self‐protect. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.