Associative recognition: A case of recall-to-reject processing

Two-process accounts of recognition memory assume that memory judgments are based on both a rapidly available familiarity-based process and a slower, more accurate, recall-based mechanism. Past experiments on the time course of item recognition have not supported the recall-to-reject account of the second process, in which the retrieval of an old item is used to reject a similar foil (Rotello & Heit, 1999). In three new experiments, using analyses similar to those of Rotello and Heit, we found robust evidence for recall-to-reject processing in associative recognition, for word pairs, and for list-discrimination judgments. Put together, these results have implications for two-process accounts of recognition.     

The<Emphasis Type="Italic">remember</Emphasis> response: Subject to bias,graded, and not a process-pure indicator of recollection

Recognition memory judgments have long been assumed to depend on the contributions of two underlying processes: recollection and familiarity. We measured recollection with receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) data and remember-know judgments. Under standard remember-know instructions, the two estimates of recollection diverged. When subjects were told they might need to justify theirremember responses to the experimenter, the two estimates were more likely to agree. The data support the conclusion thatremember responses are generally based on a continuous underlying process but that specific task instructions can produce data that appear consistent with a high-threshold recollective process. Models based on signal detection theory provide a better account of these data than does the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994) or process-pure interpretations.     

Strong memories obscure weak memories in associative recognition

The list strength effect, in which strengthening some memories has a detrimental effect on the retrieval of other memories, has generally not been found in item recognition. The present study shows that the list strength effect does occur in associative recognition. Study materials were sets of overlapping word pairs (A-B, A-C, D-B, etc.). Within critical sets of words, strong pairs were presented three times at study, as compared with one presentation for weak pairs. In Experiment 1, associative recognition for weak pairs was less accurate than that for baseline pairs, and response times for hits were slower. In Experiment 2, receiver-operating characteristic curve data provided further evidence of poor accuracy for weak pairs. These findings support a qualitative distinction between item and associative recognition.     

Does familiarity change in the revelation effect?

The revelation effect describes the increased tendency to call items "old" when a recognition judgment is preceded by an incidental task. Past findings show that d' for recognition decreases following revelation, evidence that the revelation effect is due to familiarity change. However, data from receiver operating characteristic curves from 3 experiments produced no evidence of changes in recognition sensitivity. The authors illustrate how the use of a single-point measure like d' can be misleading when familiarity distribution variances are unequal. Also investigated was whether the effect depends on the revelation materials used. Neither the memorability of the revelation items, their similarity to recognition probes, nor the difficulty of the task changed the size of the effect. Thus, the revelation effect is not the result of a memory retrieval mechanism and seems to be generic and all-or-nothing. These characteristics are consistent with response bias rather than familiarity change.     

The Medium Shapes the Message: McLuhan and Grice Revisited in Race Talk Online

Compared with the wealth of research accumulated on face‐to‐face social interactions, relatively little research has examined race talk within anonymous Web 2.0 mediums. We investigated online threaded comments on YouTube video clips of two race‐related incidents involving New Zealand television presenter Paul Henry. Through thematic content analysis, thematic analysis, and discourse analysis, it was found that characteristics unique to Web 2.0 were associated with the appearance of old‐fashioned racism and high‐levels of obscenity (together with modern racism/symbolic racism). The hyper‐low context of communication led to interpretive ambiguity; conversation sequences failed to follow Gricean maxims for cooperative communication, with most comments attracting no replies and the modal sequence being two turns. There was almost never resolution to a disagreement online: rather there was points‐scoring against opposing opinions and a tangential style of dialogue influenced by the asynchronous and anonymous nature of communication. The YouTube medium shaped but did not determine the message, as obscenity and racist content in the target video from the eliciting public figure influenced the subsequent degree of obscenity and hostility in the responses. A third corpus that examined responses to our own research on race talk presented on a news website (stuff.co.nz) underlined this point by engendering a dramatically different response to the same subject, retaining the tangential style of communication, but with little to no obscenity. A framework to understand race talk as a function of both medium and context effects is proposed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Positive and negative remember judgments and ROCs in the plurals paradigm: Evidence for alternative decision strategies

Using old-new ratings and remember-know judgments we explored the plurals paradigm, in which studied words must be distinguished from plurality-changed lures. The paradigm allowed us to investigate negative remembering—that is, the remembering of a plural-altered study item; capacity for this judgment was found to be poorer than or equivalent to the conventional positive remembering. A response-bias manipulation affected positive but not negative remembering. The ratings were used to construct ROC curves and test the prediction of the most common dual-process theory of recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2001) that the amount of recollection can be independently estimated from ROC curves and from remember judgments. By fitting the individual data with pure signal detection theory (SDT) models and dual-process models that combined SDT and high-threshold components (HTSDT), we identified two types of subjects. For those who were better described by HTSDT, the predicted convergence of remember-know and ROC measures was observed. For those who were better described by SDT, the ROC intercept could not predict the remember rate. The data are consistent with the idea that all subjects rely on the same representation but base their decisions on different partitions of a decision space.     

On the importance of models in interpreting remember-know experiments: Comments on Gardiner et al.'s (2002) meta-analysis

From a meta-analysis of recognition experiments using the remember-know-guess paradigm, Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (2002) reported two findings that they viewed as evidence against the one-dimensional model for that paradigm: (1) Memory strength increased when know responses were added to remember responses, decreasing when guess responses were also included. (2) The accuracy of guess responses was correlated with the location of the old-new criterion in the one-dimensional model for the paradigm, implying that guesses were influenced by decision processes. We question both findings. The first result is contradicted by a signal-detection (SDT) analysis, which shows that both know and guess responses reduced estimated memory strength. The discrepancy results from the properties of A′, the measure of accuracy used by Gardiner et al., which we argue is flawed. The second result follows directly from the one-dimensional model, in which accuracy and response criteria are fixed. The authors' reasons for rejecting the one-dimensional model are thus not persuasive, but it can nonetheless be rejected because ROC curves implied by the data are inconsistent with ROCs derived from ratings experiments. A two-dimensional SDT model (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004) accounts for both sets of data. The analysis illustrates the importance of models in interpreting remember-know data.     

Eye movements when looking at print advertisements: the goal of the viewer matters

Viewers looked at print advertisements as their eye movements were recorded. Half of them were asked to rate how much they liked each ad (for convenience, we will generally use the term ‘ad’ from this point on), while the other half were asked to rate the effectiveness of each ad. Previous research indicated that viewers who were asked to consider purchasing products in the ads looked at the text earlier and more often than the picture part of the ad. In contrast, viewers in the present experiment looked at the picture part of the ad earlier and longer than the text. The results indicate quite clearly that the goal of the viewer very much influences where (and for how long) viewers look at different parts of ads, but also indicate that the nature of the ad per se matters. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating models of remember-know judgments: Complexity, mimicry, and discriminability

Remember-know judgments provide additional information in recognition memory tests, but the nature of this information and the attendant decision process are in dispute. Competing models have proposed that remember judgments reflect a sum of familiarity and recollective information (the one-dimensional model), are based on a difference between these strengths (STREAK), or are purely recollective (the dual-process model). A choice among these accounts is sometimes made by comparing the precision of their fits to data, but this strategy may be muddied by differences in model complexity: Some models that appear to provide good fits may simply be better able to mimic the data produced by other models. To evaluate this possibility, we simulated data with each of the models in each of three popular remember-know paradigms, then fit those data to each of the models. We found that the one-dimensional model is generally less complex than the others, but despite this handicap, it dominates the others as the best-fitting model. For both reasons, the one-dimensional model should be preferred. In addition, we found that some empirical paradigms are ill-suited for distinguishing among models. For example, data collected by soliciting remember/know/new judgments--that is, the trinary task--provide a particularly weak ground for distinguishing models. Additional tables and figures may be downloaded from the Psychonomic Society's Archive of Norms, Stimuli, and Data, at www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

A little learning is a dangerous thing: an experimental demonstration of ignorance-driven inference

Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether - under conditions where such inferences might be expected - the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a "less-is-more effect"). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.