Can Coherence Generate Warrant Ex Nihilo? Probability and the Logic of Concurring Witnesses

Most foundationalists allow that relations of coherence among antecedently justified beliefs can enhance their overall level of justification or warrant. In light of this, some coherentists ask the following question: if coherence can elevate the epistemic status of a set of beliefs, what prevents it from generating warrant entirely on its own? Why do we need the foundationalist’s basic beliefs? I address that question here, drawing lessons from an instructive series of attempts to reconstruct within the probability calculus the classical problem of independent witnesses who corroborate each other’s testimony. Starred section headings indicate sections omitted here, but available on the author’s USC website.     

A Prospective Validation Study of Inclination,Belief, and Context Predictors of Family-Focused Prevention Involvement

Prior research by the authors tested a model of factors influencing parent inclination to participate in parenting interventions. Family context, belief, attitude, and inclination to participate variables from this model were used to predict the actual participation of 1,121 families in assessment and intervention activities of a family-focused preventive intervention research project. Invitations to the project assessment and intervention components were, respectively, about 6 months and 10 months following the initiation of a telephone survey collecting predictor variable data. Logistic regression analyses examining each predictor individually showed that a number of family context, belief, attitude, and inclination variables were predictive of project participation. Subsequently, multiple logistic regressions were conducted, entering variables by blocks corresponding to theoretical model components. These analyses showed that prospectively stated inclination to participate in a parenting intervention and level of education were consistently significant predictors of both assessment participation and intervention enrollment. Implications for both research and practice are discussed.     

Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction

According to the main tradition in epistemology, knowledge is a variety of justified true belief, justification is an undefinable normative concept, and epistemic principles (principles about what justifies what) are necessary truths. According to the leading contemporary rival of the tradition, justification may be defined or explained in terms of reliability, thus permitting one to say that knowledge is reliable true belief and that epistemic principles are contingent. My aim here is to show that either of these approaches will yield a solution to the problem of induction. In particular, either of them makes it possible to ascertain the reliability of induction through induction itself. Such a procedure is usually dismissed as circular, but I shall argue that it cannot be so dismissed if either approach is correct.
As one would expect, the solution based on the traditional approach differs from the one based on the reliabilist alternative, but they have important features in common. The common elements are presented in sections I, II, and III, the elements specific to the reliabilist approach in sections IV, V, and VI, and those specific to the traditional approach in section VII.     

TOUCH,SOUND, AND THINGS WITHOUT THE MIND

Abstract: Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind‐independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so‐called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind‐independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds—and argue that only on the normative construal of them are they resolvable as intended by the a priori methods of the philosophers who pose them.