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The inefficacy objection to consequentialism and the problem with the expected consequences response
Philosophical Studies - Collective action problems lie behind many core issues in ethics and social philosophy—for example, whether an individual is required to vote, whether it is wrong to... 相似文献
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Mark Bryant Budolfson 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(2):243-259
Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is
a satisfactory solution to the Frege–Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible
even assuming that the Frege–Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically
rational inferences as irrational. Dorr’s argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper
I will show that Dorr’s argument equivocates between two different notions of evidence, and that once this equivocation is noted there is no reason to doubt that non-cognitivism is consistent with the rationality
of such inferences, at least if it is assumed that the Frege–Geach problem can be solved. In particular, I will show that
non-cognitivists can endorse the same explanation of the rationality of such inferences that cognitivists should endorse,
and that there is thus no need for non-cognitivists to offer any sort of idiosyncratic account of the epistemology of such
cases, in contrast to what other commentators on Dorr’s argument have thought. 相似文献
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