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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - 相似文献
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On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of consciousness in agency. In this paper we criticize Schroeter’s analysis of the type of consciousness involved in executive control and examine the way in which the conscious self allegedly intervenes in action. We argue that Schroeter’s proposal should not be preferred over recent versions of CTA. 相似文献
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Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the ‘mental state’ theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states. 相似文献
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Andrei A. Buckareff Joel S. Van Wagenen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(3):123-139
In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne
Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the
identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some
problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot
for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must
either be rejected or modified. 相似文献
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Andrei A. BUCKAREFF 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(3):402-425
This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that
I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation
of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental
causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is
taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections to nonreductive physicalism, including versions of the exclusion
argument. This paper examines some features of three recent versions of intralevelism defended by John Gibbons, Markus Schlosser,
and Amie Thomasson. This paper shows that the distinctive problems faced by these three representative versions of intralevelism
suggest that the intralevelist strategy does not provide a viable solution to the exclusion problem. 相似文献
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Andrei A. Buckareff 《Sophia》2000,39(2):56-69
The suffering of creatures experienced throughout evolutionary history provides some conceptual difficulties for theists who
maintain that God is an all-good loving creator who chose to employ the processes associated with evolution to bring about
life on this planet. Some theists vexed by this and other problems posed by the interface between religion and science have
turned to process theology which provides a picture of a God who is dependent upon creation and unable to unilaterally intervene
in the affairs of the world and avert suffering.
In the present paper I seek to critique process theism, focusing on divine action and the aforementioned problem posed by
evolutionary suffering. I show that the promise of a more compelling account of a loving God who suffers with creation advanced
by the process theist is illusory. Rather, the process God is less dynamic than promised. And on such an account the freedom
of both God and the world are significantly more circumscribed than one may find in other forms of theism. 相似文献
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Andrei A. Buckareff 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):83-89
I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, ‘Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity’. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional. 相似文献
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Andrei A. Buckareff 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):143-152
Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
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Andrei A. BuckareffEmail: Phone: +1-716-3533623 |