CHARACTER,PSYCHOANALYTIC IDENTIFICATION,AND NUMERICAL IDENTITY

Identification figures prominently in moral psychological explanations. I argue that in identification the subject has an ‘identity‐thought’, which is a thought about her numerical identity with the figure she identifies with. In Freud's psychoanalytic psychology character is founded on unconscious identification with parental figures. Moral philosophers have drawn on psychoanalysis to explain how undesirable or disadvantageous character dispositions are resistant to insight through being unconscious. According to Richard Wollheim's analysis of Freud's theory, identification is the subject's disposition to imagine, unconsciously, her bodily merging with the figure she identifies with. I argue that this explanation of identification is not adequate. Human character is held to be capable of change when self‐reflection brings unconscious identifications to conscious self‐knowledge. I argue that for self‐knowledge these identifications must be an intelligible part of the subject's self‐conception, and that Wollheim's ‘merging phantasy’ is not intelligible to the subject in this way. By contrast, the subject's thought that she is numerically identical to the figure she identifies with does provide an intelligible starting‐point for reflecting on this identification. This psychoanalytic account provides a clear conception of identification with which to investigate puzzle cases in the moral psychology of character.     

Impulsivity partially mediates the relationship between BIS/BAS and risky health behaviors

Several theorists have suggested that impulsivity can be understood as a joint function of the behavioral approach (BAS) and behavioral inhibition systems (BIS). After resolving questions concerning the measurement of impulsivity and BAS, this study examined the relationships among risky health behaviors, impulsivity, BIS, and BAS. Utilizing a sample of undergraduates (N = 904), a structural model was tested in which BAS and BIS predicted impulsivity, which, in turn, predicted risky behavior. Fit indices were acceptable, but not good. A modified version of the model showed a statistically significant negative relationship between BAS and risky behaviors. However, the fit indices were not unequivocally supportive of the need to include that path. Overall, the data suggest that impulsivity is the joint result of countervailing motivational forces and that it partially or fully mediates the influence of BIS and BAS on risky health behavior.     

Adaptation and communicative design.

Two theoretical frameworks that examine the nature of adaptability and mutual influence in interaction, interpersonal deception theory and interaction adaptation theory, were used to derive hypotheses concerning patterns of interaction that occur across time in truthful and deceptive conversations. Two studies were conducted in which senders were either truthful or deceptive in their interactions with a partner who increased or decreased involvement during the latter half of the conversation. Results revealed that deceivers felt more anxious and were more concerned about self‐presentation than truthtellers prior to the interaction and displayed less initial involvement than truthtellers. Patterns of interaction were also moderated by deception. Deceivers increased involvement over time but also reciprocated increases or decreases in receiver involvement. However, deceivers were less responsive than truthtellers to changes in receiver behavior. Finally, partner involvement served as feedback to senders regarding their own performance.     

The stoic attitude

The 'best-system' analysis of lawhood [Lewis 1994] faces the 'zero-fit problem': that many systems of laws say that the chance of history going actually as it goes--the degree to which the theory 'fits' the actual course of history--is zero. Neither an appeal to infinitesimal probabilities nor a patch using standard measure theory avoids the difficulty. But there is a way to avoid it: replace the notion of 'fit' with the notion of a world being typical with respect to a theory.     

CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY ON WELL‐BEING AND VIRTUE

What is the nature of human well‐being? This paper joins the ancient debate by rejuvenating an ancient claim that is quite unfashionable among moral philosophers today, namely, the Aristotelian claim that moral virtue is (non‐instrumentally) necessary for human well‐being. Call it the Aristotelian Virtue Condition (AVC). This view can be revived for contemporary debate by a state‐of‐the‐art approach that we might call constructivist experimental philosophy, which takes as its goal the achievement of a reasonable constructivist account of well‐being and takes the investigation of actual folk intuitions as the central means to achieving that goal. The paper motivates this approach and challenges the commonplace philosophical rejection of AVC by arguing (1) that folk intuitions should count as evidence in the debate, especially if we aim at a constructivist account of well‐being, (2) that folk intuitions can be accurately elicited through a thought experiment (the “Crib Test”), and (3) that there is some reason (subject to experimental confirmation) for thinking that folk intuitions, thus elicited, support AVC. Aristotelian ethics, and indeed the entire virtue ethics tradition, has come under fire recently by empirically informed philosophers who question the empirical adequacy of the postulation of robust character traits, but regardless of how that debate turns out, other parts of this tradition might be empirically supported rather than undermined. This paper sketches a promising, empirically informed way of supporting Aristotelian views of well‐being.     

The Sweating Cognitions Inventory: A Measure of Cognitions in Hyperhidrosis

Primary hyperhidrosis is a dermatological condition involving excessive sweating. Little research has been conducted on the psychological processes associated with this condition. A cognitive-behavioral approach would suggest that negative beliefs about the nature and consequences of sweating paradoxically increase sweating, and therefore maintain hyperhidrosis. The present research reports on the development and psychometric evaluation of the Sweating Cognitions Inventory (SCI), a self-report measure that assesses dysfunctional beliefs in hyperhidrosis. The SCI was administered to a clinical sample of patients diagnosed with hyperhidrosis (N = 226) as well as a student comparison group (N = 482). The SCI demonstrated good internal consistency and a stable, unidimensional factor structure in both samples. Sweating cognitions differentiated between the two groups, indicating discriminant validity. Correlations with comparison measures indicated that sweating cognitions were strongly related to sweating severity, and also to social anxiety and anxiety sensitivity. These results are consistent with our conceptualization that dysfunctional sweating cognitions can maintain and exacerbate excessive sweating. A cognitive-behavioral conceptualization of hyperhidrosis could advance our understanding of the condition and could lead to novel treatment approaches.