Forest chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus) remember the location of numerous fruit trees

It is assumed that spatial memory contributes crucially to animal cognition since animals’ habitats entail a large number of dispersed and unpredictable food sources. Spatial memory has been investigated under controlled conditions, with different species showing and different conditions leading to varying performance levels. However, the number of food sources investigated is very low compared to what exists under natural conditions, where food resources are so abundant that it is difficult to precisely identify what is available. By using a detailed botanical map containing over 12,499 trees known to be used by the Taï chimpanzees, we created virtual maps of all productive fruit trees to simulate potential strategies used by wild chimpanzees to reach resources without spatial memory. First, we simulated different assumptions concerning the chimpanzees’ preference for a particular tree species, and, second, we varied the detection field to control for the possible use of smell to detect fruiting trees. For all these assumptions, we compared simulated distance travelled, frequencies of trees visited, and revisit rates with what we actually observed in wild chimpanzees. Our results show that chimpanzees visit rare tree species more frequently, travel shorter distances to reach them, and revisit the same trees more often than if they had no spatial memory. In addition, we demonstrate that chimpanzees travel longer distances to reach resources where they will eat for longer periods of time, and revisit resources more frequently where they ate for a long period of time during their first visit. Therefore, this study shows that forest chimpanzees possess a precise spatial memory which allows them to remember the location of numerous resources and use this information to select the most attractive resources.     

Do chimpanzees anticipate an object’s weight? A field experiment on the kinematics of hammer-lifting movements in the nut-cracking Taï chimpanzees

When humans are about to manipulate an object, our brains use visual cues to recall an internal representation to predict its weight and scale the lifting force accordingly. Such a long-term force profile, formed through repeated experiences with similar objects, has been proposed to improve manipulative performance. Skillful object manipulation is crucial for many animals, particularly those that rely on tools for foraging. However, despite enduring interest in tool use in non-human animals, there has been very little investigation of their ability to form an expectation about an object’s weight. In this study, we tested whether wild chimpanzees use long-term force profiles to anticipate the weight of a nut-cracking hammer from its size. To this end, we conducted a field experiment presenting chimpanzees with natural wooden hammers and artificially hollowed, lighter hammers of the same size and external appearance. We used calibrated videos from camera traps to extract kinematic parameters of lifting movements. We found that, when lacking previous experience, chimpanzees lifted hollowed hammers with a higher acceleration than natural hammers (overshoot effect). After using a hammer to crack open one nut, chimpanzees tuned down the lifting acceleration for the hollowed hammers, but continued lifting natural hammers with the same acceleration. Our results show that chimpanzees anticipate the weight of an object using long-term force profiles and suggest that, similarly to humans, they use internal representations of weight to plan their lifting movements.     

Long-term memory for the emotional gist and the emotional essence of an experience

We investigated accuracy in recalling past emotional behaviours and emotionality. Male couples discussed the history of their relationship, and coders rated the extent to which each partner engaged in behaviours such as complimenting or criticising. These ratings were combined into dimensions representing the deeper, emotional essence of that partner's discussion (expressions of We-ness, Fondness, Negativity, and Disappointment). Four years later, participants accurately recalled some of their own and some of their partner's emotional gist-level behaviours, but their answers indicated that they also remembered the emotional essence of the conversation. We conclude that individuals can retain the emotional essence of an experience for a long time, and that they may use this memory to infer, in part, gist-level details of the experience.     

Long-term memory for the emotional gist and the emotional essence of an experience

We investigated accuracy in recalling past emotional behaviours and emotionality. Male couples discussed the history of their relationship, and coders rated the extent to which each partner engaged in behaviours such as complimenting or criticising. These ratings were combined into dimensions representing the deeper, emotional essence of that partner's discussion (expressions of We-ness, Fondness, Negativity, and Disappointment). Four years later, participants accurately recalled some of their own and some of their partner's emotional gist-level behaviours, but their answers indicated that they also remembered the emotional essence of the conversation. We conclude that individuals can retain the emotional essence of an experience for a long time, and that they may use this memory to infer, in part, gist-level details of the experience.     

The means-end account of scientific,representational actions

Synthese - While many recent accounts of scientific representation have given a central role to the agency and intentions of scientists in explaining representation, they have left these agential...     

What makes us human (Homo sapiens)? The challenge of cognitive cross-species comparison

Two major theoretical approaches have dominated the quest for uniquely human cognitive abilities: a developmentalist approach stressing the importance of environmental and social conditions, and a predominant approach in experimental and comparative psychology, the deterministic approach suggesting the effect of environmental and social conditions to be minimal. As a consequence, most claims of human cognitive uniqueness are based on comparisons of White middle class Westerner humans (Homo sapiens) with captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). However, humans are much more than only White middle class Westerners, and chimpanzees are much more than only captives. A review of some data available on different populations of humans and chimpanzees reveals that only the predictions of the developmentalist approach are supported. In addition, systematic biases are too often introduced in experiment protocols when comparing humans with apes that further cast doubts on cross-species comparisons. The author argues that only with consideration of within-species population differences in the cognitive domains and the use of well-matched cross-species experimental procedures will an objective understanding of the different cognitive abilities between species emerge. This will require a shift in the theoretical approach adopted by many in experimental and comparative psychology.