Who are the Mentally Handicapped?

ABSTRACT In this paper we compare philosophical and contemporary psychological approaches to mental handicap. Careful comparison between the disciplines reveals major differences and indicates that much further work is needed which would be fruitful for both sides.
The two disciplines concentrate on different questions: philosophy tends to look chiefly at mental handicap in relation to issues of personhood and is not very clear about what mental handicap is; psychology on the other hand is much more specific about mental handicap, but shows little concern with critically examining value issues. Our main intention is to explore the different ways in which mental handicap is defined and seen as a class.
We conclude that class definition embodies a significant normative component and a large element of social construction. To ignore this and attempt to make normative judgements on the basis of class membership is thus highly problematic. Since within philosophy, these normative issues are often discussed in terms of personhood, this category is also critically examined and the conclusion is reached that it too has normative and social components which can lead to ethically dubious judgements being made about 'the mentally handicapped'.     

The relationship between monoaminergic gene expression,learning, and optimism in red junglefowl chicks

Animal Cognition - Intra-species cognitive variation is commonly observed, but explanations for why individuals within a species differ in cognition are still understudied and not yet clear....     

Adolescent Carrier Testing in Practice: The Impact of Legal Rulings and Problems with “Gillick Competence”

Testing for carrier status for various genetic conditions often takes place during adolescence or young adulthood. This paper aims to add to the discussion of when is the best time to test through an examination of how the law on medical treatment of children appears to be used in practice and how a careful examination of legal rulings might shed light upon best practice in this area. Our focus is on the Gillick ruling (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 1986), which dealt with consent and confidentiality with respect to the provision of contraceptive advice to under 16-year-olds, but which has become a general benchmark for consent to medical treatment within UK law. In addition, we draw upon data from a qualitative research study which indicates potential problems with certain practices in respect of the influence of the Gillick ruling on carrier testing procedures. We present evidence that in at least some instances, adolescents have reduced capacity to grasp fully the implications of carrier test results. In the light of our findings we make recommendations for practice concerning the testing of children and young persons.     

Policy Recommendations for Carrier Testing and Predictive Testing in Childhood: A Distinction That Makes a Real Difference

The genetic testing of children raises many ethical concerns. This paper examines how five position statements from Canada, UK and USA, which present guidelines for good practice in this area produce different recommendations for carrier testing and predictive testing. We find that the genetic information generated through carrier testing is routinely presented as less serious than that generated from predictive testing. Additionally, the reproductive implications of predictive testing are also routinely erased. Consequently, the papers argue strongly against predictive testing but advise caution against carrier testing in somewhat weaker terms. We argue that these differences rest on assumptions about the status of reproduction in people’s lives and on an ethical stance that foregrounds the self over others. We propose that questioning the crude and sharp distinction between carrier and predictive testing in principle may enable practitioners and parents/families to make more nuanced decisions in practice. Parts of this work have been presented in the 1st International CESAGen Conference, London, 2004, and Genetics and Society Meetings, Wales.     

Variation in inhibitory control does not influence social rank,foraging efficiency,or risk taking,in red junglefowl females

Animal Cognition - Individual variation in cognition, seen in many taxa, is not well understood, despite its potential evolutionary consequences. Inhibitory control is an aspect of cognition which...     

Organ Donation After Death — Should I Decide,or Should My Family?

Who should decide about organ donation after death, the individual or the family? This paper examines why this practical question can be difficult to resolve. A comparison is made between standard decision-making in medicine and decision-making about organ donation. The questions are raised of the connection of the dead body to the person, and of who properly has autonomous control over the dead body. To understand the issues, an exploration of autonomy is needed, but at the same time this shows that a resolution depends on addressing complex spiritual and cultural issues, and questions about the autonomy of the individual versus that of the group.