Interoceptive sensitivity and self-reports of emotional experience

People differ in the extent to which they emphasize feelings of activation or deactivation in their verbal reports of experienced emotion, termed arousal focus (AF). Two multimethod studies indicate that AF is linked to heightened interoceptive sensitivity (as measured by performance on a heartbeat detection task). People who were more sensitive to their heartbeats emphasized feelings of activation and deactivation when reporting their experiences of emotion over time more than did those who were less sensitive. This relationship was not accounted for by several other variables, including simple language effects. Implications for the role of interoception in experienced emotion and the validity of self-reported emotion are discussed.     

Language and the perception of emotion

Three studies assessed the relationship between language and the perception of emotion. The authors predicted and found that the accessibility of emotion words influenced participants' speed or accuracy in perceiving facial behaviors depicting emotion. Specifically, emotion words were either primed or temporarily made less accessible using a semantic satiation procedure. In Studies 1 and 2, participants were slower to categorize facial behaviors depicting emotion (i.e., a face depicting anger) after an emotion word (e.g., "anger") was satiated. In Study 3, participants were less accurate to categorize facial behaviors depicting emotion after an emotion word was satiated. The implications of these findings for a linguistically relative view of emotion perception are discussed.     

Authors’ response: what are emotions and how are they created in the brain?

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.     

A Practical Guide to Experience-Sampling Procedures

Experience-sampling is a powerful method for understanding a range of psychological phenomena as they occur in the daily lives of individuals. In this primer, we discuss the different techniques, equipment, and design options available to the experience-sampling researcher. We place special emphasis on computerized procedures and discuss the crucial social dynamic of the research team, which optimizes the success of experience-sampling procedures.     

The brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.     

I like the sound of your voice: Affective learning about vocal signals

This paper provides the first demonstration that the content of a talker’s speech is sufficient to imbue the acoustics of his voice with affective meaning. In two studies, participants listened to male talkers utter positive, negative, or neutral words. Next, participants completed a sequential evaluative priming task where a neutral word spoken by one of talkers was presented before each target word to be evaluated. We predicted, and found, that voices served as evaluative primes influencing the speed with which participants evaluated the target words. These two experiments demonstrate that the human voice can take on affective meaning merely based on the positive or negative value words it has spoken. Implications for affective processing, the pragmatics of communication, and person perception are discussed.     

Individual differences in learning the affective value of others under minimal conditions

This paper provides the first demonstration that people can learn about the positive and negative value of other people (e.g., neutral faces) under minimal learning conditions, with stable individual differences in this learning. In four studies, participants viewed neutral faces paired with sentences describing positive, negative or neutral behaviors on either two (Study 1) or four (Studies 2, 3, and 4) occasions. Participants were later asked to judge the valence of the faces alone. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that learning does occur under minimal conditions. Study 3 and 4 further demonstrated that the degree of learning was moderated by Extraversion. Finally, Study 4 demonstrated that initial learning persisted over a period of 2 days. Implications for affective processing and person perception are discussed.     

Of Mice and Men: Natural Kinds of Emotions in the Mammalian Brain? A Response to Panksepp and Izard

ABSTRACT— For almost 5 decades, the scientific study of emotion has been guided by the assumption that categories such as anger, sadness, and fear cut nature at its joints. Barrett (2006a) provided a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence from the study of emotion in humans and concluded that this assumption has outlived its usefulness. Panksepp and Izard have written lengthy papers (published in this issue) containing complementary but largely nonoverlapping criticisms of Barrett (2006a) . In our response, we address three of their concerns. First, we discuss the value of correlational versus experimental studies for evaluating the natural-kind model of emotion and refute the claim that the evidence offered in Barrett (2006a) was merely correlational. Second, we take up the issue of whether or not there is evidence for "coherently organized neural circuits" for natural kinds of emotions in the mammalian brain and counter the claim that Barrett (2006a) ignored crucial evidence for existence of discrete emotions as natural kinds. Third, we address Panksepp and Izard's misconceptions of an alternative view, the conceptual act model of emotion, that was briefly discussed in Barrett (2006a) . Finally, we end the article with some thoughts on how to move the scientific study of emotion beyond the debate over whether or not emotions are natural kinds.     

Flexible target templates improve visual search accuracy for faces depicting emotion

Theories of visual attention hypothesize that target selection depends upon matching visual inputs to a memory representation of the target – i.e., the target or attentional template. Most theories assume that the template contains a veridical copy of target features, but recent studies suggest that target representations may shift "off veridical" from actual target features to increase target-to-distractor distinctiveness. However, these studies have been limited to simple visual features (e.g., orientation, color), which leaves open the question of whether similar principles apply to complex stimuli, such as a face depicting an emotion, the perception of which is known to be shaped by conceptual knowledge. In three studies, we find confirmatory evidence for the hypothesis that attention modulates the representation of an emotional face to increase target-to-distractor distinctiveness. This occurs over-and-above strong pre-existing conceptual and perceptual biases in the representation of individual faces. The results are consistent with the view that visual search accuracy is determined by the representational distance between the target template in memory and distractor information in the environment, not the veridical target and distractor features.