Deflationism About Logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Logical consequence is typically construed as a metalinguistic relation between (sets of) sentences. Deflationism is an account of logic that challenges this...     

Logical pluralism without the normativity

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of which depends not on logic’s normativity but on epistemic goals.

     

Correction to: Deflationism About Logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic - The original version of this article unfortunately contains mistakes introduced by the publisher during the production process. The mistakes and corrections are...