Discovery as correction

In recent years, there have been some attempts to defend the legitimacy of a non-inductive generative logic of discovery whose strategy is to analyze a variety of constraints on the actual generation of explanatory hypotheses. These proposed new theories, however, are only weakly generative (relying on sophisticated processes of elimination) rather than strongly generative (embodying processes of correction).This paper develops a strongly generative theory which holds that we can come to know something new only as a variant of what we already know — and that the novelty of this variant is not thereby eliminated nor beyond our powers of characterization, a double requirement that is vital for resolving the Meno paradox. In this light, the discovery of a new hypothesis is taken as the correction of an antecedent hypothesis in response to the discrepancies between the predictions generated by that antecedent hypothesis and the desired result (e.g. the actual data to be explained). This process comprises two parallel operations: the first, which demonstrates the positive role of the facts in generating new explanations, involves a mapping between multiple hypotheses and sets of predictions generated from those hypotheses, for the purpose of taking the actual data as a determinable variant of neighboring sets of predictions. This mapping permits the facts to indicate how corrective adjustments in the working hypothesis should be made; the second operation, which demonstrates the positive role of explanations in generating new facts, involves a mapping between differently construed versions of the actual data and the conceptualizations derived from those perceptual versions, for the purpose of taking the working hypothesis as a determinable variant of these neighboring conceptualizations. This mapping permits a given hypothesis to generate predictions increasingly closer to the actual facts.The proposed theory provides the basis for a reformed conception of justification. Because hypotheses are meaningful only as variants of neighboring hypotheses, and because such variation is corrective, their justification in the reformed sense will incorporate not only their justification in the traditional sense, but their generation as well.     

Ampliative abduction

In Peirce's and Hanson's characterization of abductive inference, the abducted hypothesis (but not others) is present in the premises, so that the inference can hardly be taken as ampliative. Abduction has consequently been treated as part of the process whereby already generated hypotheses are judged in terms of their plausibility, simplicity, etc. I propose an interpretation of abduction which supports an ampliative view. It relies on a distinction between two logical stages in the generation of hypotheses, one “factual” and one “explanatory”. I also indicate how we may reconstruct Peirce's and Hanson's original inference in an ampliative form.     

Elimination,correction and Popper's evolutionary epistemology

Evolutionary epistemologists from Popper to Campbell have appropriated the Darwinian principle to explain the apparent fit between the world and our knowledge of it. I argue that this strategy suffers from the lack of any principled distinction among various types of elimination. I offer such a distinction and show that there is a species of elimination that is really corrective, that is, which violates the Darwinian principle as Popper understands it.     

Reciprocal Justification in Science and Moral Theory

In this paper, I analyze the particular conception of reciprocal justification proposed by Nelson Goodman and incorporated by John Rawls into what he called reflective equilibrium. I propose a way of avoiding the twin dangers which threaten to push this idea to either of two extremes: the reliance on epistemically privileged observation reports (or moral judgments in Rawls version), which tends to disrupt the balance struck between the two sides of the equilibrium and to re-establish a foundationalism; and the denial of any privileged status to such reports (or judgments), which makes the equilibrium into a theoretical monolith.     

Unarticulated meaning

It is a common experience of mental life that we come to articulate meanings which we had initially grasped in only a sketchy way. In this paper, I consider how this idea of an initially unarticulated meaning may fit in a general theory of mental representation. I propose to identify unarticulated meanings with what I callspecific concepts, which are quite similar to Rosch's categories of basic objects and are distinct both from images and generic concepts (which come to articulate meanings). I argue that unarticulated meaning is non-representational in an important respect, a claim which relies on a distinction amonglevels of representation.     

READING EDUCATION: REPORT FROM ITALY

Cross‐cultural examinations of teaching and schooling can help one gain a new, more open perspective on that which is the closest at hand. One's own experiences provide a personal framework through which all subsequent perceptions are filtered, so that what may seem “objective” is really a view colored by past events and performances.

This paper presents information gained from a year spent observing and talking with teachers and teacher trainers in Italy, a country in which the statement “There is no reading problem in Italy” is often heard and just as often qualified by exceptions. By looking at the processes and procedures which match and vary from the norm of the United States, one can begin to sort out those things that may be operational or philosophical “giyens” in reading education from those things which vary in a different cultural context.     

Technology and At-Risk Young Readers and their Classrooms

This study examined the ways in which 18 first-grade teachers and their students in 11 high-risk urban schools began to use literacy-focused technology. The goal of the study was to observe the technology in use by the students, to observe the classroom dynamics and teachers’ instructional choices centered around technology use, to look at student learning, and to investigate student and teacher perceptions and beliefs as they began to use technology for literacy. Analyses of classroom and pupil observational data and of student performance data indicated positive effects of the literacy technology on classroom instruction and student literacy achievement. Further, interviews of students and teachers confirmed that the literacy technology was perceived as engaging and effective by both groups of stakeholders. The study also generated implications for further research and practice in schools struggling to make change.     

Monotheism and the Spirituality of Reason

In this paper I propose a cognitive interpretation of the emergence of monotheism. I first distinguish between two fundamentally different conceptions of representation: one intuitive, which favors an analog model of rational cognition, and one discursive, which favors a digital model. While both Hellenism and Judaism may have been instrumental in setting civilization on the path to reason and law, it is the discursive or digital conception of God as a single universal Judge, I argue, that provides the foundational axiom of the moral logic of the Hebrew Scriptures. That is, in monotheism, God came to be represented differently.     

The Constraint Interpretation of Physical Emergence

I develop a variant of the constraint interpretation of the emergence of purely physical (non-biological) entities, focusing on the principle of the non-derivability of actual physical states from possible physical states (physical laws) alone. While this is a necessary condition for any account of emergence, it is not sufficient, for it becomes trivial if not extended to types of constraint that specifically constitute physical entities, namely, those that individuate and differentiate them. Because physical organizations with these features are in fact interdependent sets of such constraints, and because such constraints on physical laws cannot themselves be derived from physical laws, physical organization is emergent. These two complementary types of constraint are components of a complete non-reductive physicalism, comprising a non-reductive materialism and a non-reductive formalism.