Loving and angry? Happy and sad? Understanding and reporting of mixed emotions in mother–child relationships by 6‐ to 12‐year‐olds

The Evaluative Space Model of emotions allows for the coactivation of positive‐appetitive and negative‐avoidant systems, but few studies have examined mixed emotions in child development. Existing research suggests children's understanding of opposite valence emotion combinations emerges by approximately 11 years of age. However, it is not yet clear whether various opposite valence combinations are understood at different ages, nor whether children can understand them in others before they have experienced such mixed emotions themselves. Semi‐structured interviews with 97 children investigated whether they regarded six combinations of opposite valence mixed emotions as possible, could provide reasons for them, and report their own experience of each in the context of mother–child relationships. Both understanding that such combinations are possible and ability to provide reasons for them increased after age 6 and up to age 11, but were still incomplete in 12‐year‐olds. Understanding of different opposite valence combinations developed at different rates. At each age, fewer children who showed understanding of these combinations in others reported having had a similar experience themselves. The findings suggest a need to systematically examine a range of mixed emotions in order to develop a comprehensive theory of the development of mixed emotion understanding. They also suggest extending research into adolescence.     

Implicit psychologists' estimates of attitude-behaviour consistencies

To investigate the relationship between implicit psychological hypotheses and explicit empirical findings, summaries of twenty published studies on attitude-behaviour consistency were presented to a sample of forty-eight psychology undergraduates. Subjects were asked to estimate the percentage of agreement between attitudes and behaviour obtained by each study. Correlations between subjects' covariation judgements and empirically obtained attitude-behaviour consistencies were minimal and nonsignificant. Results are discussed in the light of more recent research on attitude-behaviour relationship.     

A basic information psychological parameter (BIP) for the reconstruction of concepts of intelligence

Adherents of the Galton paradigm favour the concept that the simple parameter ‘speed of information processing’ has a physiological basis and determines complex achievements assessed in intelligence tests as well as social success. These assumptions are supported by inter-individual correlations. Further supporting evidence comes from total measurement where not only the information content of the stimuli is measured, but also the time to process them. This reveals an individually constant period during which 1 bit of information is processed. It is called the ‘basic period of information processing’ (BIP), which lasts 1/15 s (= 67 ms) in average adults (IQ 100) and is constant over the ranges from which target stimuli can be drawn and over varying modes of the signs (letters, numbers, musical notes, etc.). In representative samples of adults duration of BIP correlates with global IQ (r ? ?0.60): We conclude that the BIP of an adult with an IQ of 122 is 50 ms and with an IQ of 78 twice as long (100 ms). We consider BIP to be a physiological and general determinant of intelligence, being measurable at a ratio or even an absolute scale level. Thus, it appears to be suitable as a building unit for reconstructing the rather fuzzy traditional concept of general intelligence.     

Scaling occupational prestige by magnitude estimation and category rating methods: A comparison with the sensory domain

In a field study, models for magnitude estimation and for category ratings are applied to the scaling of occupational prestige. The two respective models provide sufficient conditions for magnitude estimates to yield logarithmic interval scales and for category ratings to lead to interval scales. Both models are found to hold reasonably well for the majority of respondents. As implied by a third model, the relation between magnitude estimation and category rating scales can well be described by a generalized power function. Although overall results do not favour one method over the other individual data analyses reveal substantial interindividual differences with respect to the capability of performing magnitude estimates and category ratings, respectively. The findings are compared to results recently found in psychophysical laboratory experiments, and it is concluded that the individual scale properties the two methods provide do not differ across the attitudinal and the sensory domains.     

The police officer's dilemma: using ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals

Using a simple videogame, the effect of ethnicity on shoot/don't shoot decisions was examined. African American or White targets, holding guns or other objects, appeared in complex backgrounds. Participants were told to "shoot" armed targets and to "not shoot" unarmed targets. In Study 1, White participants made the correct decision to shoot an armed target more quickly if the target was African American than if he was White, but decided to "not shoot" an unarmed target more quickly if he was White. Study 2 used a shorter time window, forcing this effect into error rates. Study 3 replicated Study 1's effects and showed that the magnitude of bias varied with perceptions of the cultural stereotype and with levels of contact, but not with personal racial prejudice. Study 4 revealed equivalent levels of bias among both African American and White participants in a community sample. Implications and potential underlying mechanisms are discussed.     

Neubewertung kognitiver Leistungen im Lichte der F?higkeiten einzelliger Lebewesen

A closer look at unicellular organisms and their behavior as autonomous and social beings sheds new light on the nature of cognition. This allows, at the same time, a search for minimal conditions that help to identify the yet unknown appearance of cognition during evolution. Positive results might also serve as principles for the construction of intelligent artefacts as striven for in artificial intelligence and cognitive robotics research. Analyzing the abilities of prokaryotes and unicellular eukaryotes and comparing them to the abilities of "higher" organisms, we conclude that common definitions of cognition are not specific enough. The attempt to define cognition by focusing on the coupling between stimulus and response and asserting that (to have cognition) it has to be indirect and modifiable fails, simply because in all organisms every reaction to a stimulus is indirect and modifiable. A definition of cognition based on such a distinction cannot hold unless one is willing to ascribe cognitive capacities also to Escherichia coli bacteria, for instance. Viewing cognition as the sum of abilities necessary for coping with a complex physical and social environment is also highly questionable, i.e. unspecific. We show that functions comparable to the cognitive functions "perception" and "memory" in higher organisms can well be identified in unicellular beings. The "architecture" of the bacterial (prokaryotic) sensorimotor apparatus is also in some structures, but particularly at the functional level, comparable with that of higher organisms and should be, as a consequence, indicative of cognition. Furthermore, we discuss other, somewhat more delimitable, phenomena like detection of identity, counting, adaptation, habituation and learning in ethological categories and compare them to findings from the microorganismic world. In this context, we argue that so-called "true learning" and the appearance of nervous systems are not break-points in the evolution of cognition. The presence of nervous systems means only a huge amplification of the recognition power of individual organisms. The molecular net that realizes the regulation and transduction of signals in unicellular beings is comparable to the processes within a neural net, and a population of unicellular organisms can be viewed as an individual, multicellular net with amplified recognition power. Finally, we show that sophisticated forms of cooperation and competition developed also in populations of unicellular organisms. This seems not to be true for the phenomena imagination (rehearsal) and introspection, also to be seen as stemming from social problem-solving needs. As for these aspects, further research is needed, however, to put them on firm scientific grounds. Zusammenfassung. Eine genaue Betrachtung einzelliger Lebewesen und ihres Verhaltens als autonome und soziale Wesen wirft neues Licht auf die Natur von Kognition. Das erlaubt gleichzeitig eine Suche nach minimalen Bedingungen, die bei der Bestimmung des Erscheinens von Kognition in der Evolution helfen. Positive Ergebnisse könnten auch als Prinzipien für die Konstruktion intelligenter Artefakte dienen, wie sie in der Künstlichen Intelligenz und der kognitiven Robotikforschung angestrebt werden. Ein Vergleich der Fähigkeiten von Einzellern mit denen von "höheren" Organismen führt uns zu dem Schluß, daß gängige Definitionen von Kognition nicht spezifisch genug sind. Der Versuch, Kognition über die Indirektheit und Modifizierbarkeit der Kopplung zwischen Reiz und Reaktion zu definieren, scheitert, weil in allen Organismen Reiz-Reaktionsverbindungen indirekt und modifizierbar sind. Eine solche Definition ist nicht haltbar, es sei denn, man ist bereit, z.B. auch Escherichia coli-Bakterien kognitive Eigenschaften zuzubilligen. Die Definition von Kognition als Summe der Eigenschaften, die notwendig sind, um in einer komplexen physikalischen und sozialen Umgebung zu bestehen, ist ebenfalls hinterfragbar und unspezifisch. Wir zeigen, daß Leistungen, die mit den Kognitionsleistungen "Wahrnehmung" und "Gedächtnis" in höheren Organismen vergleichbar sind, in Einzellern nachweisbar sind. Die sensomotorische Komplexität von Einzellern ist auch in vieler Hinsicht strukturell, vor allem aber funktionell vergleichbar mit derjenigen höherer Organismen und kann deshalb als ein Hinweis auf Kognition gewertet werden. Darüber hinaus diskutieren wir andere, abgrenzbare Phänomene, wie Erfassung von Identität, Zählen, Adaptation, Habituation und Lernen, aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung und vergleichen sie mit Befunden aus der Welt der Mikroorganismen. In diesem Zusammenhang bestreiten wir, daß sogenanntes "echtes Lernen" und das Erscheinen von Nervensystemen Bruchstellen in der Evolution von Kognition sind. Die Anwesenheit von Nervensystemen bedeutet nur den Übergang von Systemen mit einem relativ begrenzten (Erkennungs-) Potential zu solchen mit einem riesigen Potential. Das molekulare Netz, das die Regulation und Transduktion von Signalen in Einzellern realisiert, ist vergleichbar mit den Prozessen innerhalb eines Nervennetzes. Eine Population von einzelligen Organismen kann als individuelles, multizelluläres Netz mit erhöhtem Erkennungspotential angesehen werden. Schließlich zeigen wir, daß raffinierte Formen von Kooperations- und Konkurrenzverhalten auch in Einzellerpopulationen vorhanden sind. Eine ähnliche Aussage scheint nicht für Phänomene wie Imagination (Probehandeln) und Introspektion möglich zu sein, die auch im Zusammenhang mit der Bewältigung sozialer Probleme zu sehen sind. Eine genaue naturwissenschaftliche Erfassung solcher Aspekte, die erst einen Vergleich zwischen Mehrzellern und Einzellern erlauben würde, ist allerdings noch zu leisten.     

Interpersonal problems and outcome in outpatient psychotherapy: findings from a long-term longitudinal study in Germany

We used a comprehensive longitudinal data set from Germany to examine trajectories of symptom distress depending on interpersonal problems at study intake measured via the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-64 (IIP-64; Horowitz, Strau, & Kordy, 1994). Participants (N=622) underwent mid- or long-term outpatient psychotherapy (either psychodynamically oriented psychotherapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, or analytic psychotherapy). Data comprises up to 5 assessments during a 2-year period and was analyzed via hierarchical linear modeling. In the analytic psychotherapy subgroup, initial symptom level was higher in submissive patients. Initial interpersonal problems were not predictive of the rate of symptom change during therapy. Only in psychodynamic treatments, low affiliation positively affected treatment outcome. Interpersonal problems at intake were not related to the number of utilized sessions and utilization rate across treatment subgroups. We discuss the findings and outline future research topics.     

The role of locomotion in the acquisition and transfer of spatial knowledge in children

The role of locomotion in the acquisition and transfer of spatial knowledge was investigated in 144 five-, seven- and eleven-year-old children. Two experiments were conducted in the Kiel locomotor maze. In the first experiment, one group of children explored the spatial layout by walking through the maze, while another learned the maze by surveying the layout. In the second experiment, children were exposed to one of two orientation tests in the maze, one of which could be solved using "landmark orientation", the other only using a "relational place orientation". Children sitting by the side of the experimental chamber surveying the maze needed fewer trials to learn the spatial layout than children exploring the environment in the locomotion condition, but in the orientation test demanding the "relational place orientation" children who had explored the maze in the locomotion condition outperformed the children in the non-locomotion condition. Results are discussed in the context of cognitive mapping models.