It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this assumption. On the first, extensional, interpretation whether we perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, intensional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not perceive dispositional properties. The two most important and influential arguments to the contrary fail. 相似文献
I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: (a) one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action (everything else being equal) and (b) one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s perceptual attention (everything else being equal). If we put these claims together, what we get is that one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action (everything else being equal).
When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this
is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual
beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical
and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we represent the occluded parts of perceived
objects by means of mental imagery. This conclusion could be thought of as a (weak) version of the Strawsonian dictum, according
to which “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself”. 相似文献
In this study, we investigated whether control of the conflict between incongruent heuristic and analytical answer options in a reasoning task is modulated by the presence of conflict on previous trials. In two experiments, we found that the incongruency of the previous trial has a significant effect on the control exhibited on the current trial. Our data also showed that this adaptation effect is modulated by the incongruency of the previous series of trials. These results demonstrate the same control adaptation effects for a reasoning task as observed for standard response interference tasks. Coinciding control effects in the two research areas suggest that cognitive control might be an important mechanism underlying performance on reasoning tasks. Based on these results we argue that the study of cognitive control in reasoning could potentially facilitate the refinement of empirical predictions and provide a new tool to explore the exertion of top-down control in human thinking. 相似文献
The canonical version of the history of twentieth century philosophy of science tells us that Lakatos was Popper’s disciple, but it is rarely mentioned that Popper would have learned anything from Lakatos. The aim of this paper is to examine Lakatos’ influence on Popper’s philosophical system and to argue that Lakatos did have an important, yet somewhat unexpected, impact on Popper’s thinking: he influenced Popper’s evolutionary model for ‘progress’ in science. And Lakatos’ influence sheds new light on why and how Popper continually revised one of the central claims of his philosophy of science: the evolutionary account of scientific theory change. 相似文献
I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture.
My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive
of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem
attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of our
experience of pictures: the “visual awareness not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of the representation.”
I argue for the following four claims: (a) the depicted scene is represented by ventral perception, (b) the depicted scene
is not represented by dorsal perception, (c) the picture surface is represented by dorsal perception, and (d) the picture
surface is not necessarily represented by ventral perception. 相似文献
Book reviewed in this article: The Family Therapy of Drug Abuse and Addiction M. Duncan Stanton, Thomas C. Todd, and Associates New York: Guilford Press, 1982. 相似文献
Theories of picture perception aim to understand our perceptual relation to both the picture surface and the depicted object. I argue that we should talk about not two, but three entities when understanding picture perception: (A) the picture surface, (B) the three dimensional object the picture surface visually encodes and (C) the three dimensional depicted object. As (B) and (C) can come apart, we get a more complex picture of picture perception than normally assumed and one where the notion of twofoldness, which has played an important albeit controversial role in understanding picture perception is replaced by the concept of threefoldness. 相似文献