A theory of permission based on the notion of derogation

This paper presents a unifying theory of permission that integrates the concept of negative permission with three concepts of positive permission, namely explicit permission, exemption and antithetic permission. The concepts are defined and logically related by paying particular attention to the system of which they form part. A simple procedure for calculating the permitted actions that can be said to be implicit in a code of norms or a policy specification is then given.     

Sprachspiel vs. vollständige Sprache

The article formulates a criticism of Wittgenstein's later philosophy which, in its substance, I would like to think, is fairly the same as the (hermeneutic) criticism issued by Apel and Habermas in the sixties. Contrary to these philosophers, however, I try to make the point by focusing on the distinction between language game and language, respectively between intralanguage relations of family resemblance (between language games) and interlanguage translation relations. The notion of a complete language is introduced — completeness of a language being, roughly, its possibility in principle of being translated into any (other) language — and the criticism of Wittgenstein is formulated as the allegation that he does not, or will not, acknowledge such a concept of completeness.So far the contents of the first part of the article. The rest of it assembles some hints, remarks and reminders which bear upon the question of the completeness of a language. These considerations include comments on the conditions of translatability, on the performative (agent's) knowledge or intention-in-action of the acting person, on Habermas' concept of communicative competence and on the notion of a responsible subject of action. It is alleged that to speak of translation and reporting an event as language games is misleading.     

Students’ Reasoning About Whether to Report When Others Cheat: Conflict,Confusion, and Consequences

Journal of Academic Ethics - Nearly all students believe academic cheating is wrong, yet few students say they would report witnessed acts of cheating. To explain this apparent tension, the present...     

Unsettling Preferential Semantics

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This paper is concerned with removing the identity schema from the axiomatic basis of deontic conditionals. This is in order to allow a stipulated ideal to be...     

Some problems of counter‐inductive policy as opposed to inductive

The article is concerned with the practicalist attempt to ‘solve’ the problem of induction. The point of departure is the concept of counter‐induction introduced by Max Black and his refutation of practicalism. If we arc not to beg the question whether induction yields knowledge of the future, Max Black asserts, there is a symmetry between induction and counter‐induction as methods. The main point of the article is to show that this assertion is false, at least when induction and counter‐induction are compared as regards their relations to hypo‐thetico‐deductive method. As regards these relations, there is a striking asymmetry. The author tries to establish the following conclusion: A theory can agree with all future data and yet be false because it does not agree with all past data. If we are not to be in a position where our theories are necessarily falsified either by past or future data, we must use induction rather than counter‐induction.     

Infants’ unprovoked acts of force toward others

Infants harm others at higher rates than older children and adults. A common explanation is that infants fail to regulate their frustration, becoming aggressive when they do not get what they want. The present research investigated whether infants also use force against others without provocation, for instance because they seek to explore the consequences of hitting or try to pet someone using too much force. Two studies with infants aged 11 to 24 months investigated infants’ use of force against others in everyday life using maternal report (Study 1) and direct observation (Study 2). In both studies, a large proportion of infants’ acts of force were unprovoked and occurred without signs of infant distress. Unlike provoked acts, unprovoked acts showed a decrease late in the second year and were positively associated with reports of infant pleasure‐proneness. The presence of unprovoked acts of harm may reflect that infants’ actions are not reliably guided by an aversion for harming others and may provide unique opportunities for early moral development.     

The Bergen 4-day treatment for OCD: four years follow-up of concentrated ERP in a clinical mental health setting

There are few long-term follow-up studies on psychological treatment of anxiety disorders carried out in clinical mental health settings, so called effectiveness studies. The present paper presents a four year follow-up of patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder treated by the Bergen 4-day treatment (B4DT), a concentrated form of exposure and response prevention (ERP). A total of 77 obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) patients received treatment during four consecutive days and were assessed with the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) pre, post, and at follow-ups after 3 and 6 months, and 4 years post-treatment. The Y-BOCS mean score changed from 25.9 at pre- to 10.0 post-treatment and 9.9 at long-term follow-up. The proportion fulfilling the strict international consensus criteria for remission was 73% at post-treatment and 69% at follow-up. When taking declining rate, attrition rate, remission, relapse, and further improvement during the follow-up period into account, 72% were recovered on a long-term basis. A comparison with previously published effectiveness studies of ERP indicated that the 4-day treatment yielded significantly higher proportions of remission at post-treatment and recovery at follow-up, as well as within-group effect size on the Y-BOCS. The implications of these results are discussed.     

Responsibility,Reactive Attitudes and Very General Facts of Human Nature

This paper defends P.F. Strawson's controversial ‘reversal move’, the view that the reactive attitudes determine what it means to be responsible. Many are critical of this account, arguing that it leads to the result that if we were to start to hold very young children responsible, they would be responsible. I argue that it is possible to read Strawson as providing a grammatical analysis of our moral responsibility language‐game by drawing two parallels between Strawson and Wittgenstein. This interpretation shows that the formulation of the problem associated with the ‘reversal move’ rests on a grammatical mistake.