Proof-Theoretic Analysis of the Logics of Agency: The Deliberative STIT

Studia Logica - A sequent calculus methodology for systems of agency based on branching-time frames with agents and choices is proposed, starting with a complete and cut-free system for multi-agent...     

Newborns' preference for faces: what is crucial?

Three experiments investigated whether the presence of more elements in the upper part of a configuration (i.e., up-down asymmetry) plays a role in determining newborns' preference for facelike patterns. Newborns preferred a nonfacelike stimulus with more elements in the upper part over a nonfacelike stimulus with more elements in the lower part (Experiment 1), did not show a preference for a facelike stimulus over a nonfacelike configuration equated for the number of elements in the upper part of the configuration (Experiment 2), and preferred a nonfacelike configuration located in the upper portion of the stimulus over a facelike configuration in the lower portion of the pattern (Experiment 3). Results demonstrated that up-down asymmetry is crucial in determining newborns' face preference.     

Nonspatial attentional shifts between audition and vision

This study investigated nonspatial shifts of attention between visual and auditory modalities. The authors provide evidence that the modality of a stimulus (S1) affected the processing of a subsequent stimulus (S2) depending on whether they shared the same modality. For both vision and audition, the onset of S1 summoned attention exogenously to its modality, causing a delay in processing S2 in a different modality. That undermines the notion that auditory stimuli have a stronger and more automatic alerting effect than visual stimuli (M. I. Posner, M. J. Nissen, & R. M. Klein, 1976). The results are consistent with other recent studies showing cross-modal attentional limitation. The authors suggest that such cross-modal limitation can be produced by simply presenting S1 and S2 in different modalities and that central processing mechanisms are also, at least partially, modality dependent.     

Situational determinants of inpatient self-harm

Auto-aggressive individuals have a higher likelihood of engaging in interpersonal violence, and vice versa. It is unclear, however, whether ward circumstances are involved in determining whether aggression-prone patients will engage in auto-aggressive or outwardly directed aggressive behavior. The current study focuses on the situational antecedents of self-harming behavior and outwardly directed aggression of psychiatric inpatients. Inwardly and outwardly aggressive behavior were monitored on a locked 20-bed psychiatric admissions ward for 3.5 years with the Staff Observation Aggression Scale-Revised (SOAS-R). A map of the ward was attached to each SOAS-R form, enabling staff members to specify locations of aggressive incidents. Time of onset, location, and provoking factors of auto-aggressive incidents were compared to those connected to aggression against others or objects. Of a total of 774 aggressive incidents, 154 (20%) concerned auto-aggressive behavior. Auto-aggression was significantly more prevalent during the evening (i.e., 50% compared to 32%), and reached its highest level between 8 and 9 P.M. (17% compared to 7%). The majority of self-harming acts (66%) were performed on patients' bedrooms. Outwardly directed aggression was particularly common in the day-rooms (24%), the staff office (19%), the hallways of the ward (14%), and the dining rooms (10%). Provoking factors of auto-aggressive behavior are less often of an interactional nature compared to outwardly directed aggression. The results suggest that a lack of stimulation and interaction with others increases the risk of self-injurious behavior. Practical and testable measures to prevent self-harm are proposed.     

Selective deficit of motor imagery as tapped by a left-right decision of visually presented hands

This paper presents the case of MT, a patient suffering from apraxia with left-hemisphere damage who showed a selective deficit in mentally rotating images of hands whereas he was still able to mentally rotate other visual stimuli. The deficit was particularly evident when MT was asked to decide which hand (left or right) was represented in a picture. suggested that in order to carry out this task, participants would mentally rotate a representation of their own body part until it aligns with the stimulus and it does appear that MT's ability to mentally simulate movements is impaired. In contrast, he was able to mentally rotate other forms of bi- and three-dimensional stimuli. Our findings are also consistent with proposal that there are at least two ways in which objects can be mentally rotated, one that recruits processes devoted to motor preparation (e.g., hands), and another that does not.     

Action for perception: a motor-visual attentional effect

Five experiments investigated whether preparation of a grasping movement affects detection and discrimination of visual stimuli. Normal human participants were required to prepare to grasp a bar and then to grasp it as fast as possible on presentation of a visual stimulus. On the basis of the degree of sharing of their intrinsic properties with those of the to-be-grasped bar, visual stimuli were categorized as "congruent" or "incongruent." Results showed that grasping reaction times to congruent visual stimuli were faster than reaction times to incongruent ones. These data indicate that preparation to act on an object produces faster processing of stimuli congruent with that object. The same facilitation was present also when, after the preparation of hand grasping, participants were suddenly instructed to inhibit the prepared grasping movement and to respond with a different motor effector. The authors suggest that these findings could represent an extension of the premotor theory of attention, from orienting of attention to spatial locations to orienting of attention to graspable objects.     

Does the deduction theorem fail for modal logic?

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction- and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hilbert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of ${\square\,A}$ from A.     

Priming the mental time line

Growing experimental evidence suggests that temporal events are represented on a mental time line, spatially oriented from left to right. Support for the spatial representation of time comes mostly from studies that have used spatially organized responses. Moreover, many of these studies did not avoid possible confounds attributable to target stimuli that simultaneously convey both spatial and temporal dimensions. Here we show that task-irrelevant, lateralized visuospatial primes affect auditory duration judgments. Responses to short durations were faster when the auditory target was paired with left- than with right-sided primes, whereas responses to long durations were faster when paired with right- than with left-sided primes. Thus, when the representations of physical space and time are concurrently activated, physical space may influence time even when a lateralized, spatially encoded response is not required by the task. The time-space interaction reported here cannot be ascribed to any Spatial-Temporal Association of Response Codes effect. It supports the hypothesis that the representation of time is spatially organized, with short durations represented on the left space and longer ones on the right.