Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held

In two experiments involving a total of 542 subjects, a series of slides depicting a burglary was shown. After the initial event, subjects were exposed to one or more narratives about the event that contained some misinformation or neutral information about four critical details. Finally, subjects were tested on their memories of what they saw, and their reaction times and confidence levels were measured. When subjects took a standard test in which the misinformation item was a possible response option, they responded very quickly and confidently when making this incorrect choice. Misled subjects responded as quickly and confidently to these "unreal" memories as they did to their genuine memories. It does not seem, then, that the misinformation effect arises from a large proportion of subjects who must resolve a conflict between two memories when they are tested, a conflict that would be expected to take time. When subjects took a modified test in which the misinformation item was not a possible response, misled subjects were as accurate as were controls, but they responded more slowly, regardless of whether they ultimately chose the right or wrong option. These findings indicate that misinformation does introduce some form of interference not detected by a simple test of accuracy.     

Determination of a behavioral transfer function: White-noise analysis of session-to-session response-ratio dynamics on concurrent VI VI schedules

Six pigeons were exposed to concurrent variable-interval schedules in which the programmed reinforcer ratios changed from session to session according to a pseudorandom binary sequence. This procedure corresponded to the stochastic identification paradigm (“white-noise experiment”) of systems theory and enabled the relation between log response ratios in the current session and log reinforcer ratios in all previous sessions to be determined. Such dynamic relations are called linear transfer functions. Both nonparametric and parametric representations of these, in the form of “impulse-response functions,” were determined for each bird. The session-to-session response ratios resulting from the session-to-session pseudorandom binary variations in reinforcer ratios were well predicted by the impulse-response functions identified for each pigeon. The impulse-response functions were well fitted by a second-order dynamic model involving only two parameters: a time constant and a gain. The mean time constant was 0.67 sessions, implying that the effects of abrupt changes in log reinforcer ratios should be 96% complete within about five sessions. The mean gain was 0.53, which was surprisingly low inasmuch as it should equal the sensitivity to reinforcement ratio observed under steady-state conditions. The same six pigeons were subjected to a similar experiment 10 months following the first. Despite individual differences in impulse-response functions between birds within each experiment, the impulse-response functions determined from the two experiments were essentially the same.     

Effects of Eyewitness Evidence on Plea-Bargain Decisions by Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys1

The present experiment tested the relative impact of two types of eyewitness evidence (identification and non identification) on plea-bargain decisions by prosecutors and defense attorneys. A hypothetical case involving a robbery was mailed to three prosecutors and three defense attorneys in each of 47 states. The subjects were randomly assigned to receive a case in which an eyewitness claimed: (a) the defendant was the criminal (identification), (b) the defendant was not the criminal (non identification), or (c) it was not possible to tell whether the defendant was the criminal (control). Similar to findings with jurors, both prosecutors and defense attorneys underutilized the non identification information in making their plea-bargain decisions. In the case of the prosecutors, there was evidence that the underutilization of eyewitness non identification was at least partially mediated by the prosecutors' predictions of juror reaction to the evidence.     

NEEDED:

Abstract— The significance test as currently used is a disaster Whereas most researchers falsely believe that the significance test has an error rate of 5%, empirical studies show the average error rate across psychology is 60%—12 times higher than researchers think it to be The error rate for inference using the significance test is greater than the error rate using a coin toss to replace the empirical study. The significance test has devastated the research review process. Comprehensive reviews cite conflicting results on almost every issue. Yet quantitatively accurate review of the same results shows that the apparent conflicts stem almost entirely from the high error rate for the significance test. If 60% of studies falsely interpret their primary results, then reviewers who base their reviews on the interpreted study "findings" will have a 100% error rate in concluding that there is conflict between study results.     

WORD FREQUENCY AND WORD DIFFICULTY:

Abstract— This article compares word counts made using four different collections of text, including one based on collections of electronic text For each of the collections, standard word frequency indices were computed and compared with a carefully developed list of words ranked in order of difficulty as determined by vocabulary tests Correlations between the word frequency indices and word difficulty ranks show that word frequencies for all four corpora are highly correlated with word difficulty Despite these high correlations, the results show also that the difficulty of some words is not estimated accurately by word frequency The reasons for disparities between word frequency and word difficulty are not clear The high correlations obtained for the corpus based on electronic text suggest that this method of text sampling has potential but that caution is advisable in conducting such collections.     

A repertory grid study of therapist/couple interaction

A case of marital therapy is described in which the presenting problem, one of non-consummation, is treated by the standard Masters and Johnson's technique. Using repertory grids at the start and finish of treatment the changing perceptions of both partners and the therapist were determined. In spite of an ostensibly behavioural treatment, substantial changes occurred in the couple's understanding of the nature of their problem. The changes undergone in the couple's perceptions, and their differences from the therapist's assessments of change give rise to speculations about the nature of the therapeutic interaction and suggest further lines of exploration.