Instructed versus pharmacological effects of alcohol in alcoholics and social drinkers

Twelve alcoholics and 12 social drinkers were studied in an experiment where instructions about alcohol or placebo were orthogonally crossed with administration of alcohol or placebo in a Balanced Placebo Design. Three subjects were simultaneously observed while watching soccer games on the TV together and having free access to a mixed drink, which in the alcohol conditions contained 150ml of 80% proof vodka. The assessment procedure included several aspects of drinking behavior, behavioral observations during the session, psychiatric ratings and nurse observations before and after each session, ratings for craving, self-reported state anxiety and physiological changes (heart rate and blood pressure). In general, the results showed the alcoholic's behavior to be controlled by instruction-induced expectancies rather than by the actual beverage given, whereas the social drinkers showed tendencies in the opposite direction. The implications of these results for the traditional disease conception of alcoholism and for learning theory approaches are discussed.     

How to Precisify Quantifiers

I here argue that Ted Sider's indeterminacy argument against vagueness in quantifiers fails. Sider claims that vagueness entails precisifications, but holds that precisifications of quantifiers cannot be coherently described: they will either deliver the wrong logical form to quantified sentences, or involve a presupposition that contradicts the claim that the quantifier is vague. Assuming (as does Sider) that the “connectedness” of objects can be precisely defined, I present a counter-example to Sider's contention, consisting of a partial, implicit definition of the existential quantifier that in effect sets a given degree of connectedness among the putative parts of an object as a condition upon there being something (in the sense in question) with those parts. I then argue that such an implicit definition, taken together with an “auxiliary logic” (e.g., introduction and elimination rules), proves to function as a precisification in just the same way as paradigmatic precisifications of, e.g., “red”. I also argue that with a quantifier that is stipulated as maximally tolerant as to what mereological sums there are, precisifications can be given in the form of truth-conditions of quantified sentences, rather than by implicit definition.     

Health Survey of Adults with Neurofibromatosis 1 Compared to Population Study Controls

Neurofibromatosis type 1 (NF1) is a genetic, autosomal dominant multi-organ disease characterized by susceptibility to tumor formation, changes in skin pigmentation, skeletal abnormalities, and neuropsychological deficits. Clinical studies have shown impaired health-related quality of life (HQoL) in adults with NF1. However, little is known about HQoL in non-clinical NF1 samples. We conducted a cross-sectional self-report survey of 142 persons with NF1 (M age?=?50.3 years, SD?=?12.0, range 32 to 80; 62.0% females) recruited from non-clinical settings. Several HQoL domains, including life satisfaction, mental health, sleep, pain, gastrointestinal problems, oral health, and social support, were compared between the NF1 sample and 46,293 controls from the HUNT3 population study. We also examined gender differences within the NF1 sample and predictors of HQoL. Compared to controls, the NF1 sample reported significantly poorer life satisfaction, mental health, sleep, and oral health, and more pain, gastrointestinal problems, comorbid diseases, and memory problems. Several HQoL domains were significantly correlated. Mental health was the only unique significant predictor of overall life satisfaction. Women with NF1 reported significantly more mental health, sleep, and pain problems than men with NF1. Mental health assessment and management should be integrated into clinical care of persons with NF1 to potentially improve their HQoL.     

Formulating deflationism

I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, ${\langle \text{p}\rangle}$ is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue that certain circularity charges rest on mistaken assumptions about logic that lead to Carroll’s regress. I show how the propositional quantifier can be seen as on a par with first-order quantifiers and so equally acceptable to use. While the proposed parallelism between these quantifiers is controversial in general, deflationists have special reasons to affirm it. I further argue that the main three types of approach the truth-paradoxes are open to an adherent of (Q), and that the derivation of general facts about truth can be explained on its basis.     

HYPNOSIS AS SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE

Å s , A. & O sstvold , S. Hypnosis as subjective experience. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1968, 9, 33–38.—Fifty female students were interviewed about their subjective experiences during experimental hypnosis. A majority of the experiences correlated positively with measured depth of hypnosis. A factor analysis suggested three experiential factors, differently correlated with hypnotic depth.     

The corpus callosum: Some anatomical and functional considerations with special reference to language

Recent studies on the anatomy and development of the corpus callosum (CC) are reviewed, and discussed in relation to present theories of the function of the CC. The contributions of various pathological conditions of the CC, as well as that of the split-brain studies, to the understanding of the functions of the CC are considered. The recent theory that the language dominant hemisphere exerts inhibitory influences over the nondominant hemisphere via the CC did not receive much support, and an alternative theory implicating the CC in the establishment of lateralization of language is presented. Direct evidence for this view is as yet not available, but it receives some support from cases of agenesis of the CC.     

Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

A deflationary theory of reference

The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S says something about x” are exhaustive of the notions of aboutness and reference. An account of the usefulness of “about” is then given, which, I argue, is superior to that of Horwich. I close with a few considerations about how the advertised theory relates to well-known issues of reference, the conclusions of which is (1) that the issues concern reference and aboutness only insofar as the words “about” and “refer” serve to generalise over the claims that are really at issue, (2) that the theory of reference will not settle the issues, and (3) that it follows from (2) that the issues do not concern the nature of aboutness or reference.