Effects of opportunity to reciprocate and self-esteem on help-seeking behavior

The present investigation explored the link between an individual's self-esteem and willingness to seek help under conditions in which future reciprocity is, or is not, expected Based on past research on (a) the effects of perceived opportunity to reciprocate on help seeking, and (b) the effects of self-esteem on help-seeking and receiving, it was expected that relative to low self-esteem individuals, high self-esteem individuals would be more committed to the norm of reciprocity in interpersonal helping, and be more reluctant to seek help which cannot be reciprocated Two studies were conducted In the first it was observed that the higher the level of self-esteem the more the expressed commitment to the norm of reciprocity as measured by scores on an especially designed scale The second study assessed actual help-seeking behavior, and found that least help was sought by high self-esteem individuals who did not foresee an opportunity for future reciprocity The conceptual and applied implications of these findings are discussed     

No attentional bias for pictoral stimuli in spider-fearful subjects

A number of experiments have shown that (spider) fearful subjects direct their attention to fear-relevant words, even when these words are irrelevant to the completion of a target task (e.g., color naming). The present study examined whether subjects with an intense fear of spiders also display such attentional bias for a fear-relevant pictoral stimulus. Female spider-fearful (n=13) and control subjects (n=13) saw neutral patterns (i.e., horizontal and vertical bars). One pattern served as target for a reaction time, while the other pattern served as nontarget. Targets and nontargets were accompanied by either fear-relevant or neutral pictoral material (i.e., a picture of a spider or a picture of a flower, respectively). The fear-relevant picture did not selectively delibate reaction time performance of spider-fearful subjects. Thus, no evidence was found for an attentional bias for fear-relevant pictoral material in subjects with an intense fear of spiders. Instead, fearful subjects exhibited a general inhibition of performance which became stronger over trials. This suggests that the fear-relevant picture induced a state of anxious arousal or defensive withdrawal that interfered with reaction time performance on both fear-relevant and neutral trials.     

Philosophy of medicine in the Netherlands

This report explores the relationship between philosophy and medicine in the Netherlands. In Section 1 we outline the ups and downs of medico-philosophical research in our country: pre-war flourishing, post-war decline, and modern renaissance. In Section 2 we review recent Dutch literature in the philosophy of medicine. The topics dealt with include methodology of medical science, alternative medicine, the basic concepts of medicine, anthropological medicine, medicalization, medicine and culture, and health care ethics.     

Common items and reliability in personality measurement

Most psychological tests and inventories, particularly in personality and attitude measurement, contain common items, that is, various subscales of the test or inventory may share one or more items in common. Surprisingly, the role of common items in such a fundamental personality test attribute as reliability is not known. The present report specifically considered common-item contributions to test internal consistency reliability using extant data from the California Psychological Inventory. No negative contribution of item overlap was found. To the contrary, it was concluded that the use of common items is an economical technique for increasing the total number of items in the scales, thus increasing scale internal reliabilities without increasing the overall number of items in the inventory.     

Bias and error in human judgment

Currently prevalent views of human inference are contrasted with an integrated theory of the epistemic process. The prevailing views are characterized by the following orienting assumptions: (1) There exist reliable criteria of inferential validity based on objectively veridical or optimal modes of information processing. (2) Motivational and cognitive factors bias inferences away from these criteria and thus enhance the likelihood of judgmental error. (3) The layperson's epistemic process is pluralistic; it consists of a diverse repertory of information-processing strategies (heuristics, schemas) selectively invoked under various circumstances. By contrast, the present analysis yields the following conclusions: (1) There exist no secure criteria of validity. (2) Psychological factors that bias inferences away from any currently accepted criteria need not enhance the likelihood of error. (3) The inference process may be considered unitary rather than pluralistic. The various strategies and biases discussed in the literature typically confound universal epistemic process with specific examples (or contents) of such processes. Empirical support for the present analysis is presented, including evidence refuting proposals that specific contents of inference are of universal applicability; evidence suggesting that people do not, because of a reliance on subnormative heuristics, underutilize nonnative statistical information—rather, people seem unlikely to utilize any information if it is nonsalient or (subjectively) irrelevant; and evidence demonstrating that the tendency of beliefs to persevere despite discrediting information can be heightened or lowered by introducting appropriate motivational orientations.     

Helping is not enough: Recipient's reactions to aid as a function of positive and negative information about the self

The present research investigated the effects of experimentally induced positive and negative feedback about the self on the recipient's subsequent reactions to aid. In line with a consistency prediction, subjects given positive feedback who later received aid had lower mood ratings and less favorable self-evaluations than those who were given positive feedback but no subsequent help. Conversely, subjects given negative feedback who later received aid had higher mood ratings and more positive self-evaluations than those who were given negative feedback but no subsequent help. Subjects' evaluations of another individual were characterized by aid main effects, which indicate that an other who helped was evaluated more favorably than an other who did not help. The conceptual and applied implications of these results are discussed.     

Does inconsistency always lead to negative affect? The influence of need for closure on affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency

We present an experiment showing that need for closure (NFC)—defined as the epistemic desire for certainty—can moderate individuals' affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency. Informed by Kruglanski and colleagues' new theory, that cognitive inconsistency elicits negative affect particularly under certain circumstances, we find that NFC (i.e. the desire for certain, stable and unambiguous knowledge) influences the strength of consistency effects and resulting negative affect. More specifically, we find that individuals who are high on NFC experience more negative affect upon encountering an inconsistent (vs. consistent) cognition. However, when individuals are low on NFC, inconsistency is irrelevant, and their affect depends on whether the ultimate outcome of the cognition is positive or negative. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research.     

Making Americans Feel Great Again? Personal Significance Predicts Political Intentions of Losers and Winners of the 2016 U.S. Election

Reactions of losers and winners of political elections have important consequences for the political system during times of power transition. In four studies conducted immediately before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, we investigated how personal significance induced by success or failure of one's candidate is related to hostile versus benevolent intentions toward political adversaries. We found that the less significant supporters of Hillary Clinton and supporters of Donald Trump felt after an imagined (Study 1A) or actual (Study 2) electoral failure the more they were willing to engage in peaceful actions against the elected president and the less they were willing to accept the results of the elections. However, while significance gain due to an imagined or actual electoral success was related to more benevolent intentions among Clinton supporters (Study 1B), it was related to more hostile intentions among Trump supporters (Studies 1B, 2, and 3).     

When opportunity knocks: bottom-up priming of goals by means and its effects on self-regulation

Four studies using general attribute goals or specific task goals revealed that attainment means cognitively activate the goals they are perceived to serve. A range of means replicated this effect including goal-directed activities, specific behavioral strategies, or opportunities, assumed to afford effective goal pursuit. The increased accessibility of a currently pursued goal due to "bottom-up" priming by its attainment means improved task persistence and performance, whereas a similarly increased accessibility of a competing goal impeded task persistence and performance.     

Leaders as Planners and Movers: Supervisors' Regulatory Modes and Subordinates' Performance

In three field studies, we found that leaders high in both locomotion and assessment tendencies (Studies 1 and 2: evaluated by subordinates; Study 3: evaluated by leaders themselves) elicited higher levels of performance from their subordinates (Studies 1 and 3: as assessed by the subordinates themselves; Study 2: as assessed by their supervisors) than leaders low in one or both of these tendencies. The research supports the notion that locomotion and assessment constitute critical regulatory functions whose conjunction is indispensible for successful performance, whether on the level of the individual (Kruglanski et al., 2000) or the group (Mauro et al., 2009).