Do locally defined feature discontinuities capture attention?

Results from previous visual search studies have suggested that abrupt onsets produce involuntary shifts of attention (i.e., attentional capture), but discontinuities in simple features such as color and brightness do not (Jonides & Yantis, 1988). In the present study we tested whether feature discontinuities (i.e., “singletons”) can produce attentional capture in a visual search task if defined “locally” or over a small spatial range. On each trial, a variable number of letters appeared, one of which differed from the others in color or intensity. The location of this singleton was uncorrelated with target location. Local discontinuities were created by embedding the letters in a dot texture. In Experiment 1, display size effects for singleton targets were not reduced with the addition of a background dot texture. Similar results were obtained in Experiment 2, regardless of variations in texture density. Experiment 3 confirmed that when targets are defined by a color or intensity singleton, they are detected preattentively, and that increasing texture density yields faster detection. We conclude that the spatial range over which feature discontinuities are defined may influence the guidance of spatial attention, but it has no influence on their ability to capture attention.     

The relationship between rational thinking and intelligence in children

This study ws designed to evaluate the efficacy of a four-session REE curriculum and examine the relationship between intelligence and the endorsement of irrational beliefs in elementary school children. A twotailedt-test administered to examine difference between pre- and post-test scores onThe Idea Inventory was statistically significant,t (1,94)=5.90,p<.0001. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between pre-test scores onThe Idea Inventory and theOtis-Lennon School Ability Test failed to reach significance (r=.15) suggesting higher intelligence did not predict greater endorsement of rational beliefs. The post-test scores using the same two instruments reached a correlation coefficient of r=.51 and was statistically significant at the .01 level. A higher percentage of children who scored below the mean on theOtis-Lennon improved from pre- to post-test than children who scored above the mean.     

A technique for controlling speech disfluencies induced by delayed auditory feedback

On the basis of cybernetic models of speech it was hypothesized that “stuttering” induced by delayed auditory feedback could be significantly reduced if the Ss were provided with an alternate input to which they could attend. The results of the experiment supported the hypothesis. The possible implications for the treatment stuttering are discussed.     

The Drawback of Sexual Empowerment: Perceiving Women as Emancipated but Still as Sexual Objects

Sex Roles - The belief that sexualization might be used as a source of power for women in Western societies is spreading (Anderson 2014; Erchull and Liss 2013). The present research aims at...     

Part-whole practice of movement sequences

A 16-element movement sequence was taught under part-whole and whole-practice conditions. Participants (N = 18) produced a right-arm lever movement to sequentially presented target locations. The authors constructed part-whole practice by providing practice on only the 1st 8 elements on the 1st day of practice (100 repetitions of the 8-element sequence) and on all 16 elements on the 2nd day of practice (100 repetitions of the 16-element sequence). The whole-practice group practiced all 16 elements on both days (100 repetitions of the 16-element sequence per day). No differences in sequence structure or in movement duration of the 16-element sequence were noted on the retention test (Day 3). On transfer tests in which the 1st and last 8 elements were tested separately, however, the participants in the part-whole practice group performed more quickly than the participants in the whole-practice group, especially on the last 8 elements. Participants in the whole-practice group appeared to code the sequence so that it was relatively difficult to fully partition it into separate movements. Thus, on the transfer tests, there continued to be residual effects of the 8 elements that did not have to be produced but slowed down the rate of responding for the whole-practice group. That finding was not observed for the part-whole practice group.     

Confirmatory factor analysis of the WMS-III in patients with temporal lobe epilepsy

Five competing models specifying the factor structure underlying the Wechsler Memory Scale-Third Edition (D. Wechsler, 1997b) primary subtest scores were evaluated in a sample of patients with intractable temporal lobe epilepsy (N = 254). Models specifying separate immediate and delayed constructs resulted in inadmissible parameter estimates and model specification error. There were negligible goodness-of-fit differences between a 3-factor model of working memory, auditory memory, and visual memory and a nested--more parsimonious--2-factor model of working memory and general memory. The results suggest that specifying a separate visual memory factor provides little advantage for this sample--an unexpected finding in a population with lateralized dysfunction, for which one might have predicted separate auditory and visual memory dimensions.     

Dyslexia and handedness: developmental phonological and surface dyslexias are associated with different biases for handedness

Developmental disorders of reading and spelling have long been associated with increased left- and mixed-handedness but the evidence has been controversial. The right shift (RS) theory of handedness and cerebral dominance, developed by Annett from 1972 onward, offers resolutions to several puzzles about laterality in the so-called dyslexias. This review of findings in the light of the theory shows that "phonological" dyslexics are less likely to be right-handed, while "surface" or "dyseidetic" dyslexics are more likely to be right-handed than the general population.     

Deontic and epistemic reasoning in children

It is widely accepted that adults show an advantage for deontic over epistemic reasoning. Two published studies (Cummins, 1996b; Harris and Núñez, 1996, Experiment 4) found evidence of this “deontic advantage” in preschool-aged children and are frequently cited as evidence that preschoolers show the same deontic advantage as adults. However, neither study has been replicated, and it is not clear from either study that preschoolers were showing the deontic advantage under the same conditions as adults. The current research investigated these issues. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate both Cummins’s and Harris and Núñez’s studies with 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 56), replicating the former with 4-year-olds and the latter with both 3- and 4-year-olds. Experiment 2 modified Cummins’s task to remove the contextual differences between conditions, making it more similar to adult tasks, finding that 4-year-olds (n = 16) show no evidence of the deontic advantage when no authority figure is present in the deontic condition, whereas both 7-year-olds (n = 16) and adults (n = 28) do. Experiment 3 removed the authority figure from the deontic condition in Harris and Núñez’s task, again finding that 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 28) show no evidence of the deontic advantage under these conditions. These results suggest that for preschoolers, the deontic advantage is reliant on particular contextual cues such as the presence of an authority figure, in the deontic condition. By 7 years of age, however, children are reasoning like adults and show evidence of the advantage when no such contextual cues are present.     

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.