A Cross-Classified CFA-MTMM Model for Structurally Different and Nonindependent Interchangeable Methods

Multirater (multimethod, multisource) studies are increasingly applied in psychology. Eid and colleagues (2008) proposed a multilevel confirmatory factor model for multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) data combining structurally different and multiple independent interchangeable methods (raters). In many studies, however, different interchangeable raters (e.g., peers, subordinates) are asked to rate different targets (students, supervisors), leading to violations of the independence assumption and to cross-classified data structures. In the present work, we extend the ML-CFA-MTMM model by Eid and colleagues (2008) to cross-classified multirater designs. The new C4 model (Cross-Classified CTC[M-1] Combination of Methods) accounts for nonindependent interchangeable raters and enables researchers to explicitly model the interaction between targets and raters as a latent variable. Using a real data application, it is shown how credibility intervals of model parameters and different variance components can be obtained using Bayesian estimation techniques.     

The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: a psychological perspective

The paper argues that Zahavi's defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. "identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena", and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object "feels" like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-reflective minimal core self and the explanation of the unity and identity of the self through time give rise to intractable problems.     

The problems of consciousness and content in theories of perception

The paper aims to show, first, that O’Regan’s and Noë’s Sensorimotor Theory of Vision and Visual Experiences suffers from circularity, and that evidence from empirical research within perception psychology unequivocally invalidates their theory. Secondly, to show that the circularity in O’Regan’s and Noë’s theory of vision and in other general causal and functional theories of perception (i.e. Gibson’s and Marr’s theories of perception) is the inevitable consequence of mutually conflicting assumption of Cartesian dualism underlying these theories. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences of this conflict of assumptions for psychological theories of perception.