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T M?ntyl? L B?ckman 《Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition》1992,18(6):1298-1309
Adult age differences in the consistency effect were examined in 3 experiments. The consistency effect refers to items inconsistent with expectations being better remembered than items consistent with expectations. Younger and older adults walked into an office room and viewed objects that varied in their consistency with expectation. Immediate and delayed recognition tests on item information (i.e., distractors were defined by their semantic identity) revealed that both age groups recognized unexpected items better than expected items. However, when recognition of token information was requested (i.e., distractors were defined by their physical appearance), younger adults, in contrast to older adults, exhibited consistency effects. Also, under divided attention, young adults revealed the same pattern of data as did elderly adults under full attention. The results are discussed in terms of capacity-related differences in distinctive encoding. 相似文献
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Martinus J. A. Buekers Richard A. Magill Kellie G. Hall 《The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A: Human Experimental Psychology》1992,44(1):105-117
Even though it can be shown that verbal knowledge of results (KR) is redundant with sensory feedback for learning certain motor skills, such findings do not eliminate the possibility that when KR is available it influences underlying learning processes. In order to examine the function of KR more closely, two experiments were designed in which the subjects received conflicting information about their own sensory feedback and the KR presented by the experimenter. In Experiment 1, two erroneous-KR groups, a correct-KR group, and a no-KR group performed 150 practice trials on a simple anticipation timing task and then performed three no-KR retention tests of 30 trials each following intervals of 10 minutes, 1 week, and 1 month. The results supported previous findings that providing correct KR is redundant in anticipation tasks. However, learning was influenced by KR as subjects performed according to the erroneous KR information, thereby ignoring their sensory feedback even after a 1-month interval. In Experiment 2, subjects practised a more complex striking response for the anticipation task for 75 trials and then performed no-KR retention trials either immediately, or 1 day or 1 week later. One of the groups received erroneous KR after 50 practice trials with correct KR. The results confirmed and extended those from Experiment 1, as erroneous KR, even after initial practice with correct KR, influenced retention performance. These results indicate that although KR provides information that is not needed to learn anticipation timing skills, this augmented verbal information is a dominant source of information that influences underlying cognitive processes involved in learning motor skills. 相似文献
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - 相似文献
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Angela M. Smith 《Journal of applied philosophy》2015,32(2):115-132
There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to resolve this apparent tension, many philosophers appeal to a tracing principle to argue that agents are morally responsible (only) for those attitudes whose existence can be traced back, causally, to a voluntary action or omission in the past. My aim in this article is to critically evaluate this tracing strategy and to argue that it gives us a misguided picture of when and why we are morally responsible for our attitudes. I argue that we should accept a ‘judgment sensitivity’ condition of moral responsibility rather than a ‘voluntary control’ condition, and defend this account against various objections. 相似文献
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