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1.
Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco-operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show that the level of contribution depends on the provision threshold, and that it increases when contributions are not restricted to be all-or-none. We present, discuss, and competitively test two models for this class of social dilemmas, one postulating maximization of expected utility and the other yielding an equitable solution.  相似文献   
2.
Our research studied the gender-specific perceptions of Arab-Israeli adolescents regarding issues that determine female subordination (e.g., inheritance rights, freedom of movement, and female chastity). The main finding shows that young females oppose the imposition of social constraints upon women significantly more than their male counterparts, while both sexes are in agreement regarding the issues they conceive more or less traditionally; both express the strong conservative attitudes regarding the Islamic code of protecting female honor and chastity. The findings imply that, while females do not oppose the preservation of the cultural code that underlies their subordinate position, they ascribe to it more lenient normative implications.This paper developed out of the masters thesis of Mr. Mohammed Masalha submitted to the Department of Sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem under the supervision of the first author and Professor Reuven Kahane. Special thanks are due to Helene Hogri for her indispensable editorial assistance and to Zvi Richter for his statistical aid. We also thank the NCJW Institute for Innovation in Education for funding the technical aspects of this paper.  相似文献   
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A binary detection task, free from sensory components, is investigated. A deterministic model prescribing a fixed cutoff point is confirmed; a probabilistic model, which generalizes Lee’s micromatching model for externally distributed stimuli, is rejected.  相似文献   
5.
Considered in this paper is a decision task which has been employed to study multistage betting behavior. When the task commences, a decision maker (DM) is provided with some capital x (x > 0) which he is required to allocate over m (m > 1) mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive alternatives, each of which occurs with probability pi (pi > 0, i = 1,…, m; Σi=1mpi = 1). If the amount yi is allocated to alternative i (yi ≥ 0, Σi=1myi = x) and alternative i obtains, DM's capital for the next stage of the game becomes yiri, where ri (ri > 0) is the return per unit allocated to alternative i. The task consists of N stages.Defining risk in terms of the mean and variance of DM's bets, and assuming that the minimization of risk is DM's objective, decision policies satisfying this objective are derived in closed form and their testable properties are briefly discussed.  相似文献   
6.
A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game‐theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within‐team social dilemma in a between‐team competition for an exogenously determined prize. In equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free‐riding. Extending existing literature, we focus on asymmetric competitions between teams of unequal size, and competitions between more than two teams. Comparing two protocols for sharing the prize—egalitarian and proportional profit‐sharing rules—we find that (i) free‐riding diminishes and (ii) team members contribute more toward their team's effort when they belong to the larger team and when the profit‐sharing rule is proportional. (iii) Additionally, under the egalitarian profit‐sharing rule team members contribute more than predicted by the equilibrium solution. We discuss implications of our findings for eliciting contributions in competitive environments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
7.
Games of timing constitute a sub-class of two-person, constant-sum, infinite games, where the problem facing each player is not what action to take, but rather when he should take action. The theoretical structure of games of timing with complete information and equal accuracy functions is described. An experimental paradigm of such games is presented by a computer-controlled, two-person, infinite game that simulates the Western-style duel.Ten pairs of male subjects participated in three sessions each in a duel experiment. Each pair played 420 duels in which both players had the same accuracy function, but the starting number of bullets available to each player in the dyad was varied systematically. The results of this experiment are analyzed and discussed in terms of variables that relate to predictions arising from the mathematical theory of duels.  相似文献   
8.
The paradigm of the 2-person, zerosum, infinite game as a model of bipolarized conflicts in real time is extended to the probabilistic duel, where a player does not know with certainty whether or not this opponent is armed, but only knows the probability of such armament. Twenty dyads participated in a computer-controlled probabilistic duel experiment, ten of them playing a noisy version (where all bullets fired are public knowledge) and ten playing a silent version (where unsuccessful fire is unknown to the opponent). Several game-theoretic implications were tested, some of which demonstrate the efficacy of the theory of games of timing as an explicatory mechanism for decision behavior in experimental duels.  相似文献   
9.
NPER II is an on-line PDP-11/45 computer program for studying bargaining and coalition formation processes within the framework of n-person games in characteristic function form. The extensive vocabulary of the program and its mode of operation are presented nontechnically, followed by an examination of a protocol from a sample four-person game. Improvements over a previous version of the program and applications to other experimental paradigms investigating coalition formation and bargaining are discussed in the last two sections of the paper.  相似文献   
10.
The hypothesis is tested that the response to dextroamphetamine in terms of activity, attention, impulsivity, and autonomic activity is similar in normal (N) and hyperactive (H) children. Fourteen N and 15 H boys had skin conductance (SC), heart rate (HR), and finger temperature (ST) recorded during rest, presentation of eight 75- dB tones, and a reaction time (RT) procedure on three occasions: off drug (Day 1) and after ingestion (double-blind) of placebo and of .5 mg/kg dextroamphetamine. Both N and H groups showed drug effects, compared to placebo, of reduced motor activity and impulsivity, improved attention (RT), increased HR and HR slowing during RT foreperiods, and decreased ST. Both groups also had decreases in SC responsivity but in different parts of the test. Placebo compared to Day 1 produced increased activity and autonomic arousal but no change in RT. Stimulant drugs thus have similar behavioral and autonomic effects in both N and H boys, but the beneficial effects on behavior do not depend critically on increases in arousal.  相似文献   
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