Secondary enuresis in institutionalized conduct-disordered children

The incidence of secondary enuresis in 16 institutionalized conduct-disordered children was examined. In contrast to a control group of 16 noninstitutionalized conduct-disordered children, the former showed significantly more enuretic behaviour. Also, enuresis began within 6 mo. of the children's separation from their families, suggesting this problem is very likely related to the emotional trauma surrounding the change in living conditions. However, the small number of subjects limits further interpretation of the findings.     

Topographic electroencephalographic alpha in recovered depressed elderly

Late-middle-aged and elderly normal volunteers with past histories of Major Depression according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (third edition-revised) criteria were compared with sex- and age-matched control subjects using topographic electroencephalographic (EEG) indices. Healthy, euthymic recovered depressed subjects showed greater alpha amplitudes than controls. Delta, theta, and beta amplitudes did not reliably distinguish the groups. Considered in the context of previous research indicating that actively depressed subjects exhibit elevated EEG alpha compared to controls, these findings raise questions concerning state and trait conceptualizations of depression and EEG alpha.     

Understanding the language of thought

Conclusions To conclude then, our question was, What determines the content of a thought? This question gets its punch by being set against the background assumption that thoughts are internal physical occurrences. The answer I have proposed is that thoughts can be classified in four importantly different ways. Introspection yields syntactic categories. These are important for cognitive processing, but they do not correspond to contents. A second way of categorizing thoughts is in terms of narrow content. This is determined by the functional role of the thought in rational architecture together with the way in which that rational architecture is tied to the world through input correlations. Narrow contents are indexical, so to get truth bearers we must augment the narrow contents with the values of the indexical parameters. Propositional content can be taken to consist of pairs of narrow contents and values for indexical parameters. Finally, thoughts can be classified in terms of that clauses. This kind of classification does not uniquely determine propositional content, but describes it in a more general way.     

Semantic and associative priming in the cerebral hemispheres: some words do, some words don't ... sometimes, some places

This study investigated spreading activation for words presented to the left and right hemispheres using an automatic semantic priming paradigm. Three types of semantic relations were used: similar-only (Deer-Pony), associated-only (Bee-Honey), and similar + associated (Doctor-Nurse). Priming of lexical decisions was symmetrical over visual fields for all semantic relations when prime words were centrally presented. However, when primes and targets were lateralized to the same visual field, similar-only priming was greater in the LVF than in the RVF, no priming was obtained for associated-only words, and priming was equivalent over visual fields for similar + associated words. Similar results were found using a naming task. These findings suggest that it is important to lateralize both prime and target information to assess hemisphere-specific spreading activation processes. Further, while spreading activation occurs in either hemisphere for the most highly related words (those related by category membership and association), our findings suggest that automatic access to semantic category relatedness occurs primarily in the right cerebral hemisphere. These results imply a unique role for the right hemisphere in the processing of word meanings. We relate our results to our previous proposal (Burgess & Simpson, 1988a; Chiarello, 1988c) that there is rapid selection of one meaning and suppression of other candidates in the left hemisphere, while activation spreads more diffusely in the right hemisphere. We also outline a new proposal that activation spreads in a different manner for associated words than for words related by semantic similarity.     

Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application.     

A resource-bounded agent addresses the newcomb problem

In the Newcomb problem, the standard arguments for taking either one box or both boxes adduce what seem to be relevant considerations, but they are not complete arguments, and attempts to complete the arguments rely upon incorrect principles of rational decision making. It is argued that by considering how the predictor is making his prediction, we can generate a more complete argument, and this in turn supports a form of causal decision theory.