Response selection strategies and realism of confidence judgments

Two studies were conducted to examine how response selection strategy is related to confidence ratings and to performance on general knowledge questions. In both studies subjects were asked to answer 80 general knowledge questions and to rate their confidence in the correctness of the answer selected. A pilot study, in which subjects thought aloud while answering general knowledge questions, was carried out to identify different response selection strategies. In the first study, 40 subjects were asked to indicate which of four strategies (immediate recognition, inference, intuition, or guessing) they used for selecting an answer. In Study 2, think aloud reports from 20 subjects were coded into the same four strategies. The distribution of strategies differed between the studies, but there were very similar relations among strategy, confidence, and correctness of answer in the two studies. Response selection strategy was related to correctness of answer when confidence was partialed out. More specifically, immediate recognition was associated with higher proportion correct than with the other strategies. It was also found that ratings of how difficult the knowledge questions were to fellow students of the subjects were on a much more realistic level than the confidence ratings were. It is concluded that people could improve their confidence judgments by taking into account (a) how difficult a question is to other people, and (b) the response selection strategy used for answering the question.     

Effects of Acute Stress or Centrally Injected Interleukin-1beta on Neuropeptide Expression in the Immune System

Acute stress stimulates the expression and release of corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) and arginine vasopressin (AVP) from the hypothalamus, and the pro-opiomelanocortin products beta-endorphin and ACTH from the anterior pituitary. These neuropeptides are also expressed in immune tissues, and it has been proposed that they may modulate immune responses to stress through paracrine mechanisms. We subjected rats to restraint stress or central injection of interleukin (IL)-1beta to determine whether these acute stimuli can alter the expression of neuropeptides in the spleen and thymus. Restraint stress significantly increased the contents of all these neuropeptides in thymic, but not splenic, extracts. A single icv injection of IL-1beta increased contents of CRH, AVP, ACTH and beta-endorphin in the spleens of both sham-operated and adrenalectomised (ADX) rats. IL-1beta increased thymic contents of CRH and ACTH in sham-operated rats but these increases were not observed in ADX rats. These results suggest that the effects of IL-1beta on neuropeptide expression in the spleen are independent of glucocorticoids, whereas IL-1beta stimulation of neuropeptide expression in the thymus is dependent on circulating glucocorticoids. There were significant correlations between increases in CRH, ACTH and beta-endorphin in the spleen, and between CRH and ACTH in the thymus, consistent with the suggestion that IL-1beta-induced increases in ACTH and beta-endorphin may be mediated through CRH. These results provide evidence that stressors can directly influence neuropeptide expression in immune tissues. Thus stress may influence immune functions through paracrine mechanisms involving locally synthesised neuropeptides as well as through activation of the hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal axis.     

Actor-observer differences in realism in confidence and frequency judgments

Taking a social psychological approach to metacognitive judgments, this study analyzed the difference in realism (validity) in confidence and frequency judgments (i.e., estimates of overall accuracy) between one's own and another person's answers to general knowledge questions. Experiment 1 showed that when judging their own answers, compared with another's answers, the participants exhibited higher overconfidence, better ability to discriminate correct from incorrect answers, lower accuracy, and lower confidence. However, the overconfidence effect could be attributable to the lowest level of confidence. Furthermore, when heeding additional information about another's answers the participants showed higher confidence and better discrimination ability. The overconfidence effect of Experiment 1 was not found in Experiment 2. However, the results of Experiment 2 were consistent with Experiment 1 in terms of discrimination ability, confidence, and accuracy. Finally, in both experiments the participants gave lower frequency judgments of their own overall accuracy compared with their frequency judgments of another person's overall accuracy.     

Realism in confidence judgements of performance based on implicit learning

In two experiments we employed calibration methods to investigate the realism of participants' confidence ratings of their own classification performance based on knowledge acquired after training on an artificial grammar. In Experiment 1 participants showed good realism (but overconfidence) for grammatical strings but very poor realism for non-grammatical strings. Method of training (string repetition in writing or mere exposure) did not affect the realism. Furthermore, the participants underestimated their overall performance. In Experiment 2, using a more complex grammar and controlling for two types of associative chunk-strength, participants showed good realism (but still overconfidence) for both letter and symbol strings, irrespective of grammaticality. Together, these experiments show that implicit learning can give rise to knowledge products that are associated with fairly realistic meta-knowledge. It is argued that both the zero-correlation criterion and the guessing criterion are misplaced when used to define implicit knowledge; two reasons being that confidence judgements may be affected both by implicit knowledge and by inferences.     

Who Knows? Knowledge Activation,Belief in Certainty of Knowledge,Maximization Tendencies and Need for Cognition in Answerability Judgments

In this study, investigating answerability judgments, 123 participants judged whether each of 46 general knowledge questions could currently be answered by themselves, by someone else, or by no one. There were 26 consensus questions (high expected consensus about their answerability) and 20 non-consensus questions. Before each question, half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge related to the question. Results showed that answering consensus questions compared with non-consensus led to a lower proportion of “No one knows” answers. Moreover, in the knowledge rating condition compared with the control condition, participants choose “No one knows” proportionally less. Participants’ ratings of belief in certainty of knowledge were associated with more “Someone else knows” for the non-consensus questions. Moreover, tendency to maximization led to a higher proportion of “Someone else knows” options for the non-consensus questions. Finally, high need for cognition was associated with fewer choices of “Someone else knows.”     

Effects of communication with non‐witnesses on eyewitnesses' recall correctness and meta‐cognitive realism

In forensic contexts it is common that witnesses retell and discuss the experienced event many times. It is of forensic importance to understand how this influences memory and meta‐memory. Eighty‐nine participants viewed a short film and were assigned to one of four conditions: (1) Laboratory discussion (five discussions of the event with a confederate), (2) Family discussion (five discussions of the event with a family member), (3) Retell (five retellings of the event) and (4) Control. Three weeks later participants gave an open free recall, and then 3 days later confidence judged the recalled information. The results showed significant differences between the four conditions on number of correct items, incorrect items, accuracy, confidence and calibration. The results suggest that discussion of an experienced event may reduce some of the beneficial memory and meta‐memory effects caused by mere retelling, but may have no great negative effects compared to a control condition. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconstructive group therapy with HIV-affected people

This paper describes reconstructive group therapy with people affected by AIDS. It begins with the therapeutic need as we defined it in the AIDS-affected community and the practicalities of the group therapies we offered. The reconstructive perspective, based on personal construct theory, is then explored and applied to interpret both the psychosocial functioning of AIDS-affected people and group therapy. The group therapy process is described: client engagement and group beginnings, goals, group rules, leadership roles, group experiments, group issues and endings. Some problems that arose are then identified; and a sample of group process is provided. Finally, the appropriateness of the reconstructive perspective and of group therapy for these clients is discussed, together with the identification of the major ethical issues and some recommendations for its use.     

Effects of reiteration,hindsight bias,and memory on realism in eyewitness confidence

This study investigated the effects of repetition, memory, feedback, and hindsight bias on the realism in confidence in answers to questions on a filmed kidnapping. In Experiment 1 the participants showed overconfidence in all conditions. In the Repeat condition (‘how confident are you now that your previous answers are correct’) overconfidence was reduced as a consequence of the decrease in confidence in both correct and incorrect answers compared with the Repeat condition when the participants received feedback on their answers and were asked to remember their initial confidence, the confidence level was higher for correct and lower for incorrect answers. In Experiment 2, recalled confidence (the Memory condition) increased compared with the original confidence both for correct and incorrect answers; the effect of this was increased overconfidence. The Hindsight condition showed a decrease in confidence in incorrect answers. The results suggest that a unique hindsight effect may be more clearly present for incorrect than for correct answers. Our study gives further evidence for the malleability of the realism in eyewitness confidence and we discuss both the theoretical and forensic implications of our findings. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.