The effect of culture and self‐construals on predispositions toward verbal communication

This study tested the effects of culture and self‐construals (i.e., independence and interdependence) on predispositions toward verbal communication. For the purpose of this study, we focused on two main areas of verbal communication predispositions: (a) communication apprehension and (b) argumentativeness. In our path model, we expected that culture‐level individualism increases one's construal of self as independent, which, in turn, leads to a higher degree of argumentativeness and a lower level of communication apprehension. We also expected that culture‐level individualism decreases one's construal of self as interdependent, which, in turn, leads to a lower degree of argumentativeness and a higher level of communication apprehension. Data to test the model were drawn from undergraduates (N=539) studying in Korea, Hawaii, and mainland U.S. The data were partially consistent with the theoretical predictions made. The implications of the results for theory and practice are discussed.     

Language‐Games and Relativism: On Cora Diamond's Reading of Peter Winch

We will look critically at three essays by Cora Diamond concerning Peter Winch's views on the possibility of communication and criticism between language‐games. We briefly present our understanding of Winch's approach to philosophy. Then, we argue that Diamond misidentifies Winch's views, taking them to imply language‐game relativism or linguistic idealism. When she does raise valid criticisms against language‐game relativism, her critical points mainly coincide with things that Winch has already stressed in his own work. That leaves us with the question what their real disagreement amounts to. Finally, we suggest that at the bottom of Diamond's objections lies her failure to appreciate Winch's insights about the place of logic in human intercourse.     

Aversive properties of the negative stimulus in a successive discrimination

Experiment I sought to determine if the stimulus correlated with extinction in a successive discrimination was an aversive stimulus. An escape response provided an index of aversive control. Two groups of pigeons were exposed to a multiple variable-interval 30-sec extinction schedule. For the experimental group, a single peck on a second key produced a timeout during which all lights in the chamber were dark. For the control group, pecks on the second key had no contingency. The rate of responding on the timeout key during extinction for the experimental group was higher than that of the control group during all sessions of discrimination training except the first. In Exp. II, green was correlated with variable interval 30-sec and red was correlated with variable-interval 5-min. Timeouts were obtained from variable-interval 5-min. There were more timeouts from extinction in Exp. I than from variable-interval 5-min in Exp. II. Experiment III showed that not presenting the positive stimulus reduced the number of timeouts from the negative stimulus for the two birds from Exp. I that had the highest rate of timeouts from extinction, but had little effect on the two birds that had the lowest rate of timeouts. These results suggest that in a multiple schedule, the stimulus correlated with extinction, or the lower response rate, functions as a conditioned aversive stimulus. Explanations of the timeout response in terms of extinction produced variability, displaced aggression, and stimulus change, were considered but found inadequate.     

Philosophy and the real reasons for action: G. H. von Wright's understanding explanations

According to the received view, philosophy of action took a justified turn towards causalism because anti-causalists failed the causalist challenge about efficacious reasons. This paper contests that view by examining the ways in which Georg Henrik von Wright responded to causalism in his later philosophy. First, von Wright attacked the subjectivism of causalism by arguing for an objectivist view that construes reasons not as subjective mental states but as external facts of the agent's situation. Second, von Wright fundamentally disagreed with the view of philosophical inquiry that underpinned causalism. For von Wright, the task of philosophy was conceptual: to explicate what one is looking for when one is looking for the real reasons for action. In contrast, for causalists the task was ontological: to determine what kind of item in the world the real reason for action is. Examining von Wright's account contributes to contemporary assessments of the metaphilosophical dimension of the reasons/causes debate.