The Relationship Between Aesthetic Value and Cognitive Value

Recent attention to the relationship between aesthetic value and cognitive value has focused on whether the latter can affect the former. In this article, I approach the issue from the opposite direction. I investigate whether the aesthetic value of a work can influence its cognitive value. More narrowly, I consider whether a work's aesthetic value ever contributes to or detracts from its philosophical value, which I take to include the truth of its claims, the strength of its arguments, and its internal consistency. I argue that aesthetic value does have such an impact, at least sometimes and to some degree. The aesthetic merits of some works help to preserve their consistency, and the aesthetic defects of other works render them self‐contradictory.     

The Concept, and Conceptions, of Justice

ABSTRACT Occasioned by but not pretending to constitute a critique of Julian Le Grand's 'Equity as an Economic Objective', published in the first issue of the Journal of Applied Philosophy , this paper argues that the concept of justice must be distinguished from conceptions thereof. Once this is done it emerges that many of what are both offered and accepted as conceptions of justice really are not. By proceeding next both to enquire what are the incentives to such misrepresentations and to reveal some of their unrecognized costs, this is shown to be by no means a merely trifling and purely verbal matter. In particular, by misrepresenting the imposition of their peculiar and characteristic ideal of equality of outcome as the enforcement of the mandate of justice, Procrusteans unwittingly imply that they are themselves involved in appallingly shabby and discreditable practices.     

A Moral Problem for Difficult Art

Works of art can be difficult in several ways. One important way is by making us face up to unsettling truths. Such works typically receive praise. I maintain, however, that sometimes they deserve moral censure. The crux of my argument is that, just as we have a right to know the truth in certain contexts, so too we have a right not to know it. Provided our ignorance does not harm or seriously endanger others, the decision about whether to know the truth ought to be left to us. Within this limit, therefore, difficult art is morally problematic if it intentionally targets those who have chosen not to know. To illustrate the problem, I discuss the literary writings of Søren Kierkegaard, which aim to deceive readers into seeing unpleasant truths about themselves that they seek to ignore.     

Critical Notice

Collected Philosophical Papers, G. E. M. Anscombe
Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe, Edited by Cora Diamond and Jenny Teichman     

Self-reported Attitude Towards Speeding and Its Possible Consequences in Five Different Road Contexts

Driving above the permitted speed limit is a common violation on the roads of Great Britain. Moreover, speeding is associated with negative consequences in the form of damage, injury and fatal road traffic accidents. The aim of this study was to assess, by means of self-report, the prevalence of this social problem across five different contexts: a residential road, a busy shopping street, a dual carriageway, a winding country road, and a motorway. The extent to which speeding was perceived to be associated with negative consequences was also assessed. Results suggest that most drivers make judgements about the type of road on which they are driving and the degree of speeding that is acceptable, and that their intentions to speed vary accordingly. Some drivers reported a consistent intention to speed, however, and these people were characterized by greater general deviance on the road (e.g. high violation score), rather than by a stronger tendency to underestimate the negative consequences. In general, however, younger people and those with less regard for negative consequences reported stronger intentions to speed. These results are discussed with reference to strategies for addressing the problem of speeding. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Rationality of the Arms Racers

Abstract  Against Peter Baehr's 'The "irrationality" of the arms race', published in Vol. 2 No. 2 of the Journal of Applied Philosophy, this paper argues that, at least directly and in the first instance, both rationality and irrationality characterise individual beliefs and individual behaviour. Furthermore it is fundamental to the understanding of persons that, before putting anyone down as in either respect irrational, we should first reconsider whether we were right, either in attributing to them beliefs which it would have been irrational for them to hold, or in assuming that their actual purposes and priorities were indeed such as to make their behaviour—by these standards—counterproductive. Once our present questions are approached in this way it becomes apparent that we have been given no sufficient reason for concluding that there is significantly more irrationality here than elsewhere. More than enough is too much.     

Self-Determination, Wellbeing, and Threats of Harm

David Rodin argues that the right of national‐defence as conceived in international law cannot be grounded in the end of defending the lives of individuals. Firstly, having this end is not necessary because there is a right of defence against an invasion that threatens no lives. However, in this context we are to understand that ‘defending lives’ includes defending against certain non‐lethal threats. I will argue that threats to national‐self determination and self‐government are significant non‐lethal threats to the wellbeing of individuals that can justify lethal defensive force. Therefore the end of defending individuals can ground a right of national‐defence against a ‘bloodless invasion’. Secondly, Rodin argues that defending lives is not a sufficient condition for military action to be national self‐defence, because humanitarian intervention is military action to defend individuals, and such action is in deep tension with national self‐defence. I will argue that a reductive account, grounded in claims of need and threats of harm, can justify principles of both intervention and non‐intervention on the same grounds; that is, protecting the wellbeing of individuals.