Getting to the Bottom to Understand the Top

Culture is a vague and elusive concept that most individuals seldom explain or consciously think about and evaluate. It is imperative, however, that counselors engaged in multicultural counseling have an understanding of what is meant by culture. A myriad of definitions exist that focus on behaviors and artifacts to shared belief systems and worldviews. It is suggested that the philosophical assumptions underlying a worldview, the deep structure of culture, provide a framework for better understanding cultural differences. Viewing culture from this holistic perspective facilitates culturally relevant meanings to the explanation of behaviors, thus placing one at a greater advantage for understanding behavioral and attitudinal differences. Cultura es un concepto vago y evasivo que la mayoría de los individuos no suelen explicar, ni pensar conscientemente sobre él, ni tampoco lo evaluan. Sin embargo, es necesario que los consejeros que trabajan en la consejería multicultural entiendan lo que se quiere decir con cultura. Existe una miriada de definiciones que se centran en el comportamiento y los utensilios hasta formar un sistema verosimil y una visión universal. Se surgiere que las asunciones filisóficas que son la base de una visión universal, la estructura profunda de cultura, proporcionan un cuadro que permite entender mejor las diferencias culturales. El ver la cultura desde esta perspectiva holísitica facilita entiendimientos culturalmente pertinentes para la explicación de comportamientos y de este modo aumenta las ventajas para entender diferencias de conducta y diferentes actitudes.     

Appearances,Rationality, and Justified Belief

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.