DO PUBLIC SCHOOLS TEACH SECULAR HUMANISM? WHY WE MAY NEVER KNOW

Members of the New Right regularly charge that public schools teach secular humanism. This alleged teaching of secular humanism is held responsible for varied social ills and is perceived as a violation of constitutional prohibitions against the advocacy of one set of religious beliefs over others. Although New Right attacks may be perceived as political tactics, the author explores them as empirical claims that schools are in fact teaching secular humanism. Currently, there is no persuasive body of research supporting the New Right allegations. The author questions whether or not such research could be designed and concludes that it could but, for various reasons, is unlikely ever to be enacted.     

Behavioral Marriage Therapy: II. Empirical Perspective

Two recent published reviews of research on behavioral marriage therapy stimulated us to supplement these accounts with additional relevant data. First, we place research on behavioral couples therapy in the broader context of outcome research on nonbehavioral marital therapy. We then summarize the results of 23 studies of behavioral couples therapy not included in these previous reviews and conclude that these additional data on controlled and comparative studies do little to enhance the current empirical status of the efficacy of behavioral marriage therapy and in no case do they establish the superiority of social learning approaches. It is concluded that an open mind to all sources of data on the efficacy of marital therapy is needed if the field is to make meaningful advances.     

Guidance and Counseling in New Zealand

This article describes guidance and counseling in multicultural New Zealand as a professional service facing social change and supported by training, research, and a national association.     

Biodiversity and All That Jazz

This article considers several of the most famous arguments for our being under a moral obligation to preserve species, and finds them all wanting. The most promising argument for preserving all varieties of species might seem to be an aesthetic one. Unfortunately, the suggestion that the moral basis for the preservation of species should be construed as similar to the moral basis for the preservation of a work of art seems to presume (what are now widely regarded as) erroneous conceptualizations of "species". The article concludes by arguing that more promising approaches to how "species" ought to be conceptualized suggest that the preservation of species should be construed as of far greater aesthetic importance than is suggested by focusing upon the preservation of any single work of art. Hence, if we have a moral obligation to preserve a single artwork, then we have a far greater moral obligation to preserve species than has often been presumed.     

The Broad View of Aesthetic Experience

Peter Kivy and Noël Carroll advocate a narrow view of aesthetic experience according to which it consists mainly in attention to formal properties. Excluded are cognitive and moral properties. I defend the broader view that includes the latter properties. I argue first that cognition and moral assessment can be inseparable in experience from grasp of form and expressiveness. Second, Kivy and Carroll must extend the notion of form itself beyond ordinary usage to accommodate acknowledged aesthetic experience. Third, the broad view has a more impressive historical lineage than the narrow view. Fourth, aesthetic experience is appreciation of aesthetic value, and the latter is more plausibly analyzed in a broad way.