China and the Problem of Human Rights: Ancient Verities and Modern Realities

The six sections of the essay discuss recurrent issues relative to the modern advocacy of human rights and the vicissitudes of the Chinese response—universal standards versus cultural and historical particularity, individualism versus community, traditional Confucian ethics versus Western modernism, nativism versus foreign influence, the stability of the social order versus individual well-being, and the possibility of developing a view of rights a part of which is drawn from the Chinese philosophical tradition. The concluding segment examines historical conditions of law and religion and their relevance for contemporary discussion on human rights. By looking closely at selected classical texts and events, the essay offers both a sustained critique of Confucianism in its traditional formulation and a suggested attempt to re-interpret aspects of the tradition for the current situation.     

SCIENCE AND CONFUCIANISM IN RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

In contrast to Western science and religion, a topic which has been studied very much since the twentieth century, less research has been done on science and Confucianism. By way of a comparative viewpoint within the history of science, this article will deal with some aspects of science and Confucianism in retrospect, for instance, the Confucian origin of the idea of tian yuan di fang 天圓地方, the natural philosophy of qi, and the wu xing li tian zhi qi 五行沴天之氣 bringing abnormal astrological phenomena and reflecting a negative Confucian relation between politics, ethics, and nature. In the late Ming, Xiong Mingyu found that abnormal astrological phenomena, as atmospheric events, happened in the sublunar region rather than in the stars, and in the present time we can reinterpret the crisis of air pollution or global climate change as reflecting a negative Confucian relation between politics, ethics, and nature and as a warning of collective misbehavior in our use of modern scientific technologies.     

荀子性恶论的多维解读

在传统思想研究中,苟子是以性恶论而与孟子、老庄一同构成了中国古典人性论。其实,深入阅读苟子读本,笔者发现荀子对人性的评判较为复杂。传统性恶论远不能揭示荀子人性论思想的丰富性和多元性。笔者现从苟子之“性”的中性色彩、苟子之“恶”的真实解释、苟子人性论中的向善和知善、人和环境的互动四个层面予以展开论述。     

《易纬》爻辰说之三组变例探究

<易纬·乾凿度>以易与历相结合,以<周易>六十四卦两卦一组主岁,而构造出独具特色的爻辰说体系,在这其中又涉及<乾><坤>、<泰><否>和<中孚><小过>三组变例问题.对此问题,自明季以来虽论之者甚众,然犹有可商榷之处.     

Developing Ethical Leadership in China: The Value of Confucian Virtue Ethics

Most research into ethical leadership depends on Western corporate experience, however current research findings may not fit the Chinese context. As a result, it is necessary to appeal to indigenous and traditional Chinese sources of wisdom when defining and evaluating ethical leadership in China. Both rule-following ethics and instrumental approaches, which are mainly used in recent empirical studies about ethical leadership, cannot enable people to have inner motivation to behave ethically. Accordingly, this article intends to establish an ethical leadership model in China by appealing to Confucian virtue ethics. A Confucian ethical leader possesses benevolence (ren 仁) inside and treats others in a proper way according to ritual and rites (li 禮). He/she makes self-cultivation as the first priority and is a virtuous role model, influencing others in a natural way by of his/her moral charisma. For such a person, economic profitableness is not a primary concern, where instead the goals, strategies and practices of his/her organization are defined by the principle of righteousness (yi 義).     

论儒家伦理道德的普遍性与特殊性——以北宋理学家吕大临的思想的个案分析为例

本文试图以北宋理学家吕大临的思想的个案分析为例,探讨儒家伦理道德的普遍性与特殊性。文章通过对吕大临思想中的“性”、“仁”、“理义”、“天理”、“时中”等观念的解析,讨论了吕大临对儒家“道德法则”的普遍性和特殊性的看法以及他在处理两者之间关系方面的观点。     

王弼解《易》之道阐释

王弼注《易》有返归《易传》的强烈企图。从他的《周易略例》对解《易》的原则说明中,可以知道他特别重视《明象》及《明彖》,并把问题的讨论集中在阴阳符号的卦爻结构的启发上。王弼综论卦爻之义的背后则是他对天道的基本认识。由于王弼视天道为一系列的展开,所以其“意象言”之说与之成一类比的对应,由这一类比而产生了王弼在言说时独特的论述文法。在《老子注》中,“言、象、意”可以被代换成“名言、称为、无称无名”,这不但是作为一种论述的方法,而且可视为道在名言世界的一种实践。王弼既然在《周易略例》中提出“言象意”说,那么他的《周易注》是否也依此一方法而成?其次,王弼注《易》的方法,究竟使读者对《易》产生什么新的认识?凡此二点即为本文所关心之重点。     

《周易注疏》版本流变及阮刻《周易正义》补议

《周易》的注、疏合刻始于南宋茶盐司八行本,自此以后,又有十行本。阮元的《重刊十三经注疏》即是以十行本为依据。十行本为元刻明修本,这一点已为学者所指出。然而,不同的十行本,其先后传承仍然是需要辨明的。阮元所依据的十行本,乃是十行本中错讹最多的一个本子。由此我们审视阮元的重刻,其主要失误在于选择底本的错误而非刊刻工作本身。同时,由《周易正义》的情况来看,十行本与闽、监、毛本的关系亦并非仅仅是前贤所认为的递相传承。闽本实际出自元刻九行本,且此元刻九行本反倒是十行本明代补版所从出。在《周易注疏》的众版本中,武英殿本及四库本较易被忽略,然而这个版本从分卷到校勘却是比较有特色的。     

The Flexibility of Gua and Yao—Based on an Interpretation of Yizhuan

In Yizhuan’s interpretation of The Book of Changes, the book’s fundamental concepts, xiang 象 (images) and ci 辞 (words), play different roles. Concepts, including yin and yang, firmness and gentleness, sancai 三才 (three fundamentals), and the wuxing 五行 (five active elements), are used to interpret The Book of Changes through the interpretation of images, while the core Confucian values, such as benevolence and righteousness, are used to interpret The Book of Changes because of their connection with words of gua and yao. In order to expand the meaning of the words of gua and yao, Yizhuan sometimes connects words with images; in other occasions, however, it simply takes these words as independent guides. The Confucian scholars who wrote Yizhuan, therefore, not only revered the classic, but also used it to send their own message. Out of reverence, they “shu 述 (recited)”; in using it, they “zuo 作 (created)”. The combination of recitation and creation made the words of gua and yao very flexible in the process of interpretation, while the interpretation changed the meaning of the classic to a great extent.     

On Cheng Chung-Ying’s Bentiyong Onto-hermeneutics

The onto-hermeneutic approach to bentiyong 本体用 championed by Cheng Chung-Ying 成中英 is a valuable addition to comparative philosophy. In his well-honed reading, bentiyong is described as the continuous, integrative substance at the base of things, which becomes known through an ongoing hermeneutic integration and interpretation of reality. However, his use of the English word “substance” to describe bentiyong is problematic, mainly because substance, being without properties and existing without change, cannot be read as part of a hermeneutic process. Luckily, there are resources within the Chinese philosophical tradition that can help in overcoming some of the difficulties in translation presented here. Namely, the way that Zhu Xi 朱熹 approaches ti-yong as a principle (li 理) provides a better and more fittingly discursive basis for expressing the onto-hermeneutic character of bentiyong intended by Cheng, and allows English translation of the term with a firm footing in mainstream Neo-Confucianism.