BIBLICAL AND THEISTIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT AGAINST NATURALISM

Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism states that evolution cannot produce warranted beliefs. In contrast, according to Plantinga, Christian theism provides (I) properly functioning cognitive faculties in (II) an appropriate cognitive environment, in accordance with (III) a design plan aimed at producing true beliefs. But does theism fulfill criteria I–III? Judging from the Bible, God employs deceit in his relations with humanity, rendering our cognitive functions unreliable (I). Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that God's purpose would be to produce true beliefs in humans (III). Finally, from the theistic/religious perspective, it is impossible to tell whether observations have natural or supernatural causes, which undermines an appropriate cognitive environment (II). Reliable identification of deceit or miracles could alleviate these problems, but the theistic community has failed to resolve this issue. Dismissal of parts of the Bible, or attempts to find alternative interpretations, would collapse into skepticism or deism. Thus, Plantinga's problem of epistemic warrant backfires on theism.     

Living on a Slippery Slope

Our actions, individually and collectively, inevitably affect others, ourselves, and our institutions. They shape the people we become and the kind of world we inhabit. Sometimes those consequences are positive, a giant leap for moral humankind. Other times they are morally regressive. This propensity of current actions to shape the future is morally important. But slippery slope arguments are a poor way to capture it. That is not to say we can never develop cogent slippery slope arguments. Nonetheless, given their most common usage, it would be prudent to avoid them in moral and political debate. They are often fallacious and have often been used for ill. They are normally used to defend the moral status quo. Even when they are cogent, we can always find an alternate way to capture their insights. Finally, by accepting that the moral roads on which we travel are slippery, we become better able to successfully navigate them.     

Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View

Is there a duty to respond to objections in order to present a good argument? Ralph Johnson argues that there is such a duty, which he refers to as the “dialectical tier“ of an argument. I deny the (alleged) duty primarily on grounds that it would exert too great a demand on arguers, harming argumentation practices. The valuable aim of responding to objections, which Johnson 's dialectical tier is meant to satisfy, can be achieved in better ways, as argumentation is a social-epistemic activity.     

On the Theoretical Unification and Nature of Fallacies

I argue in a non-reductive sense for a plausible epistemic principle, which can (1) theoretically and instrumentally unify or systematize all fallacies, and (2) provide a justification for using such a principle for characterizing an erroneous argument as a fallacy. This plausible epistemic principle involves the idea of an error in the method of justification, which results in a failure to provide relevant evidence to satisfy certain standards of adequate proof. Thus, all fallacies are systematically disguised failures to provide substantive proof: a failure in the attempt to persuade rationally, as opposed to emotionally or rhetorically. I argue that the epistemic idea of begging the question is essential to this idea of a fallacy as an inadequate proof.     

Is Modernism Really Modern? Uncovering a Fallacy in Postmodernism

Some postmodernists criticize the view that the logics of Western thought can be employed universally. In doing so, they assume without adequate proof that different human societies have greatly different rationalities and employ completely different logics. This essay argues that, on the contrary, widely different cultures often share noteworthy similarities in rationality.     

Negotiation, Persuasion and Argument

Argument is often taken to deal with conflicting opinion or belief, while negotiation deals with conflicting goals or interests. It is widely accepted that argument ought to comply with some principles or norms. On the other hand, negotiation and bargaining involve concession exchange and tactical use of power, which may be contrasted with attempts to convince others through argument. However, there are cases where it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between bargaining and argument: notably cases where negotiators persuade others through `framing' and cases where the aims of negotiation have to do with public assertion and acceptance. Those cases suggest that the distinction between negotiation and argument is not absolute, and this raises the question whether rules about what is acceptable in argument and rules about what is acceptable in negotiation can all be viewed as instances of more general common norms about human interaction.     

Writing about patients III: Comparisons of attitudes and practices of analysts residing outside and within the USA

When analysts write about patients, they find themselves in a position of conflict. Their first loyalty is to their patients and maintaining confidentiality. However, they are also committed to advancing scientific knowledge in the psychoanalytic field. The attitudes and practices of 36 analysts residing outside the USA, who published articles using clinical material from their patients, are reported. Their attitudes and practices are compared with those of 30 author-analysts residing within the USA, who had been previously interviewed. Among the 66 analysts, geographic region was not a basis for distinguishing differences in attitudes or practices. Slightly more than twice as many analysts use only disguised material as regularly ask permission of their patients to write about them. The decision to use only disguise is somewhat more frequent for analysts who reside outside the USA than for those living within it. Analysts around the world are increasingly concerned about the accessibility of published material. More analysts have come to believe that it is necessary to ask permission before publishing material. Some analysts also believe that the request itself, and the patients reading written material about themselves, focus issues that are central to patients' characters and confl icts that can then be explored analytically.     

In Defence of the Open Question Argument

The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

汉语句子理解中句法启动机制的眼动和ERP研究

语言产生的句法启动效应在近20年得到较深入研究。那么, 语言理解和语言产生中, 句法启动效应具有相同的加工机制吗？近些年, 研究者考察了印欧语系语言理解中的启动效应, 但还存在较多争论。这究竟是句法效应, 还是策略或者语义效应, 是词汇驱动还是词汇独立的？而且, 这是人类语言理解的语系特性还是普遍特性？单独采用行为技术、眼动技术或者ERP技术很难为这些争论提供坚实的实验证据和较深入的理论解释。鉴于此, 本项目拟采用眼动和ERP结合的技术, 从心理学、语言学和认知神经科学等多学科交叉的视角考查汉语句子理解的句法启动效应。通过分析眼动和ERP实验提供的一致性和差异性证据, 本项目力图阐明和揭示汉语句子理解中句法启动效应的认知特点和机制, 检验内隐学习理论和论元结构理论在解释句法启动效应时的适用性。