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251.
G. C. Goddu 《Argumentation》1999,13(3):243-250
George Bowles and Thomas Gilbert claim that illatives such as so, therefore, and hence convey the meaning that the premise confers upon the conclusion a probability greater than 1/2. This claim is false, for there are straightforward uses of these illatives that do not convey the meaning that the probability is greater than 1/2. In addition, because Bowles' and Gilbert's claim is false, a revision of their definition of argument is required. 相似文献
252.
Kevin C. Klement 《Argumentation》2002,16(4):383-400
Attempts to evaluate a belief or argument on the basis of its cause or origin are usually condemned as committing the genetic fallacy. However, I sketch a number of cases in which causal or historical factors are logically relevant to evaluating a belief, including an interesting abductive form that reasons from the best explanation for the existence of a belief to its likely truth. Such arguments are also susceptible to refutation by genetic reasoning that may come very close to the standard examples given of supposedly fallacious genetic reasoning. 相似文献
253.
Omar Mirza 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):125-146
Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating, and cannot be rationally accepted. I distinguish between two different ways of understanding this argument, which I call the "probabilistic inference conception", and the "process characteristic conception". I argue that the former is what critics of the argument usually presuppose, whereas most critical responses fail when one assumes the latter conception. To illustrate this, I examine three standard objections to Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism: the Perspiration Objection, the Tu Quoque Objection, and the "Why Can't the Naturalist Just Add a Little Something?" Objection. I show that Plantinga's own responses to these objections fail, and propose counterexamples to his first two principles of defeat. I then go on to construct more adequate responses to these objections, using the distinctions I develop in the first part of the paper. 相似文献
254.
Hitchcock advances a diachronic Dutch Book argument (DDB) for a 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Bradley and Leitgeb
argue that Hitchcock’s DDB argument fails. We demonstrate the following: (a) Bradley and Leitgeb’s criticism of Hitchcock
is unconvincing; (b) nonetheless, there are serious reasons to worry about the success of Hitchcock’s argument; (c) however,
it is possible to construct a new DDB for 1/3 about which such worries cannot be raised. 相似文献
255.
How Berkeley Corrupted His Capacity to Conceive 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Michael Jacovides 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):415-429
Berkeley’s capacity to conceive of mind-independent bodies was corrupted by his theory of representation. He thought that
representation of things outside the mind depended on resemblance. Since ideas can resemble nothing than ideas, and all ideas
are mind dependent, he concluded that we couldn’t form ideas of mind-independent bodies. More generally, he thought that we
had no inner resembling proxies for mind-independent bodies, and so we couldn’t even form a notion of such things. Because
conception is a suggestible faculty, Berkeley’s arguments actually made it the case that he himself couldn’t conceive of mind-independent
bodies.
相似文献
Michael JacovidesEmail: |
256.
John Turri 《Synthese》2009,166(1):157-163
This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues
that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response,
I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for
infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us. 相似文献
257.
Lawrence Cahoone 《Zygon》2009,44(4):777-796
This essay explores a simple argument for a Ground of Being, objections to it, and limitations on it. It is nonsensical to refer to Nothing in the sense of utter absence, hence nothing can be claimed to come from Nothing. If, as it seems, the universe, or any physical ensemble containing it, is past‐finite, it must be caused by an uncaused Ground. Speculative many‐worlds, pocket universes and multiverses do not affect this argument, but the quantum cosmologies of Alex Vilenkin, and J. B. Hartle and Stephen Hawking, which claim that the universe came from literally nothing, would. I argue that their novel project cannot work for reasons both physical (their “nothing” is actually a vacuum state governed by eternal physical laws) and methodological (physical theory cannot explain the emergence of the physical per se). Thus my argument stands. However, as David Hume showed, a posteriori arguments like mine infer a creation, and Creator, of a certain character, namely, a stochastic concept of creation and a panentheistic, partly physical Creator lacking omniscience and omnipotence. Rather than undermining the cosmological argument, as Hume intended, these limitations liberate the concept of the Ground from unnecessary problems, as Hartshorne suggested. 相似文献
258.
Emmanuelle Danblon 《Argumentation》2009,23(3):351-359
According to Perelman (Rhétoriques, Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1989: 80), a pseudo-argument is an argument that is supposed to be convincing from a given audience viewpoint, while it is not
from another audience viewpoint. Such a claim raises the traditional problem of the boundaries between the well known “convince
versus persuade” dichotomy. This paper aims at investigating it from a contemporary rhetorical and argumentative perspective
which will take into account the fictional dimension of persuasion. In this perspective, it will be claimed that the notion
of an “as if” argument better fits to some rhetorical phenomena.
相似文献
Emmanuelle DanblonEmail: |
259.
The notion of “the burden of proof” plays an important role in real-world argumentation contexts, in particular in law. It
has also been given a central role in normative accounts of argumentation, and has been used to explain a range of classic
argumentation fallacies. We argue that in law the goal is to make practical decisions whereas in critical discussion the goal
is frequently simply to increase or decrease degree of belief in a proposition. In the latter case, it is not necessarily
important whether that degree of belief exceeds a particular threshold (e.g., ‘reasonable doubt’). We explore the consequences
of this distinction for the role that the “burden of proof” has played in argumentation and in theories of fallacy. 相似文献
260.
It is often argued that the great quantity of evil in our world makes God’s existence less likely than a lesser quantity would,
and this, presumably, because the probability that some evils are gratuitous increases as the overall quantity of evil increases.
Often, an additive approach to quantifying evil is employed in such arguments. In this paper, we examine C. S. Lewis’ objection
to the additive approach, arguing that although he is correct to reject this approach, there is a sense in which he underestimates
the quantity of pain. However, the quantity of pain in that sense does not significantly increase the probability that some
pain is gratuitous. Therefore, the quantitative argument likely fails. 相似文献