The Relevance of Intention in Argument Evaluation

The paper discusses intention as a rhetorical key term and argues that a consideration of rhetor’s intent should be maintained as relevant to both the production and critique of rhetorical discourse. It is argued that the fact that the critic usually has little or no access to the rhetor’s mind does not render intention an irrelevant factor. Rather than allowing methodological difficulties to constrain critical inquiry, I suggest some ways in which the critic can incorporate the rhetor’s intention in evaluating argumentation. To this end, a standard of fairness is presented. The paper was presented at the 6th International Conference on Argumentation in Amsterdam, June 27–30, 2006.     

Dispensability in the Indispensability Argument

One of the most influential arguments for realism about mathematical objects is the indispensability argument. Simply put, this is the argument that insofar as we are committed to the existence of the physical objects existentially quantified over in our best scientific theories, we are also committed to the mathematical objects existentially quantified over in these theories. Following the Quine–Putnam formulation of the indispensability argument, some proponents of the indispensability argument have made the mistake of taking confirmational holism to be an essential premise of the argument. In this paper, I consider the reasons philosophers have taken confirmational holism to be essential to the argument and argue that, contrary to the traditional view, confirmational holism is dispensable.     

Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation

In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses.     

More on Putnam’s models: a reply to Belloti

In an earlier paper, I claimed that one version of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism turned on a subtle, but philosophically significant, mathematical mistake. Recently, Luca Bellotti has criticized my argument for this claim. This paper responds to Bellotti's criticisms.     

PROSPECTS FOR SKEPTICAL FOUNDATIONALISM

Abstract: Properly understood, foundationalism as a meta‐epistemic theory is consistent with skepticism. This article outlines five possible points of overlap between the two views, and shows that arguments against foundationalism posited on its inability to refute skepticism are improperly framed.     

Discussions

Summary  In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.

For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54).

     

On the Legacy of Christian Ethics in Comparative Religious Ethics

This essay is an exploratory inquiry into possible Christian ethical residues in the field of comparative religious ethics (CRE), focusing particularly on the themes of tradition and canon, trajectories of ethical reflection, emancipatory criticism, common morality, and the notion of discipline. It is suggested that even if such traces exist, they may not be detrimental to the field as currently practiced.     

书面语言的提前学习对幼儿脑电α波的影响

本研究以脑电α波为分析指标探讨提前学习书面语言对幼儿大脑皮层相应区域发育的促进作用。结果表明对学龄前幼儿提前进行书面语言学习可以使幼儿脑电α波超前发展，本结果提示提前进行书面语言学习对幼儿大脑皮层相应脑区的发育与成熟有促进作用。     

Exploring the effect of regulatory focus on ad attitudes: the moderating roles of message sidedness and argument quality

This research explores the interaction effects of message sidedness and argument quality of ads on how either promotion‐focused or prevention‐focused individuals engender their ad attitudes. Two hundred and forty undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 2 (regulatory focus: prevention‐focus/promotion‐focus) × 2 (message sidedness: one‐sided messages/two‐sided messages) × 2 (argument quality (AQ): weak/strong) between‐subjects design. Results indicate that promotion‐focused individuals tend to engender more favourable attitudes to weak AQ ads than strong AQ ads, whereas prevention‐focused individuals tend to engender more favourable attitudes to strong AQ ads than weak AQ ads. In addition, results indicate more favourable attitudes for one‐sided messages over two‐sided messages for promotion‐focused individuals, as well as more favourable attitudes for two‐sided messages over one‐sided messages for prevention‐focused individuals. Furthermore, one‐sided messages result in more favourable ad attitudes when linked with weak AQ for promotion‐focused individuals; in contrast, two‐sided messages elicit more favourable ad attitudes when linked with strong AQ for prevention‐focused individuals. Results suggest that message sidedness and argument quality are closely related to regulatory focus, which has a direct impact on ad attitudes. Practical implications, theoretical contributions, limitations and directions for future research are discussed.     

DARWIN AND CHRISTIANITY: TRUTH AND MYTH

In recent years many historical myths about the relations between science and religion have been corrected but not always with sensitivity to different types and functions of “myth.” Correcting caricatures of Darwin's religious views and of the religious reaction to his theory have featured prominently in this myth‐busting. With the appearance in 2017 of A. N. Wilson's depiction of Darwin himself as a “mythmaker,” it is appropriate to reconsider where the myths lie in discourse concerning Darwin and Christianity. Problems with Wilson's account are identified and his provocative demeaning of Darwin is contrasted with an image gleaned from Darwin's friend and colleague George Romanes. The article concludes with a brief reference to the problem of suffering and to the work of Christopher Southgate.