Manifest Rationality Reconsidered: Reply to my Fellow Symposiasts

In this paper, I respond to papers on my Manifest Rationality (2000) by Leo Groarke, Hans Hansen, David Hitchcock, and Christopher Tindale presented at the meetings of the Ontario Philosophical Society, October 2000. From the many useful challenges they have directed at my position, I have chosen to focus on two. The dominant issue raised by their papers concerns my definition of argument, and particularly problems with the idea of a dialectical tier. I have selected that as the first strand. Second, several have raised questions that deal with the relationship between logic, rhetoric and dialectic. That is the second strand.     

Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument

Quine's views on indispensability arguments in mathematics are scrutinised. A weak indispensability argument is distinguished from a strong indispensability thesis. The weak argument is the combination of the criterion of ontological commitment, holism and a mild naturalism. It is used to refute nominalism. Quine's strong indispensability thesis claims that one should consider all and only the mathematical entities that are really indispensable. Quine has little support for this thesis. This is even clearer if one takes into account Maddy's critique of Quine's strong indispensability thesis. Maddy's critique does not refute Quine's weak indispensability argument. We are left with a weak and almost unassailable indispensability argument. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

提纲策略对写作成绩影响的实验研究

本研究通过两个实验,考察了写作构思阶段的自我调控策略之一的提纲之运用对写作成绩的影响及其机制。实验一发现,书面提纲和心理提纲这两种常见的提纲形式对不同长度文章的写作质量有同等的积极影响;实验二发现,“半书面提纲”形式对写作质量的影响要显著好于书面提纲。研究表明,提纲策略效应的发挥,主要在于它帮助作者提高了构思阶段的认知加工水平。     

When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?

Some proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism believe that replies that assume substantive moral claims beg the question. In this paper, I give a new account of what's wrong with such replies. On this account, many realists beg the question when they rely on substantive moral claims in their replies to the argument, but naturalists do not. While this account generalizes to some other domains, it allows perceptual and inductive realism to remain undebunked.     

Comparing self‐directed methods for training staff to create graphs using Graphpad Prism

An important skill for behavior analysts is creating graphs that clearly convey outcomes and conform to publication conventions. GraphPad Prism is software designed for creating scientific graphs, but no prior research has empirically evaluated training graphing skills using Prism. Two effective training methods are enhanced written instructions (EWI) and video modeling with voiceover instructions (VMVO), but no single‐subject studies have compared the effects of these methods. In this study, we compared the efficacy and social validity of EWI and VMVO for training staff to create graphs using Prism. A single‐subject design was employed to compare the effects of the methods on the individual performance of 11 graduate students. EWI and VMVO were both found to be effective, and more participants chose to use EWI.     

Argument by Analogy

In this essay I characterize arguments by analogy, which have an important role both in philosophical and everyday reasoning. Arguments by analogy are different from ordinary inductive or deductive arguments and have their own distinct features. I try to characterize the structure and function of these arguments. It is further discussed that some arguments, which are not explicit arguments by analogy, nevertheless should be interpreted as such and not as inductive or deductive arguments. The result is that a presumed outcome of a philosophical dispute will have to be reconsidered.     

GOD OF THE GAPS OR THE GOD OF “DESIGN AND DOMINION”? RE-VISITING NEWTON'S THEOLOGY

Starting with Gottfried Leibniz, Isaac Newton's theology has often been caricatured as putting forward a “God of the gaps” argument for God's existence and continued involvement in the world. Peter Harrison has pointed out that this characterization of Newton's theology is “not entirely clear.” A closer look at Newton's letters and the drafts to the Opticks reveals that, rather than arguing God's providential ordering and care over the world, he takes these for granted and is reluctant to specify instances of this order and care based on his physical research. He certainly believes in gaps in mechanical causes but is more eager to fill those gaps with nonmechanical natural causes than with God. Further, his system does not exhibit the two most prevalent weaknesses attributed to “God of the gaps” theologies: (1) that by describing God as intervening in natural causes his skill as a designer is maligned and (2) that by describing the physical details of God's involvement in the world one puts too much weight on theories likely to be replaced as science advances. Newton avoids the former weakness because it is only God's masterfulness as designer that he ties in any way to his theories of the physical world. He avoids the latter because he never points to God as the direct cause of any specific physical processes. Newton hoped that his system would cause his readers to marvel not only at God's providence but also at humankind's inability to sufficiently understand it.     

Six types of fallaciousness: Toward a realistic theory of logical criticism

I begin by formulating the problem of the nature of fallacy in terms of the logic of the negative evaluation of argument, that is, in terms of a theory of logical criticism; here I discuss several features of my approach and several advantages vis-à-vis other approaches; a main feature of my approach is the concern to avoid both formalist and empiricist excesses. I then define six types of fallaciousness, labeled formal, explanatory, presuppositional, positive, semantical, and persuasive; they all involve arguments whose conclusion may be said not to follow from the premises, that is, they involve the logical evaluation of relationships among propositions. I also provide a set of data consisting of four historical cases or nine specific instances of fallacious arguments; these all pertain to the Copernican controversy about the earth's motion in the seventeenth century. I end with a discussion of further problems and inquiries that deserve attention.     

Dialectic and argument in philosophy: A case study of Hegel's phenomenological preface

This article examines two problems: the role of argument in philosophy, vis-àÏs other philosophical activities; and the nature of argument in philosophy, vis-à-vis argument in other fields. The examination proceeds by reference to the notion of dialectic, which is regarded by some as offering an alternative to argument, and by reference to Hegel's Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, which explicitly discusses these very issues. The latter is reconstructed as the argument that philosophy is dialectical in part because it is pluralistic, conceptual, concrete, self-reflective, spiritual, systematic, negative, and self-referential, and in part because it sublimates the opposition between truth and falsity, method and result, change and permanence, form and content, and subject and predicate.