Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy.     

Keyboard dynamics discrepancies between baseline and deceptive eyewitness narratives

Information manipulation and cognitive load imposition make the production of deceptive narratives difficult. But little is known about the production of deception, and how its mechanisms may help distinguish truthful from deceitful narratives. This study focuses on the measurement of keystroke dynamics while typing truthful and deceptive eyewitness testimonies after a baseline assessment. While typing their narrative, some participants would undergo an auditory cognitive load. Results show that liars typed their story slower, and in less time than the truthful participants when compared to their respective baselines. The imposition of the auditory cognitive load showed adverse results, enhancing the amount of keystrokes and the time necessary to type the narrative. Classification shows better results for deceptive narrative when no auditory cognitive load is imposed. These results are discussed in terms of expanding current models to include the cognition of linguistic production and writing strategies.     

Translating Toulmin Diagrams: Theory Neutrality in Argument Representation

The Toulmin diagram layout is very familiar and widely used, particularly in the teaching of critical thinking skills. The conventional box-and-arrow diagram is equally familiar and widespread. Translation between the two throws up a number of interesting challenges. Some of these challenges (such as the relationship between Toulmin warrants and their counterparts in traditional diagrams) represent slightly different ways of looking at old and deep theoretical questions. Others (such as how to allow Toulmin diagrams to be recursive) are diagrammatic versions of questions that have already been addressed in artificial intelligence models of argument. But there are further questions (such as the relationships between refutations, rebuttals and undercutters, and the roles of multiple warrants) that are posed as a specific result of examining the diagram inter-translation problem. These three classes of problems are discussed. To the first class are addressed solutions based on engineering pragmatism; to the second class, are addressed solutions drawn from the appropriate literature; and to the third class, fuller exploration is offered justifying the approaches taken in developing solutions that offer both pragmatic utility and theoretical interest. Finally, these solutions are explored briefly in the context of the Araucaria system, showing the ways in which analysts can tackle arguments either using one diagrammatic style or another, or even a combination of the two.     

Linguistic Analysis of Written Narratives of Caregivers of Children and Adolescents with Chronic Illness: Cognitive and Emotional Processes and Physical and Psychological Health Outcomes

Used linguistic analysis of written narratives of caregivers of hospitalized youth with chronic illness to identify emotional and cognitive processes related to physical and psychological health outcomes following writing. Measures were administered at baseline and 4 months. Experimental group (n = 29) wrote about traumas whereas the control group (n = 24) wrote about summer activities for 20 min on three different days. Compared groups on negative emotion- and cognition-related word use. Tested change in negative emotion- and cognition-related word use as predictors of outcomes in experimental group. Consistent with hypotheses, experimental group used more negative emotion words [F(1, 53) = 77.55, p < .001] and cognition-related words than control group [F(1, 53) = 19.09, p < .001] and an increase in cognition words predicted Physical Health Summary Score on SF-36 (standardized = .37, p < .05). A decrease in negative emotion words was related to Physical Health Summary Score on SF-36 only when entered into regression with change in cognition words (standardized = –.31, p < .05). A decrease in negative emotion together with an increase in cognitive processing facilitated by written emotional disclosure has beneficial effects on physical health-related quality of life.     

Steep Cliff Arguments

In recent philosophical debates a number of arguments have been used which have so much in common that it is useful to study them as having a similar structure. Many arguments – Searle's Chinese Room, for example – make use of thought experiments in which we are told a story or given a narrative context such that we feel we are in comfortable surroundings. A new notion is then introduced which clashes with our ordinary habits and associations. As a result, we do not bother to investigate seriously the new notion any further. I call such an arrangement, which is perhaps a variation of the fallacy of presumption, a Steep Cliff argument. One remedy for the misdirection of a Steep Cliff argument is to tell a counterstory from the point of view of the rejected notion.     

The Relation between Formal and Informal Logic

The issue of the relationship between formal and informal logic depends strongly on how one understands these two designations. While there is very little disagreement about the nature of formal logic, the same is not true regarding informal logic, which is understood in various (often incompatible) ways by various thinkers. After reviewing some of the more prominent conceptions of informal logic, I will present my own, defend it and then show how informal logic, so understood, is complementary to formal logic.