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81.
Palmyre M. F. Oomen 《Zygon》2003,38(2):377-392
The article begins at the intellectual fissure between many statements coming from neuroscience and the language of faith and theology. First I show that some conclusions drawn from neuroscientific research are not as firm as they seem: neuroscientific data leave room for the interpretation that mind matters. I then take a philosophical‐theological look at the notions of soul, self, and freedom, also in the light of modern scientific research (self‐organization, neuronal networks), and present a view in which these theologically important notions are seen in relation both to matter (brain) and to God. I show that religious insights expressed with soul and free will bear a remarkable resemblance to certain insights from neuroscience and the science of complex, self‐organizing systems, including emphasis on corporeality and emphasis on organization as a form of that corporeality, and that they also show an interesting parallel — albeit described in different terms — concerning the crucial role of a valuation principle that generates attraction. With that, the common‐sense idea that freedom simply is the same as indeterminism is refuted: freedom primarily means self‐determination. I bring to the fore that the self is not a static thing but a “longing.” Such longing springs from something, and it is the relationship to this source that constitutes the self. The main concern is to point out the crucial role of attraction with respect to being and to life, and to draw attention not only to the astonishing parallel on this point between Thomas Aquinas and Alfred North Whitehead but also to a surprising — albeit more implicit — analogy between these philosophical‐theological views and scientific theories of self‐organization (such as those concerning neuronal networks). In short, being attracted toward what appears as “good” is what constitutes us as selves and what thereby signifies the primary meaning of our freedom. 相似文献
82.
John Martin Fischer 《The Journal of Ethics》2004,8(2):145-177
I address various critiques of the approach to moral responsibility sketched in previous work by Ravizza and Fischer. I especially
focus on the key issues pertaining to manipulation.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
83.
84.
技术主义流行于 2 0世纪的工业社会之中 ,成为支配人们思维方式和生活方式的意识形态。“知识就是力量”的技术主义知识立论 ,在学理层面上消解了人的道德责任 ;技术意志取代人的自由意志 ,在伦理层面上消解了人的道德责任 ;社会生产领域和政治领域的标准化和科层制 ,在操作层面上颠覆了人的道德责任 ;人与自然关系问题上的人类中心主义拒斥了对自然的道德责任。 相似文献
85.
John Lemos 《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(4):468-482
In his recent book The Natural Selection of Autonomy , Bruce Waller defends a view that he calls "natural autonomy." This view holds that human beings possess a kind of autonomy that we share with nonhuman animals, a capacity to explore alternative courses of action, but an autonomy that cannot support moral responsibility. He also argues that this natural autonomy can provide support for the ethical principle of noninterference. I argue that to support the ethical principle of noninterference Waller needs either a libertarian or a compatibilist theory of autonomy. I then go on to argue that, contra Waller, the libertarian view is both compatible with Darwinism and able to make sense of how autonomous acts belong to the agents who perform them. Thus, I conclude that the libertarian position is a live option for Darwinians. If however, naturalism is taken to include a deterministic view of the universe (at least at the nonquantum level), as is often the case, then my article takes some strides in defending "Darwinian non–naturalism." 相似文献
86.
87.
Michael McKenna 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):3-13
In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist’s perspective a critical discussion of Four Views on Free Will by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer’s semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors’ objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed manipulation argument be resisted by contending that the agents in it are free and responsible. And I also argue against Vargas by challenging the sense in which his revisionist thesis differs from a position like Fischer’s and mine. I close by reflecting on the nature of desert. All seem to assume it is central to the debate, but what is it? 相似文献
88.
What are the differences between hypocrisy, change of mind, and weakness of will? Each typically involves a gap between word and deed, yet they do not seem morally equivalent. Moreover, they are intuitively different concepts, even though the conceptual boundaries between them are fuzzy. This paper explores diverse examples, attempting to identify elements which may be distinctive of each concept, with special attention to hypocrisy. It also provides a discussion of the appropriateness of such use of examples in moral philosophy. 相似文献
89.
Eleonore Stump 《The Journal of Ethics》1999,3(4):299-324
Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one's-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and leads to counter-intuitive results; or, if the supposition is acceptable, then it is possible to use it to construct a FSC in which there is no flicker of freedom at all. Either way, the flicker of freedom strategy is ineffective against FSCs. Since the flicker of freedom strategy is arguably the best defense of PAP, I conclude that FSCs are successful in showing that PAP is false. An agent can act with moral responsibility without having alternative possibilities available to her. 相似文献
90.
Harry Frankfurt 《The Journal of Ethics》1999,3(4):369-374
This essay consists in my replies to Professors John Martin Fischer, Patricia Greenspan, Eleonore Stump, Peter van Inwagen and Gary Watson regarding various aspects of my analysis of moral responsibility. 相似文献