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41.
Voin Milevski 《Philosophical Psychology》2017,30(1-2):44-57
The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them. 相似文献
42.
Christian Hengstermann 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2017,25(5):971-989
ABSTRACTThe Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen and the Chief of His Opinions, published anonymously in London in 1661, is the chief testimony of the renaissance of Origen in early modern Cambridge. Probably authored by George Rust, the later Bishop of Dromore in Ireland, it is the first defence of Origenism, and delineates a rational theology based upon the unshakable foundation of God’s first attribute, his goodness. Trespassing and falling away from God’s goodness, the souls forfeit their original ethereal bodies or ‘vehicles’ and come to inhabit lesser ones made of air and earth. Making responsible use of their freedom, however, they may climb up the ontological ladder again. Rust’s rational theodicy with its stress on God’s universal goodness and the pre-existent soul’s free will is a key document of the Cambridge Platonists’ deeply Origenian philosophy of religion. 相似文献
43.
Ursula Goodenough 《Zygon》2005,40(2):369-380
Abstract. Despite its rich and deepening panoply of empirical support, evolutionary theory continues to generate widespread concern. Some of this concern can be attributed to misunderstandings of the original concept, some to unfamiliarity with its current trajectories, and some to strongly held fears that it strips the human of cherished attributes. In this essay I seek to deconstruct such misunderstandings, lift up current concepts of what evolution entails, and address some of the existential issues it generates. 相似文献
44.
Gregory R. Peterson 《Zygon》2004,39(3):605-614
Abstract. Michael Spezio and Dennis Bielfeldt have each raised important issues with regard to my positions in Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences. In this article I respond to several of their criticisms, including issues of the nature of theology, my stance on epistemology and realism, and issues of physicalism, freedom, and determinism. 相似文献
45.
In this dialogue Derk Pereboom and Marcel Brass discuss the free will problem from the perspective of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. First, they give their opinion on how the two disciplines contribute to the free will problem. While Pereboom is optimistic regarding the contribution of science, Brass is more pessimistic and questions the usefulness of an empirical approach to the question whether free will exists or not. Then they outline their position on the free will problem. The idea of a transcendental agent is discussed in more detail. Furthermore, it is discussed whether free will scepticism is a politically, socially, psychologically viable position. Pereboom argues that promoting the idea of free will scepticism can have a positive impact on retributive emotions and the political practice regarding retributive punishment. Brass argues that retributive emotions are deeply rooted in evolution and therefore difficult to change via high-level beliefs about free will. Finally, the future of the free will debate is discussed. Both agree that the dialogue between philosophy and psychology should be intensified. Philosophy can benefit from taking empirical research more seriously. Psychology and neuroscience can benefit from philosophy by appreciating the sophistication and conceptual clarity of the philosophical debate. Both have to find a common language and define common problems that can be tackled from both perspectives. 相似文献
46.
This paper is a dialogue between Thalia Wheatley and Terence Horgan. Horgan maintains that philosophy is a broadly empirical discipline, and that philosophical theorizing about how concepts work treats certain intuitions about proper concept-usage as empirical data. He holds that the possibility of strong multiple realizability undermines the psychophysical identity theory. He holds that the concept of causation is governed by implicit contextual parameters, and that this dissolves Kim’s problem of “causal exclusion.” He holds that the concept of free will is governed by implicit contextual parameters, and that free-will attributions are often true, in typical contexts, even if determinism is true. Thalia Wheatley holds that the concept of multiple realizability hinges on the level of abstraction discussed and that neuroscientific data does not yet support multiple realizability of mental states from specific, high resolution brain states. She also holds that compatibilism redefines the concept of free will in ways that bear little resemblance to the common understanding―that of being free to choose otherwise in the moment. She maintains that this folk understanding is incompatible with the brain as a physical system and is not rescued by concepts of context and capacity. 相似文献
47.
48.
Herbert Fingarette 《Current Psychology》2008,27(1):1-5
In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can,
however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal
processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice.
Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about
the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism. 相似文献
49.
Richard M. Glatz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):257-272
Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible
for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an
agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent
lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism
and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the
grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening
of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative
to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically
fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle
to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability
to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that
Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.
相似文献
Richard M. GlatzEmail: |
50.
David L. Rennie 《Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy》2007,37(1):53-58
Reflexivity has been defined as self-awareness, and radical reflexivity as awareness of self-awareness. Based on a qualitative
research study of the client's experience of psychotherapy, clients’ reflexivity and radical reflexivity are applied to the
concepts of moral evaluation and freedom of will. These concepts in turn are related to psychotherapy clients’ relationship
with self and with the therapist. It is shown how the nature of these relationships provides a rationale for decisions on
the appropriateness of the therapist's direction of the therapeutic process. In addition, specific interventions to offset
the power differential between the client and therapist are specified. It is concluded that unconscious determinants of experience
and action notwithstanding, clients’ self-aware agency plays a significant role in their engagement in therapy.
相似文献
David L. RennieEmail: |