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251.
Takayuki Yagi 《Reformation & Renaissance Review》2020,22(1):64-79
ABSTRACTTo establish his vision of theology as the doctrine of ‘living to God,’ William Ames, the English puritan theologian exiled in The Netherlands, strongly emphasized the will as the seat of faith. This prominence has often been interpreted as an extreme version of voluntarism eliminating the intellective elements altogether and regarded as something outside mainstream, Reformed orthodoxy. However, when analysed through the distinction between habit and action, it will be clear that Ames’s emphatic statements on the will reflect his concern for the singularity of virtue, and that he did assign some roles to the intellect in terms of the action of faith. Therefore, the difference over the question of the seat of faith is highly technical in nature and should not be exaggerated. Ames argued for the priority of the will over the intellect by drawing from Scotist sources, which was compatible with the Thomistic idea of premotion. 相似文献
252.
Daniel I. Harris 《Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology》2020,51(3):247-258
ABSTRACT Nietzsche values intellectual honesty, but is dubious about what he calls the will to truth. This is puzzling since intellectual honesty is a component of the will to truth. In this paper, I show that this puzzle tells us something important about how Nietzsche conceives of our pursuit of truth. For Nietzsche, those who pursue truth occupy unstable ground, since being honest about the ultimate reasons for that pursuit would mean that truth could no longer satisfy the important human needs it satisfies at present. We can pursue truth, or be honest about what in us is served by such a pursuit, but not both. Nietzsche aims to show that understanding and owning up to this instability is the sort of affirmation of human life to which we ought to aspire, and is the price we pay for being free from otherworldly morality. 相似文献
253.
The ability to engage in counterfactual thinking (reason about what else could have happened) is critical to learning, agency, and social evaluation. However, not much is known about how individual differences in counterfactual reasoning may play a role in children's social evaluations. In the current study, we investigate how prompting children to engage in counterfactual thinking about positive moral actions impacts children's social evaluations. Eighty-seven 4-8-year-olds were introduced to a character who engaged in a positive moral action (shared a sticker with a friend) and asked about what else the character could have done with the sticker (counterfactual simulation). Children were asked to generate either a high number of counterfactuals (five alternative actions) or a low number of counterfactuals (one alternative action). Children were then asked a series of social evaluation questions contrasting that character with one who did not have a choice and had no alternatives (was told to give away the sticker to his friend). Results show that children who generated selfish counterfactuals were more likely to positively evaluate the character with choice than children who did not generate selfish counterfactuals, suggesting that generating counterfactuals most distant from the chosen action (prosociality) leads children to view prosocial actions more positively. We also found age-related changes: as children got older, regardless of the type of counterfactuals generated, they were more likely to evaluate the character with choice more positively. These results highlight the importance of counterfactual reasoning in the development of moral evaluations.
Research Highlights
- Older children were more likely to endorse agents who choose to share over those who do not have a choice.
- Children who were prompted to generate more counterfactuals were more likely to allocate resources to characters with choice.
- Children who generated selfish counterfactuals more positively evaluated agents with choice.
- Comparable to theories suggesting children punish willful transgressors more than accidental transgressors, we propose children also consider free will when making positive moral evaluations.