Autonomy and Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau’s General Will

Rousseau’s project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have seen Rousseau’s ideas as a prelude to communitarianism or authoritarianism, we should instead see his project as articulating an alternative model of moral-cognitivist reasoning. In order to provide a framework for this interpretation, I propose reading his conception of the general will through the theory of collective intentionality and social ontology. I end with a consideration of how this interpretation of the general will can provide a more satisfying understanding of political and practical rationality contemporary debates over republicanism and liberalism.     

Truthfulness and the permissibility of Falsehood in the Jewish tradition

Abstract

In this article, I deal with the concept of truth and lie in Jewish traditional literature, examining its development in the Hebrew Bible and rabbinic literature. An essential aspect in understanding this concept is the dualism of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ impulses and the free will of human beings, who were created in the image of God and have the choice to decide between right and wrong.     

Free will perceptions,religious coping,and other mental health outcomes in caregivers of individuals with dementia

Caring for a person with dementia often results in depression, anxiety, and reduced quality of life (QoL). Pinpointing beliefs and practices that reduce this distress is imperative. The current study tested the hypotheses that greater free will perceptions and religious coping would be associated with greater QoL and other mental health indicators in a sample of 107 dementia caregivers. The results of regression and content analyses supported the expectation that free will and religious coping would be associated with greater QoL. Relationships also emerged among free will perceptions, religious coping, anxiety, and depression. Clinical implications are discussed.     

Hard incompatibilism and its rivals

In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.

康德宗教哲学对我们的启示

在这个演讲里,笔者试图从康德的哲学与宗教观里发现西方文化的心理镜像结构,并以此来参照对比中国文化的心灵结构,结合个人的经验对二者都有所论衡。     

人际责任归因与助人意愿的关系

人际责任归因研究是归因研究与责任推断相结合的一个新领域,它将归因理论应用于对他人失败行为的责任分析之中,为行为责任的推断提供了一个崭新的视角。本研究结合助人行为探讨人际责任归因与助人意愿之间的内在联系,204名教育硕士生和大学生被试参与了此项研究,并通过EQS建立了有关归因的控制性、情感反应、责任推断以及助人行为之间关系的结构方程模型。研究结果支持Weiner的人际责任归因理论假设,并且表明在归因与助人意愿关系模型中责任推断与情感反应是双向的而非单向的关系。     

Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: The Use and Abuse of Examples

The philosophical debate over the compatibility between causaldeterminism and moral responsibility relies heavily on ourreactions to examples. Although we believe that there is noalternative to this methodology in this area of philosophy, someexamples that feature prominently in the literature are positivelymisleading. In this vein, we criticize the use that incompatibilistsmake of the phenomenon of ``brainwashing,' as well as the Frankfurt-styleexamples favored by compatibilists. We provide an instance of thekind of thought experiment that is needed to genuinely test thehypothesis that moral accountability and causal determinism arecompatible.     

TAKING SCIENCE SERIOUSLY WITHOUT SCIENTISM: A RESPONSE TO TAEDE SMEDES

In responding to Taede Smedes, I first examine his thesis that the recent dialogue between science and religion has been dominated by scientism and does not take theology seriously. I then consider his views on divine action, free will and determinism, and process philosophy. Finally I use the fourfold typology of Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration to discuss his proposal for the future of science and religion.     

Free Choice

In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can, however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice. Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism.     

Fischer’s Way: The Next Level

I present an analogy between analytic philosophy and a particular sort of computer game, and analyze some aspects of John Martin Fischer's My Way in the light of this analogy. I set out the different levels of the free will question, and explore how well Fischer does on them. On the compatibility level, he succeeds, in my view, in confronting the "metaphysical challenge" and the "manipulation challenge", but does less well with the "moral arbitrariness challenge". The compatibilist perspective captures only part of the moral and personal truth on the compatibility issue, and is shown to be inherently shallow. On the next levels we see that Fischer confronts particular dangers: the very virtues that make his minimalist position so resilient on the second (compatibility) level, render it too impoverished when it comes to the third, which asks about the very importance of taking moral responsibility seriously. Connecting to other positions (such as P.F. Strawson's version of naturalism) may be an imperative, but would also be risky. Likewise, on the fourth level, where we confront the difficulty of deciding how to deal with the previous conclusions, it is doubtful how well Fischer can do, given his previous philosophical commitments.