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181.
Stephen P. Schwartz 《New Ideas in Psychology》2009,27(1):18-31
Soritic thinking based on reasoning that is involved in the sorites paradox plays a crucial role in some forms of weakness of will. Such soritic reasoning leads to failures of behavior, but cannot be shown to be irrational by standard means. Thus weakness of will appears to be rational, whereas strength of will is irrational when viewed soritically. The puzzle is how to undermine weakness of will and expose it as irrational. Even though such weakness of will is not moral, moral-type reasoning involving the principle of equality can be brought to bear. Weakness of will can also be seen to be analogous to free-rider problems and the prisoner's dilemma. 相似文献
182.
Marcelo Fischborn 《Philosophical Psychology》2017,30(1-2):198-201
In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their conclusion, despite being sympathetic to a lot of what they say in support of it. 相似文献
183.
D. Justin Coates 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2017,25(4):799-822
Although Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ was published over fifty years ago and has been widely discussed, its main argument is still notoriously difficult to pin down. The most common – but in my view, mistaken – interpretation of Strawson’s argument takes him to be providing a ‘relentlessly’ naturalistic framework for our responsibility practices. To rectify this mistake, I offer an alternative interpretation of Strawson’s argument. As I see it, rather than offering a relentlessly naturalistic framework for moral responsibility, Strawson actually develops a transcendental argument, which grounds our moral responsibility practices in the practical perspective of social agents. However, the aims of this essay are not purely interpretative. Strawson’s essay continues to have important implications for a number of issues that arise in the contemporary debates that concern free will and moral responsibility. In particular, it puts significant pressure on moral responsibility sceptics like Derk Pereboom [Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001] who think that the truth of moral responsibility scepticism has no worrisome implications for our lives with others. 相似文献
184.
185.
Matthew A. Leisinger 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2017,25(4):642-662
In sections 2.21.23–25 of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke considers and rejects two ways in which we might be ‘free to will’, which correspond to the Thomistic distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. In this paper, I examine Locke’s arguments in detail. In the first part, I argue for a non-developmental reading of Locke’s argument against freedom of exercise. Locke’s view throughout all five editions of the Essay is that we do not possess freedom of exercise (at least in most cases). In the second part, I argue that, when Locke asks whether we possess freedom of specification, his question is intentionally ambiguous between two readings, a first-order reading and a higher-order reading. Locke’s view is that, on either reading, we do not possess freedom of specification (at least in any interesting sense). 相似文献
186.
187.
A. A. Howsepian 《Sophia》2007,46(3):217-236
It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents
to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would
not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of
evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those
myriad possible worlds that are populated only by compatibilist free creatures. The primary thesis of this essay is that none
of these propositions is true. This thesis is defended by appealing to a recently proposed novel, acausal, composite, unified
theory of free action – the Theory of Middle Freedom – that evades the central problems plaguing traditional theories of metaphysical
compatibilism.
相似文献
A. A. HowsepianEmail: |
188.
Jason Brennan 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):207-217
Carl Hoefer has argued that determinism in block universes does not privilege any particular time slice as the fundamental
determiner of other time slices. He concludes from this that our actions are free, insofar as they are pieces of time slices
we may legitimately regard as fundamental determiners. However, I argue that Hoefer does not adequately deal with certain
remaining problems. For one, there remain pervasive asymmetries in causation and the macroscopic efficacy of our actions.
I suggest that what Hoefer may have shown us is that causation, not determinism, was the threat to free will all along. Additionally,
Hoefer might avoid the problem of the asymmetry of macroscopic efficacy by noting we have a very small region of space-time
completely determined by our choices. However, this move implies our freedom to act is freedom to do very little, given that
the region is trivial. I suggest that Hoefer should instead claim that we do have pervasive macroscopic efficacy toward the
past, though I am unsure of how well this thesis works. Regardless, there remains a problem that the inside-out perspective
requires us to see our choices as brute facts or random occurrences. Attempts to resolve this problem seem to require either
a theory of agent causation or a traditional compatibilist argument, making Hoefer’s thesis extraneous, unless he can show
us that these require the inside-out perspective. However, Hoefer has not yet shown us this, so there is work to be done.
相似文献
Jason BrennanEmail: |
189.
Robert E. Ulanowicz 《Zygon》2007,42(4):945-960
The prevailing common assumptions about how nature behaves have their origins in the early Enlightenment. The notion of emergence does not sit comfortably within this framework. Emergence appears virtually impossible within a world determined by ineluctable and unwavering natural laws. But the variety and combinations inherent in living systems render physical laws indeterminate. The study of ecological dynamics suggests that processes rather than laws are what accounts for most order seen in the living realm. As a consequence, there are aspects of ecological dynamics that violate each of the Newtonian postulates. The dynamics of ecosystems suggest a smaller set of rational assumptions through which to view nature—an “ecological metaphysic.” Emergence appears as a rare but wholly natural phenomenon within the new rational platform. In addition, several apparent conflicts between science and theism that arose under the Newtonian framework simply vanish under the new perspective. 相似文献
190.
Oisín Deery 《Res Publica》2007,13(3):209-230
In this paper, I argue that ‹moral responsibility’ refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately
morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But,
second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy,
once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires
that we are ultimately morally responsible. I contend that this practice must, on grounds of justice, be tempered by adequate
consideration of the fact that we are not ultimately morally responsible. My proposal in this regard is that blaming be replaced
by admonishment.
I would like to thank Dr. Cara Nine and Dr. David Hemp (University College Cork), and the two anonymous referees at Res Publica
for their helpful comments on this paper. 相似文献