What's Wrong With Methodism?

I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one's justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one's being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one's justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one's being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue that we should reject DGP and methodism roughly because these views imply that many of us do not know epistemic propositions that we do know. This point is made by Roderick Chisholm in The Problem of the Criterion and challenged by Robert Amico. I consider Chisholm's arguments and Amico's objections. Finally, I argue that even if we reject DPJ and methodism, we need not embrace particularism, since we could reject both DPJ and DGP.     

Fostering Creativity in Philosophy

The American Philosophical Association suggests that studying philosophy can have an important impact on one's creative thinking ability. This paper abstracts from the empirical research on creativity a reasonable model of creative thinking, and discusses what the account implies about fostering creative thinking in philosophy courses. Given the empirical research on creativity and the nature of philosophy, studying philosophy can have an important impact on one's creative thinking ability, but faculty need to focus on it in their courses.     

Book Reviews

Joseph Margolis, Historied Thought, Constructed World: A Conceptual Primer for the Turn of the Millennium
Steven W. Laycock, Mind as Mirror and the Mirroring of Mind
John Lachs, The Relevance of Philosophy to Life
William Joseph Gavin, Cuttin' the Body Loose: Historical, Biological, and Personal Approaches to Death and Dying
Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics     

CHRISTIAN AND BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVES ON NEURO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN PERSON: PNEUMA AND PRATITYASAMUTPADA

Abstract. Recent discussions of the mind‐brain and the soul‐body problems have been both advanced and complexified by the cognitive sciences. I focus explicitly here on emergence, supervenience, and nonreductive physicalist theories of human personhood in light of recent advances in the Christian‐Buddhist dialogue. While traditional self and no‐self views pitted Christianity versus Buddhism versus science, I show how the nonreductive physicalist proposal regarding human personhood emerging from the neuroscientific enterprise both contributes to and is enriched by the Christian concept of pneuma (spirit) and the Buddhist concept of pratityasamutpada (codependent origination).     

时间人格的结构与功能

时间人格是个体对时间情境稳定的适应倾向及能力特征, 其主要功能是适应时间情境并影响身心健康。已有的研究从时间洞察力、时间定向、时间管理、时间紧迫感、拖延性等方面对时间人格进行了探讨, 最近的研究则转向构建综合的时间人格结构模型。本文针对时间概念、时间人格概念和研究范式的争论, 提出未来的研究应继续完善时间人格结构模型, 加强外部影响因素研究, 补充过程研究、质性研究和跨文化研究, 并在进化论、文化学和脑科学方面获取支持。     

Book Review

Book reviewed:
Eva Feder Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency     

How to Make Naturalism Safe for Supernaturalism: An Evaluation of Willem Drees's Supernaturalistic Naturalism

Naturalism is often considered to be antithetical to theology and genuine religion. However, in a series of recent books and articles, Willem Drees has proposed a scientifically informed naturalistic account of religion, which, he contends, is not only compatible with supernaturalistic religion and theology but provides a better account of both than either purely naturalistic or purely supernaturalistic accounts. While rejecting both epistemological and methodological naturalism, Drees maintains that ontological naturalism offers the best philosophical account of the natural world and that, in addition, it provides the opening for a supernaturalistic understanding of religion and theology, one that best fits the condition of epistemic and moral distance from the transcendent characteristic of religious wonderers and wanderers. In this paper I examine Drees's claim and argue that it is seriously flawed. I show that Drees's naturalism is, in fact, both methodologically and epistemologically naturalistic. I also show that his attempts to limit naturalism to the sphere of the natural world by means of the phenomena of limit questions and underdetermination fail. Arguing for a more optimistic, but also, I contend, more empirically accurate account of human epistemic and moral capacities, I propose a full-fledged scientifically based naturalistic account of theology.     

Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane,Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.     

Antecedents Of Trust: Establishing A Boundary Condition For The Relation Between Propensity To Trust And Intention To Trust

Two studies were conducted to examine the antecedents of intention to trust proposed by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman [1995, Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709–734]. In their model, intention to trust is influenced by the perceived characteristics of the trustee and the predisposition of the trustor. We found that perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee predicted an individuals intention to trust. Propensity to trust, that is, an individuals disposition to trust, correlated with intention to trust when information about trustworthiness was ambiguous, but did not correlate with intention to trust when information about trustworthiness was clear. The notion of strong and weak situations is used to argue that situational strength is a boundary condition of the relation between propensity to trust and intention to trust.     

Constant latent odds-ratios models and the mantel-haenszel null hypothesis

In the present paper, a new family of item response theory (IRT) models for dichotomous item scores is proposed. Two basic assumptions define the most general model of this family. The first assumption is local independence of the item scores given a unidimensional latent trait. The second assumption is that the odds-ratios for all item-pairs are constant functions of the latent trait. Since the latter assumption is characteristic of the whole family, the models are called constant latent odds-ratios (CLORs) models. One nonparametric special case and three parametric special cases of the general CLORs model are shown to be generalizations of the one-parameter logistic Rasch model. For all CLORs models, the total score (the unweighted sum of the item scores) is shown to be a sufficient statistic for the latent trait. In addition, conditions under the general CLORs model are studied for the investigation of differential item functioning (DIF) by means of the Mantel-Haenszel procedure. This research was supported by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant number 400-20-026.