汉语句子理解中语义分析与句法分析的关系

两个实验研究了中文句子理解中句法分析与语义分析的关系。实验1采用被试者自控阅读速度的方法,要求被试者对每个句子(合理句或不合理句)进行语法判断。结果表明,在歧义词(AW)和解歧词(DAW)上,合理句与不合理句的错误率存在显著差异,而反应时差异不显著。实验2研究了语境对句子理解的作用。结果表明,在有语境和无语境条件下,两类句子在歧义词和解歧词上的反应时,均有明显的差异。这些结果支持了句子理解中句法与语义加工的弱相互作用模型。     

强联觉的认知加工模型及其脑机制

联觉是当个体感受到一种感觉刺激的同时体验到其它感觉的现象, 主要分为强联觉和弱联觉两种。本文主要介绍了强联觉的各种类型及其相关脑机制的研究, 分析和比较了前人从结构和认知加工角度建构的多个强联觉理论模型, 总结了这些模型对强联觉现象脑神经机制的解释。同时本文还探讨了强联觉与其它(如注意、记忆、创造力等)认知加工过程的关系, 对弱联觉(即联觉隐喻)的研究进展和不足也进行了分析和总结, 指出未来对联觉的研究趋势应集中在弱联觉的研究上。     

BEYOND MATERIALISM: MENTAL CAPACITY AND NATURALISM,A CONSIDERATION OF METHOD

Abstract: This article challenges the neo‐Darwinist physicalist position assumed by currently prevalent naturalizing accounts of consciousness. It suggests instead an evolutionary (Deweyan) understanding of cognitive emergence and an acceptance of mental capacity as a phenomenon in its own right, differing qualitatively from, although not independent of, the physical and material world. I argue that if we accept that consciousness is an adaptation enabling survival through immediate individual intuition of the world, we may accept this metaphysics as a given. Methodological focus can then shift to investigating the, as yet untheorized, nature of consciousness itself as capacity/interconnectivity/potential. The article accepts Joseph Margolis's recent advocacy of a pragmatist approach that is “natural but not naturalizable” ( Margolis 2002 , 7), that is, an anti‐reductionist as opposed to an eliminativist position, but it seeks to develop this position further and to give it new direction.     

客体同维度特征的视觉工作记忆存储机制

客体理论认为视觉工作记忆的存储单位是客体, 人类能够把组成物体的所有特征整合成一个单元进行记忆, 不管这些特征是来自不同维度还是同一维度。然而同一维度多个特征可以被整合成客体记忆的结果只被少数研究证实, 大量研究发现同一维度的多个特征不能被整合记忆, 这形成了弱客体理论的基本观点。为了解决两大理论之间的争议, 本研究主要探究同维度特征能否被整合记忆。通过分析以往研究, 我们认为实验范式和物体意义两个因素可能是导致之前大部分研究没有发现维度内特征能够被整合记忆的原因。因此, 实验1采用回忆报告范式替代以往研究经常使用的变化觉察范式, 结果发现, 同一维度的多个特征难以被整合记忆。实验2以记忆无意义物体的特征为基线, 探究在记忆有意义物体的特征时是否可能将多个特征进行整合记忆。结果发现, 对于有意义物体的特征的记忆成绩并没有显著好于记忆无意义物体特征的成绩, 说明即使采用具有较强整合线索的有意义物体作为载体, 同一维度多个特征也难以被整合记忆。两个实验结果进一步支持了弱客体理论。     

Moral supervenience

Abstract

It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.     

THE UNSUITABILITY OF EMERGENCE THEORY FOR PENTECOSTAL THEOLOGY: A RESPONSE TO BRADNICK AND MCCALL

In this response to David Bradnick's and Bradford McCall's defense of Amos Yong's usage of emergence theory, we defend our previous argument regarding the tension between Yong's Pentecostal commitments and the philosophical entailments of emergence theory. We clarify and extend our previous concerns in three ways. First, we explore the difficulties of construing divine action naturalistically (i.e. natural divine causation). Second, we clarify the problems of employing supervenience in theology. Third, we show why Bradnick's and McCall's advice to Yong to adopt weak emergence is theologically costly. In conclusion, it is suggested that theologians within the science and religion dialogue should not fear, but recover, the language of supernaturalism and dualism.     

自省主体对Moore-型信息的处理与融合

The main task is to discuss the issue in belief dynamics in which philosophical beliefs and rational introspective agents incorporate Moorean type new information. First, a brief survey is conducted on Moore’s Paradox, and one of its solutions is introduced with the help of Update Semantics. Then, we present a Dynamic Doxastic Logic (DDL) which revises the belief of introspective agents put forward by Lindström &; Rabinowicz. Next, we attempt to incorporate Moorean type new information within the DEL (DDL) framework, as advised by van Benthem, Segerberg et al. Though we maintain the principle of “the primacy of new information” from the literature on traditional belief revision theory, several unsuccessful ways are also presented. We then conclude that some special kind of success (weak success) can still be found in those revision processes although absolute success does not hold. At last, the relevant problem of “learnability” is re-considered through weak success.     

The problem of extras and the contingency of physicalism

Perhaps all concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. Even so, it seems that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that physicalism, if true, is contingently true. In fact, many believe that the actual truth of physicalism allows metaphysically possible worlds duplicating the actual world in all physical respects while containing immaterial extras, e.g. ghosts, spirits, or Cartesian souls, that no physicalist would believe actually exist. Here I focus on physicalism regarding mentality and argue that the doctrine does not allow possible worlds that physically duplicate the actual world while differing mentally. By revealing what physicalism (regarding the mind) does not allow, this essay helps us get clear on what the view really amounts to and why it is contingent.     

Love,Value and Supervenience*

Abstract

People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non‐fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, the paper shows why it is difficult to combine with certain views on value. The main challenge comes from the idea that value judgments are universalizable. This view squares badly with the thought that the people whom we love are irreplaceable. Introducing the idea that properties may have different functions in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper determines what precisely it is about love that makes it hard to combine with universalizability. Moreover, it suggests two ways of meeting this challenge.     

THE METAPHYSICS OF DOWNWARD CAUSATION: REDISCOVERING THE FORMAL CAUSE

The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find it difficult to prove that higher‐order properties can be causally significant without violating the causal laws that operate at lower physical levels. They also face the problem of circularity and incoherence in their explanation. In our article we show that these problems can be overcome only if DC is understood in terms of formal rather than physical (efficient) causality. This breakdown of causal monism in science opens a way to the retrieval of the fourfold Aristotelian notion of causality.